THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A quarterly journal of philosophy

Volume XXXII, Number 2 JANUARY 1955

PROLEGOMENON TO ANY NATURAL SCIENCE WHICH CAN BE CALLED PHILOSOPHICAL
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Notes and Discussion, Book Reviews, Bibliography

Saint Louis University

The College of Philosophy and Letters and the Department of Philosophy, SAINT LOUIS

The Modern Schoolman *is a quarterly journal of philosophy, dedicated to furthering the work begun by the great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages.*

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is published in November, January, March, and May. Subscription price, $4.00 a year; foreign subscriptions, $4.20 a year; single copies, $1.25 each. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is indexed in the *Catholic Periodical Index*. Copyright, 1955, by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, Saint Louis, Missouri. Permission is required to reprint an article or part of an article.

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Entered as second-class matter December 1, 1923, at the post office at Saint Louis, Missouri, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on January 15, 1929.

Printed in the U.S.A. by E. W. Stephens Co., Columbia, Missouri

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G. W. R. Ardley

PROLEGOMENON TO ANY NATURAL SCIENCE WHICH CAN BE CALLED PHILOSOPHICAL

G. W. R. Ardley has his Master of Science degree from the University of Melbourne and was a Fellow of the Institute of Physics (London). He was formerly a lecturer in the University of Melbourne. He is the author of Aquinas and Kant: The Foundations of the Modern Sciences *(1950) and has written for the* Thomist.

How There Are Different Ways of Treating of Creatures

As well as the experience of individuals which suffices for the activities of the practical man, there is another and more universal knowledge of creatures which goes under the general name of *science.*[1] We find that creatures may be treated scientifically in four different ways:

α) as the theologian treats them; that is, in their relation to God.

β) as the metaphysical philosopher treats them; that is, in their own proper natures in the hierarchy of being, in continuity with metaphysical knowledge and illuminated with that knowledge.

γ) as the aberrant philosopher treats them; that is, truncated, mutilated, and debased by a fictitious separation from the hierarchy of being. The resulting science is either quite detached from metaphysics or associated with some pseudo-metaphysics. Such a science, being severed from the source of all science, is at the best precarious and at the worst false.

δ) as the categorial philosopher treats them, as in modern Kantian physics; that is, an external treatment in which nature is subjected to Procrustean transformations.

All are customarily spoken of as "science," but only α and β strictly merit the term, since they alone allow of *scientia.* As we descend from α the reality and unity diminish. The γ and δ sciences have no proper cohesion within themselves; they are accidental agglomerates with only

an artificial or conventional unity. While β is proper objective science, γ and δ are contingent human constructions.

How α Science Differs from β Science

St. Thomas distinguishes these sciences succinctly.[2] Christian faith, he points out, treats of creatures insofar as they reflect a certain likeness of God; but human philosophy considers them as such, so that the different parts of philosophy correspond to the different genera of things. For example, the Christian faith considers fire not as such but as created by God, subject to God, as representing the sublimity of God, and as being directed to Him in any way whatsoever. But the philosopher considers such things as belong to them by their own nature: for instance, that fire tends upwards.

The philosopher takes his argument from the proper causes of things; the believer, however, has recourse to the First Cause—for instance, because it has thus been delivered by God, or because it conduces to God's glory, or because God's power is infinite.

The teaching of faith is the highest wisdom, since it considers the highest cause. Human philosophy, or science, is by its nature the handmaiden; faith, the mistress.

The Character of the Real Sciences of Nature

The real sciences of nature, β, are concerned with studying the classes of things and the proper functions, activities, and properties which arise from their natures. Such sciences as botany and anatomy are substantially of this kind.[3] Real natural science is science proper, or *scientia.* The real sciences are continuous in a hierarchical manner with metaphysical knowledge; they relate to particular determinations

[1]Cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* I, 981a-b.

[2]"The philosopher and the theologian treat of creatures in different ways" (*Summa contra Gentiles,* II, cap. 4).

[3]However, since the seventeenth century, we rarely find the pursuit of a pure natural science β. Some admixture with γ science nearly always occurs in practice.

[4]It should be noted that the discourses of most modern Scholastic philosophers on the nature of the sciences are directed almost entirely to β sciences. The δ sciences require a radically different treatment.

[5]Cf. St. Thomas's basic dictum: "Grace does not destroy nature but perfects it" (*Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 1, a. 8).

of the more general and higher natures of things studied in metaphysics.

Things in nature can only be known to us by experience. The primary contingency of creation—that is, God's freedom to create any world—prevents our deduction of the structure of the world a priori from higher rational principles. On the other hand, metaphysical principles, which are of such a general character that they transcend the particular sciences, once established from experience, flow down, as it were, into the sciences of nature, illuminating and invigorating these sciences and guiding and informing philosophers in their explorations of the natural world.

The foundations of these β sciences were laid down once and for all by Aristotle; they have been refined and made more perfect by his successors.[4]

That the Real Sciences of Nature Form a Hierarchy

In the system of the *philosophia perennis* the sciences form a hierarchy from the most exalted sciences of God at the summit down to the humblest sciences of the terrestrial world of matter. Each science in the hierarchy has its proper place, its proper methods, its proper dignity, and its proper relations to its superior and inferior sciences. No science is independent, autonomous, or self-sufficient; nor is it servile or absorbed into other sciences, either higher or lower. The higher does not destroy the lower but perfects it.[5] So, for instance, the science of biology has its own proper place and value; it is neither worthless, as some excessively transcendental philosophers would imply, nor is it disguised physics and chemistry, as others would maintain.

The hierarchy of the sciences is analogous to the hierarchy in an army. The colonel is the fountain of authority; he delegates authority, proper functions, and responsibilities to his subordinates down to the humblest private soldier. Each rank has its proper subordinate place and function and its proper dignity; it is neither self-sufficient and insubordinate, nor is it weak and servile. The subtle difference between discipline and servility is the key to this whole matter.

How Profane Science Is Possible

Because creatures possess determinate natures there are determinate sciences. Plato was the first to grasp explicitly the general principle of the world hierarchy; he saw that the essence of justice is the fulfillment of this hierarchy of nature when each thing is in its right place. Plato, however, wandered into the wilderness of error by withdrawing too much of the being and dignity of the lower ranks in favor of the higher. He thus denied the possibility of proper sciences of creatures. Only in his old age, when he wrote the *Timaeus* and the *Laws,* did he succeed, to some degree, in emancipating himself from the fundamental aberration of his youth. In so doing, Plato drew near to the wisdom of his pupil Aristotle, a man of less talent, indeed, but of surer judgment.

Aristotle restored the proper gradation by allowing to creatures their determinate natures, albeit subordinate. By so doing he became the founder of the true system of the natural sciences. Through the ages, all who were concerned with the true natural sciences—the later Greek and Roman philosophers, the Jewish, Arab and the Christian doctors—quite properly built on the foundations laid by the Philosopher.

Aristotle, believing the world to be self-sufficient in its being and to have endured always, attributes the immutable order of the cosmos to the bonds of necessity. St. Thomas penetrates further into the matter. He takes up the Aristotelian principle that bodies possess proper determinate natures and activities, and recognizes this as a consequence of God having reason as well as will. God created freely. He gave proper natures to creatures for the greater glory of creation; and, since God is wise and just as well as powerful, He continues to respect these natures He has given and deals with creatures in accordance with their proper natures. Creatures are dependent, but they are not merely puppets. Hence we understand how profane science is possible; and we see, too, how the *philosophia perennis* accords with Christian faith.

The Origin and Character of the Detached Sciences of Nature

Unfortunately, many philosophers through the ages have failed fully to grasp the principle of the hierarchy of the world. Under the auspices of these aberrant philosophers the sciences were decapitated and detached from the hierarchical system and, as a consequence, have grown

into many strange distorted and mutilated forms, as might a state under an arbitrary dictatorship.

In the present historical cycle in Europe, detached γ sciences of nature began to break off from the matrix of the real β sciences in the fourteenth century with the rise of nominalism in the University of Paris.

The books of nature of the Philosopher had been spread widely through the universities of Latin Europe in the early years of the thirteenth century. The peripatetic principles were recognized by some, notably by St. Thomas, as the key to the problem of formulating a rational and unitary system of the world which would do justice to both faith and reason. Other doctors, however, particularly amongst the theologians, failed to assimilate Aristotle's principles, and an unhappy cleavage developed in the University of Paris between the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Theology. This cleavage steadily widened and fostered the growth of the disastrous nominalist system of philosophy, which came to dominate the university from the fourteenth century onwards.

The nominalist philosophers and theologians rejected the principle of the world hierarchy. For the unity-in-diversity of the hierarchy they substituted a dualist system; they viewed the world as divided into two separated and alien spheres, one the supernatural sphere of faith, and the other the natural sphere of reason. Hereafter in popular esteem faith and reason, the sacred and the profane, were left to go their separate ways; some gave their allegiance to one, some to the other somewhat in the spirit of Tertullian's rhetorical: "What is there in common between Athens and Jerusalem? What between the Academy and the Church?" On such a basis, though allegiance is given to both claims, it is not as a unity but as two separate departments; a dualistic doctrine of life has replaced the unity-in-diversity of hierarchy.

Out of this dichotomy the detached γ sciences made their appearance, notably in the cosmological theories of Buridan and Oresme and others of their school at Paris in the fourteenth century. The γ sciences gradually spread through European universities until by the seventeenth century they had largely displaced the Aristotelian β sciences. The final transition occurred in the seventeenth century when, in the

hands of Galileo, the detached γ physical science changed into the much more radical external Procrustean δ science. Only in the Spanish universities—notably in the University of Salamanca—where Aristotelian-Thomist schools continued to flourish, did the principle of the hierarchy of the sciences persist. Elsewhere in Europe pseudo-rationalism and pragmatism reigned supreme in the natural sciences.

While physical science changed from γ to δ in the seventeenth century, many other sciences remained, and still remain, in the state γ. Being severed from the hierarchy, they are no longer real sciences in the full sense of β, yet they have not undergone the radical transformation into external and autonomous Procrustean δ sciences. The science of zoology, as it is conventionally professed in modern times, is an example of such a semireal γ science.

These detached semireal γ sciences have been launched in great numbers in all fields in recent centuries by severance from the parent hierarchical stock. As a result of the diligence with which the γ sciences have been cultivated, they abound in particular facts of value; but in their decapitated, mutilated, and impoverished condition they contain much that is false, narrow, and obscurantist. Nevertheless, in many cases a comparatively small renovation would suffice to return the γ sciences to the hierarchical family.

How There Are Two Possible Philosophical Aberrations Affecting the Sciences

The *philosophia perennis* recognizes that the world is hierarchical in structure. God is at the pinnacle, and His creatures occupy a graded series of ranks under Him. They depend upon Him in every way while yet possessing their own proper natures and actions. This principle alone does justice to the world; it alone allows of the existence of the profane sciences.

However, this straight and narrow philosophical path is a most delicate one to tread; few philosophers have succeeded completely; most have strayed off the path and been caught in the traps and snares which abound on either hand. Only St. Thomas, it would appear, has been completely successful, and he had the experience of many centuries behind him reaching back to Aristotle and Plato.

[6]Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I; q. 115, a. 1.

[7]Plato *Republic* 516; cf. *Timaeus* 29 and 59 on physics as a "likely story."

In formulating the sciences of creatures there are two poles of possible error.

The first error is to withdraw from creatures their being and proper activity and to attribute all the activity in the world immediately to God. This is to absorb the world into God and to deny a proper objective science to creatures. What simulacrum of natural science there is, is thus servile and deflated.

This error is the direction in which Plato tends when he attributes sole reality to the world of transcendental forms and denies proper reality to creatures.[6] For Plato there is thus no proper physical science but only a memory of the common sequences of the passing shadows and a skill at conjecturing future events therefrom.[7]

So, too, with any philosopher who, in error regarding God's nature, regards the world as depending directly and solely on the divine will without reference to the divine reason. If the only answer to anything is "because God has willed it so," then we can have no science of nature, since there is nothing in nature of which to have a science. At most we could have a "science" of God's customary acts of will; this leaves us with the future as an insoluble enigma, since, if there is only the divine will, we can have no reason for any expectation of future events. A will having no reference to reason is entirely capricious. We must acknowledge a divine reason as well as a divine will if the world is to be intelligible.

The philosophical aberration of withdrawing too much of the being and activity from the lower world, whether in favor of the higher, or from any other motive, confronts us with the insoluble problem of understanding how the world is put together; that is, with what the nineteenth-century logicians called the "problem of induction" and what Plato had in mind when he called physical science "a probable story." On such an attenuated view of the world this problem has no solution.

The second error is to attribute to creatures too much autonomy and self-sufficiency, and hence to render the science of creatures inflated and anarchical.

This error is that to which all philosophers tend who diminish the role of God in the world, as by denying His existence or His Providence

or by assigning His function to that of creating the world at some point in past time, after which the world functions of itself like a machine.

The notion of a hierarchy in the world having been abandoned, there is a tendency to reduce all the sciences to one level, usually the lowest, in the spirit of Gresham's law that the baser currency drives out the better. Thus, for instance, there is a persistent tendency to reduce biology to physics and chemistry; that is, to explain away all the characteristics of living creatures as being merely complex physical and chemical processes. That biology is really an independent science is thus denied, although it may be granted a temporary seeming independence because the physical and chemical processes have not yet been fully worked out. Similarly throughout the sciences. Proper independence is denied, and the aim is the eventual reduction of all the sciences to one basic self-sufficient science, such as the science of atoms.

How the Two Errors Approach One Another

A remarkable fact concerning the Scylla and Charybdis of these two errors is that while they set out in opposite directions they tend toward, and join, one another. One becomes the other with chameleon-like ease.

Those who exalt the self-sufficiency of finite creatures, as in the second error, leave the first sources and reasons of things obscure—"something we know not what," as Locke puts it. This materialism readily passes into phenomenalism or positivism by the attenuation and disappearance of the unknown and unknowable basis of things. But this is now indistinguishable from the first error, which sees the world of sense as a mere procession of events issuing from an inscrutable deity or similar source.

The deficiency in the first error, which led Plato to deny that there could be any strict physical science but only a "probable story" and which left others with the insoluble problem of anticipating the arbitrary will of an omnipotent deity, becomes in the second error the popular "problem of induction," which so exercised the minds of the English empiricist philosophers and concerning which, principally, John Stuart Mill wrote his brilliant tour de force, *A System of Logic*,—really without hope or possibility of solution, since a solution is precluded by the premises.

Both errors lead to the disruption of the hierarchy of the world and hence to the severance and isolation of the sciences from their proper family, so that the sciences are changed from type β to the debased type γ. The first error "arises from some unjust" doctrine of the nature of God and His creatures, ostensibly to the greater glory of God but in truth to the diminution of His wisdom. The second error in its initial stages is very popular at all times; it manifests itself in various forms which may be described generically by such terms as "materialism," "mechanism," and "naturalism."

The classical exponent of the second error in ancient times was Anaxagoras, as witness Socrates's strictures in the *Phaedo*. In modern times, as we have seen, the initial stages of this error appeared in the fourteenth century, when the Parisian nominalists restricted the range of God's providence in formulating their cosmology; in their opinion, the universe, having been set in motion initially by God, runs thenceforth like a clock. By the nineteenth century the error was in full transition to the final stage; namely, the doctrines of "phenomenalism" or "positivism," whereby it converges to the first error.

Whether a science has passed down by the first error or the second, the result is the same: a descent of the science from its proper level to a debased level, an exile from the invigorating society of the patriarchal family of the sciences to a wilderness where confusion and error cast their grey pall.

The Character of the Procrustean Sciences: External and Internal Sciences

A detached γ science, deprived of metaphysical guidance, readily degenerates and becomes admixed with irrationalities. From this debased state it may, however, spring up again in a new guise; it may be transformed from debased metaphysics γ into the legitimate form of an external δ science, built up by the application of Procrustean-bed processes.[8] Thus the science of physics in the detached and metaphysically debased form given it by Buridan and Oresme and their successors was taken up in the seventeenth century by Galileo and

Newton and remade as a Procrustean science with the implicit charter of pragmatism. The aim of the new science from thenceforth was knowing how to perform operations rather than knowing what things are.

The δ science is an *external* science, while the β science is an *internal* science; the γ sciences are in part internal and in part external. The distinction between an internal and an external science was pointed out implicitly long ago by the eclectic eighteenth-century Italian jurist and philosopher, Vico.[9]

In sciences concerned with human beings, those which are currently termed the "social sciences," we have an insight into our subject such as we can never enjoy with inanimate nature. Facts elicited in the social sciences are illuminated by our own ability to participate in the phenomena; social introspection enables us to go far beyond mere exterior observation and penetrate to the essence; we can achieve an understanding of human behavior from a personal and internal point of view.[10]

In the natural sciences, on the other hand, the dim obscurity of matter resists our insight; our knowledge of the internal science of nature is slight compared with the deep introspective understanding which we have of human nature and behavior. The main lines of the intrinsic science of inanimate nature, so far as the human mind can penetrate its darkness, were made out by the Philosopher and refined by his successors. While blunt and shadowy compared with our insight into ourselves, the real science of nature yet has majesty and nobility. The structure of the cosmos as expounded in the *philosophia perennis* is no mean knowledge.

As we turn our gaze up the hierarchy of the world beyond men to more and more noble beings, our penetration becomes less and less owing to an *excess* of light; thus we can apprehend God but are too blinded with light to comprehend Him. As we direct our gaze down the hierarchy to the realms of corporeal and nonrational creatures we are hindered by a *defect* of light.

[8]See Gavin Ardley, *Aquinas and Kant, the Foundations of the Modern Sciences* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950).

[9]See his *Scienza Nuova* (Naples, 1725).

[10]On this intrinsically rational character of the social sciences, there may be consulted with profit the recent work of J. V. Langmead Casserby, *Morals and Man in the Social Sciences* (London, 1951), especially chap. 7.

Because of this limit to our possible knowledge of the *internal* science of inanimate nature, there is much encouragement to abandon the attempt to probe into the proper structure of the world and to take up instead a wholly different *external* treatment of nature. In the external science of nature we no longer pursue knowledge of the intrinsic character of things; we give up the aim of knowing nature as it is in itself; instead, we mold the physical world to our own superimposed patterns in order better to subjugate it to our purposes.

Vico detected the radical difference between the internal and the external sciences. It was Kant who first imperfectly recognized the mode of operation of the external sciences—how in the external sciences we do not find the laws but impose them upon our subject by the bed of Procrustes, how we thereby generate an artificial science of class δ. Kant was the penetrating if eccentric and stilted philosopher of externality. We may appropriately invoke his name to designate such science.

Human affairs are properly the field for the real internal science β, nourished by the higher principle of what the Philosopher felicitously termed "the first philosophy," more commonly known as "metaphysics." Sometimes, however, the social sciences are mistakenly and imperfectly cultivated in isolation at the lower semi-internal level γ—only semi-internal because, having severed the dependence on higher principles, we forgo the full attainable knowledge of the creature.

Attempts have even been made to extend the range of the extreme external sciences of class δ upwards into human affairs by continuing the Kantian method of externality and ignoring the vista of internality which bursts upon us when we rise above the brink of the lower kingdom into the realm of rational beings. Such attempts at creating and applying to human affairs an external imposed science in the Kantian manner meet with little success. The search for a "science" of history, social affairs, and so on, comparable with the modern science of physics, has achieved little. The free will of the rational being renders the externals of behavior too fluid and mutable for such a purpose. Only with man *en masse*, where general appetites and passions rule rather than reason and free will, does externality find a fruitful field.

Prolegomenon to any Philosophical Natural Science
G. W. R. Ardley

The Harmony of the Sciences

It will be seen that we may cultivate sciences α, β and δ simultaneously. Only class γ can have no lasting place. But to permit this harmony we must clearly recognize the peculiar character of δ. We must distinguish the sciences in order to unite them into a family.

Thus we may continue to profess the β physics of Aristotle and St. Thomas in order to understand the natural world. But in a secondary and ancillary manner we may continue to cultivate the vast and powerful extrinsic δ system stemming from Galileo.

The Future of the Procrustean Sciences

An external and artificial science, as physics has been since the seventeenth century, is directed toward higher utilitarian ends rather than toward the rational elucidation of nature. What is the future of such a pragmatic science? Will it continue to evolve indefinitely, or will it reach a limit? If it is approaching a limit, what relation will this limit have to the real internal science of nature?

The utilitarian is a species of "tail" belonging to the real sciences of nature, a tail which pertains to the lower ranks of the hierarchy of natural science, as in Plato's divided-line figure. The full contents of these lower divisions mark the upper attainable limit of utility. Hence, if external pragmatic physics could be developed far enough along its own utilitarian paths, we might anticipate that it would approach the characteristic state of these lower ranks of the hierarchy; that is, it would tend to develop the structure of a restricted and inferior image or simulacrum of the real physics. This limited system would be much inferior to, and more precarious than, real physics; but, for its lowlier purposes, it would be more specific than our present limited insight into nature allows us.

The historical career of the Kantian physics will thus consist of two phases; first, the sudden violent revolution whereby the external system was set up in the seventeenth century, the first tentative Kantian system being very different from the internal physics which preceded it; second, the evolutions of the Kantian physics in pursuit of its utilitarian goal. This evolution will generally tend toward, rather than away from, the principles of the internal system; but the road may be very long and winding. So, in politics, after a violent revolution, the

initial revolutionary order, whatever its vagaries, is generally found to evolve slowly into some measure of alignment with the natural order, impelled perhaps by only the most practical motives.

Kantian physics is essentially a temporary expedient, although its career may be long and brilliant. It has no proper inner nature and hence possesses no permanence as does a real science of nature. A Kantian science is doomed to ultimate extinction as it approaches its zenith by absorption into an Aristotelian science.

At the present time all speculation as to the condition of modern physics should be made with much caution. In several departments contemporary physical theories bear a closer formal resemblance to peripatetic doctrines than has been the case since the inception of modern physics in the seventeenth century. The system of wave mechanics, for instance, bears considerable *prima facie* resemblance to the Aristotelian doctrine of locomotion; some contemporary theories of cosmology have a bearing very different from the intransigent anti-Aristotelianism of the seventeenth-century cosmologists. It is tempting to suppose that these systems represent some measure of return to nature after Galileo and Newton virtually turned their backs on nature. Whether this approach is merely fortuitous, shortly to be canceled by some new evolution, or whether it is permanent only the future will reveal.

In the meanwhile the best course with regard to physical science is undoubtedly to adopt a conservative policy, to maintain the strict separation of the unchanging Aristotelian physics from the evolving Kantian physics whilst keeping in view the ultimate destination of the Kantian system.

Seventh Annual Meeting of the Missouri State Philosophy Association

LINUS J. THRO, S.J.

Enjoying the hospitality of the University of Missouri at Columbia, the Missouri State Philosophy Association met for the seventh time on Friday and Saturday, October 29 and 30. The programming, under the chairmanship of Arthur Berndtson, followed the pattern which has taken shape gradually since the reorganization of the association in 1948. Three independent historical papers were read and discussed Friday afternoon. One, by the Reverend Vincent F. Daues, S.J. (Rockhurst College, Kansas City), listed the failures of various attempts to establish realism by personal option; the second, by Charles R. Burton (Washington University), was an incisive exposition of the problems latent in Hobbes's conception of propositional truth; finally, there was a study, by Leslie M. Bates (Stephens College), of some of the themes in Whitehead's cosmological doctrine which reflect the influence of the *Timaeus*.

At the association dinner the address by the retiring president, Harold A. Durfee (Park College, Parkville), noted the growing concern in preceding meetings of this group with the problem of the starting-point of philosophy. He aligned current commitments to scientific method with faith and other initial assumptions, scouting the pretensions of so-called presuppositionless philosophies. Then, passing on to realism, he marked what seemed to him its failure to explore its own supposition that being is intelligible. Finally, he proposed, among other suggestions, that the relation between knowledge and faith should be given serious study. The ensuing discussion bade fair to continue all night.

The symposium Saturday morning on "The Objectivity of Values" was presented jointly by Leo Simons (University of Missouri), Huston Smith (Washington University), and the Reverend Linus J. Thro, S.J. (Saint Louis University). The papers, respectively, defended a hedonistic relativism, attempted a synthesis of the advantages of absolutism and relativism under the name of objective relativism, and proposed a relational norm of ethical value based on active tendency and its object. The lively discussion following turned largely upon the importance and possibility of establishing a sound basis for a normative ethics.

Huston Smith was elected president for the coming year. A vote of thanks was given Caroline G. Nations for her seven years of devoted service as secretary, and W. Donald Oliver (University of Missouri) was elected to assume her duties. The next meeting is to be at Park College, Parkville.

Henry G. Wolz

THE *REPUBLIC* IN THE LIGHT OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENSE OF PLATO'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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The condemnation of Plato, both as a thinker and as a man, has come to such a pass that writers of intellectual histories begin to record it almost as a matter of generally accepted fact, which requires little direct evidence or perhaps only a casual reference to a secondary source. The detractors aim their criticism mainly at Plato's political philosophy, especially as found in the *Republic,* the *Statesman,* and the *Laws.* These later dialogues they often contrast unfavorably with Plato's earlier works, such as the *Apology* and the *Crito,* which, they say, convey a faithful protrait of Socrates, for whose thought they have the highest praise.

George Sarton, for instance, regards the author of the *Republic* as a "disgruntled fanatic"[1] who was motivated by political despair; and he considers the *Laws* as the work of a disillusioned old man "full of political rancor, fearing and hating the crowd."[2] And since Plato, at least in the *Republic,* places views advocating the absolute supremacy of the state in the mouth of Socrates, "it was a betrayal not only of Athenian democracy, but of the master who had been his first guide and whom he loved."[3] Essentially the same opinion, although expressed with greater moderation, is maintained in Crane Brinton's *Ideas and Men.*[4] Here, too, Plato is accused of leaning toward absolute authoritarianism, strict indoctrination of the young, idealization of Sparta, hatred of the "vulgar world of common sense . . . trusting neither the intelligence nor the good will of the average man."[5] Even Herbert J.

Muller, who points out that Plato "thought habitually in terms of tale, myth, and symbol rather than dogma"[6] and who considers it unfair to regard Plato as a "Fascist philosopher," nevertheless thinks that "Plato was in line with Fascism in rejecting the principle of liberty and equality, tacitly denying the dignity and worth of the individual, and anticipating the technique of deliberately lying to the common people."[7]

Recently a few voices have been raised in defense of Plato. The most ambitious attempts in this direction are those of Professor John Wild of Harvard University[8] and Professor Ronald B. Levinson of the University of Maine,[9] whose books appeared during the past year. Both scholars—and particularly Professor Levinson—consider the various charges made by such men as Walter Fite,[10] R. H. S. Crossman,[11] A. D.

[1]George Sarton, *A History of Science* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952), p. 412.

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 409.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 419.

A similar view, reflecting the same contrast between Socrates and Plato, recently made its way even into the daily papers. On the occasion of the opening of his play *Barefoot in Athens*, Maxwell Anderson remarked in the *New York Times* as follows: "Socrates insisted that nothing could be taken for granted, that everything had to be taken apart and investigated . . . His notion of free, fearless and incorruptible inquiry set the pattern for all later speculation and experiment. . . . Plato . . . hated democracy . . . He poured his personal prejudices and convictions into the dialogues and since most of the words were put into Socrates' mouth, the result is defamation of character on an enormous scale, perpetrated by a man whose genius for language and thought made his libels deathless. . . . The philosophers of Plato's *Republic* act like thugs, for they murder, torture and use official lying without scruple to keep the population in line. The early dialogues, *Crito* and the *Apology*, were written without much trace of special pleading. The rest of Plato is mostly Plato's own repulsive doctrine with Socrates present only in name."

[4]Crane Brinton, *Ideas and Men* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 46.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 48.

[6]Herbert J. Muller, *The Uses of the Past* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952), p. 124.

[7]*Ibid.*, p. 127. Cf. also: "The Nazis derived their racial doctrines from Dr. Hans F. K. Guenther who in turn made no secret of his reliance on Plato's *Republic*" (Walter A. Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist and Anti-Christ* [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1950], p. 256).

[8]John Wild, *Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953).

[9]Ronald B. Levinson, *In Defense of Plato* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953).

[10]Walter Fite, *The Platonic Legend* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1934).

[11]Richard H. Crossman, *Plato Today* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1937).

[12]Alban D. Winspear, *The Genesis of Plato's Thought* (New York: Dryden Press, 1940).

[13]Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1950).

[14]*Republic* iv. 432. (*The* Republic *of Plato*, tr. Francis MacDonald Cornford [New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1945], p. 127). References to the *Republic* throughout the article are to this translation.

[15]*Ibid.*, iii. 412 (p. 103).

Winspear,[12] and K. R. Popper;[13] that is, by all those authors who are usually quoted by the more popular expositors of Plato's political philosophy. After stating the objections raised by these critics, Professors Wild and Levinson cite chapter and verse of Plato's dialogues in order to refute or at least mitigate their more extravagant claims.

Certainly their defenses are welcomed by all who have felt for some time that Plato was being presented in an unfair light. However, the unbiased reader who is unwilling to attribute attack to malice and defense to special pleading may be unable to rid himself of a feeling of uneasiness. Although these books will enlighten him in many respects and will undoubtedly shake his confidence in the accusers of Plato, he may nevertheless be seriously disturbed over the fact that the Platonic dialogues lend themselves to such divergent interpretations with so formidable an array of scholarship on either side of the debate.

This bewilderment may be sharply increased by the recollection of his own reading, however cursory, of Plato's *Republic.* For to find evidence in the *Republic* even for the most vehement charges of the accusers appears to be a simple matter. It is true, the beginning of the dialogue reveals nothing startling, but incriminating elements appear as soon as the discussion turns from a consideration of the just individual to the imaginative construction of a just or perfect state. Efficiency is of prime importance in such a state, and perhaps one cannot quarrel with the author of the *Republic* when he makes certain demands upon the individual to bring this condition about. "Everyone," he says, "ought to perform the one function in the community for which his nature best suited him."[14] Since Plato proposes only an ideal, it is perhaps not fair to insist that not merely the suitability but also the likes and dislikes of the individual should be taken into account. It can likewise be conceded that the rulers must be men who are able to regard the interests of the community as if they were their own.[15] But when the further requirement is imposed that the guardians and the auxiliaries are to be deprived of the right to accumulate wealth or hold private property, one of the young men becomes alarmed. "You are not making these people particularly happy," he exclaims; "they seem like nothing so much as a garrison of mercenaries posted in the city

and perpetually mounting guard."[16] In connection with the proposal that wives and children are to be in common and that children should be taken away from their parents after birth and brought up by officials,[17] one would at least like to see the question raised as to the effect on human nature, especially upon children, of such a radical innovation leading to the abolishment of all family ties. And when the regulation of marriage is being discussed, the Socratic spirit seems to have disappeared altogether. Here we have unmitigated interference with the most intimate affairs of the individual and authoritarianism of the worst sort which does not shrink from deception to achieve its ends:

> If we are to keep our flock at the highest pitch of excellence, there should be as many unions of the best of both sexes, and as few of the inferior, as possible, and that only the offspring of the better unions should be kept. . . . And again, no one but the Rulers must know how all this is being effected; otherwise our herd of Guardians may become rebellious. . . . I think they will have to invent some ingenious system of drawing lots, so that, at each pairing off, the inferior candidate may blame his luck rather than the Rulers.[18]

At this point it is difficult to conceive how even the most sympathetic reader can accept Professor Wild's view that the *Republic* is an ideal city "in which the Socratic spirit might find itself a home."[19] Nor is it likely that such a reader's misgivings would be allayed by Professor

[16] *Ibid.*, iv. 419 (p. 109).

[17] *Ibid.*, v. 457 (p. 156).

[18] *Ibid.*, v. 459-60 (pp. 159-60).

[19] *Plato's Modern Enemies*, p. 31.

[20] *In Defense of Plato*, p. 552.

[21] *Laws* v. 730. (*The Dialogues of Plato*, tr. B. Jowett [2 vols. New York: Random House, 1937], II, 498. All references to works other than the *Republic* are to this edition of the Jowett translation.)

[22] "Some scholars still argue that the *Republic* is not primarily the work of the aging Plato but contains much of the thought of Socrates. Since I am not in a position to settle the issue, I am content merely to point to the unmistakable difference between the Socrates of the *Apology* and the Socrates of the *Republic*. The former does not know all the answers but teaches men to keep asking first and last questions, insisting that 'the unexamined life is not worth living'; he chose to die rather than to sacrifice his own conscience to the State. The latter not only is more dogmatic but prescribes an unexamined life for almost all of his citizens; he lays down principles that justify the execution of the historic Socrates" (Muller, *Uses of the Past*, p. 128, n. 12).

"The Socratic dialogues—*Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Criton*—as well as the *Apology*, were Plato's first writings, when he was completely under Socrates' influence and tried to reproduce faithfully the latter's thought" (Sarton, *History of Science*, p. 405). Cf. also n. 3 above.

[23] *Crito* 50-51 (I, 435). (Italics are mine.)

Levinson's observation that when Plato admits "the occasional medicinal lie . . . his fundamental aim is the inculcation of truth, and he has at heart not some external cause or selfish interest, but the good of the citizens themselves."[20] One would rather expect him to side with Plato's own pronouncement in the *Laws* to the effect that "he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool."[21]

Let us first try to answer the question why passages supporting such radically opposed views can be culled from the Platonic texts. The dogmatic, fanatical attitude which certainly pervades at least some portions of the *Republic* is often contrasted unfavorably with the spirit of free and fearless inquiry so characteristic of Plato's earlier writings, especially the *Apology* and the *Crito*.[22] But let us suppose for a moment that someone not too familiar with Plato had heard of the distinction between the early and the later writings and were then confronted with the following passage:

> Can you deny in the first place that you are our *child and slave,* as your father was before you? And if this is true *you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you.* Would you have a right to strike or revile or do any other evil to your father or your master, if you had one, because you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands? . . . Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued as higher and holier than mother or father or any ancestor . . . and if she leads us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right; neither may anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank, but *whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him . . .*[23]

Here the relationship of citizen to state is likened to that of child to father or slave to master; the rights of the individuals are completely denied and the supreme virtue is made out to be unquestioning obedience to the commands of the ruler. Our imaginary reader could hardly be expected to associate this quotation with the *Crito,* and yet from this dialogue it is taken. The same could probably be said to hold true of

another quotation from the same dialogue:

> But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the state and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong; first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands.[24]

And we must not forget that this constitutes Socrates's answer to the objection: "Yes, but the state has injured us and given us an unjust sentence."[25] Does this mean that the state can do no wrong and that the individual must submit to its dictates whether he be guilty or innocent?

A similar impression could be created by quoting from the *Apology*:

> For wherever a man's place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; he should not think of death or anything.[26]
>
> Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer of death, and *know of a certainty,* that no evil can befall a good man, either in this life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods.[27]

In the first passage we find again the insistence on absolute obedience to the commands of those in authority; and in the second, a pronouncement about man's destiny, which in its dogmatism is altogether out of keeping with the skeptical, questioning attitude of Socrates as allegedly portrayed in the early dialogues.

Again, when Herbert Muller claims that Plato was "disdainful of ordinary human nature"[28] and Crane Brinton maintains that "Plato trusted neither the intelligence nor the good will of the average man,"[29]

[24] *Ibid.*, 51-52 (I, 435-36).
[25] *Ibid.*, 50 (I, 434).
[26] *Ibid.*, 28 (I, 411-12).
[27] *Ibid.*, 41 (I, 423). (Italics are mine.)
[28] Muller, *Uses of the Past*, p. 129.
[29] Brinton, *Ideas and Men*, p. 48.
[30] *Crito* 48 (I, 432).
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] *Ibid.*, 22 (I, 406).
[33] "If you say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Anytus, and you shall be let off, but upon one condition, that you are not to enquire and speculate in this way any more, and that if you are caught doing so again you shall die;—if this was the condition on which you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honour and love you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy" (*ibid.*, 29 [I, 412]).

both men would no doubt have us look to the *Republic* for evidence; and yet that same distrust is manifest in the *Crito,* one of the so-called "Socratic" dialogues:

> Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us: but what he, the one who has understanding of the just or unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when you advise that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable . . .[30] The multitude . . . would be as ready to restore people to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death—and with as little reason.[31]

It would, of course, be foolish to appeal to these isolated utterances as support for the view that the *Apology* and the *Crito* are dominated by the same authoritarian and dogmatic spirit which is so conspicuous in the *Republic.* These quotations are taken out of context, and it would be an easy matter to cite overwhelming evidence in favor of the contrary position. It is quite clear from the *Crito,* for instance, that Plato does not set one social caste over another but that he simply distrusts those who refuse to follow reason. To be guided by reason presupposes detachment, freedom from prejudice, self-discipline; that is, qualities which only the very few possess. From the *Apology* it appears that it is not the "masses" in the modern sense upon which he heaps ridicule through his questioning but the politicians, the poets, the rhetoricians, when they claim to be wise while they are really ignorant, and the artisans when they think that "because they are good workmen . . . they also know all sorts of high matters."[32]

Likewise the notion of state supremacy can easily be dispelled. In the *Apology* Socrates relates how he defied the "Thirty" who tried to implicate him in their crimes and how he would have lost his life had the oligarchy not soon after been overthrown. And in the same dialogue he defies the Athenians when he says that he will not be silenced and that he will obey God rather than men.[33] In the *Crito* the spirit of free inquiry is raised to the status of a principle of conduct, for when Crito suggests that Socrates prepare to escape, Socrates appeals neither to impulse nor to duty to obey the law but to the intelligence

of the individual man:

> And therefore we ought to consider whether I shall or shall not do as you say. For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best. And now that this chance has befallen me, I cannot repudiate my own words.[34]

The first passage cited from the *Crito,* in which Socrates refers to the citizen as the slave of the state,[35] can, without difficulty, be brought in line with the general spirit of the dialogue. Instead of ending with the words, "whether in battle or in a court of law, or any other place, he must do as his city and his country order him," we simply need to continue for another three-fourths of a line: "or he must change their view of what is just." The second quotation, which ends with the words "he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands," can be restored by a similar addition: "and we [the laws] do not rudely impose our commands, but give him the alternative of obeying or *convincing* us."[36] In both instances there is great emphasis on the importance of the laws and the danger of disregarding them, but there is at the same time a saving clause at the end of the passage preventing the law from becoming absolute and placing the responsibility for obeying or disobeying it squarely on the shoulders of the individual. In exactly the same way, Socrates seems to demand blind obedience when he says in the *Apology,* "Wherever a man's place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; he should not think of death or anything." Then the words "save disgrace"[37] are added, which again make room for the individual's conscience as the ultimate judge.

The purpose of the foregoing analysis is not, of course, to establish a new theory with reference to these early works but simply to show the ease with which Plato's pronouncements, even in the "Socratic" dialogues, whose undogmatic character is generally recognized, can be transformed from manifestations of a liberal spirit to expressions of

[34] *Ibid.,* 46 (I, 430).

[35] Cf. *supra,* p. 119.

[36] Cf. *supra,* p. 120. (Italics are mine.)

[37] Cf. *supra,* p. 120. Cf. also: ". . . the historical Socrates . . . felt compelled by his conscience as well as by his religious beliefs, to question all authority" (Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies,* p. 67).

[38] *Statesman* 294 (II, 322).

authoritarianism. As indicated, this effect can be produced by the simple process of taking statements out of context and suppressing what seem to be a few relatively insignificant words just before the phrases come to an end. In the *Apology* and the *Crito* there is little danger of such distortion and consequent misrepresentation. The Socratic method is much in evidence both from explicit statements and from the dramatic actions of Socrates. And since, according to this method, the student is merely to be aided in working out the solution for himself, it is obvious to almost everyone that no isolated statement can be regarded as a view of Socrates. This danger is not so easily avoided in the less dramatic and more complicated dialogues, especially if the general tenor and significance of the whole work is not always clearly kept in mind.

Now those who condemn the *Republic* usually seek support in the *Statesman* and the *Laws*. They rightly stress the fact that in these dialogues Plato presents almost a straightforward lecture, with the dramatic elements all but dropped, so that one may assume he meant his statements to be taken on their face value. If it should be true, as these writers maintain, that the *Statesman* and the *Laws* contain simply more elaborate and precise formulations of the same obnoxious doctrines expounded in the *Republic*, Plato's political philosophy would be beyond vindication. A brief but careful examination of these two dialogues is, therefore, in order.

In the *Statesman*, damaging evidence appears readily available. Let us, for instance, consider the following pronouncement of the Eleatic visitor, who conducts the discussion, while Socrates significantly lapses into an almost unbroken silence:

> There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the law should rule, but that a man should rule, supposing him to have wisdom and royal power.[38]

Here Plato seems to advocate rule by one man endowed with absolute power and bound by no law. What could be more offensive to modern ears than such a conception of government? Even young Socrates, one of the interlocutors, becomes alarmed: "I agree, Stranger, in the

greater part of what you say; but as to their ruling without laws—the expression has a harsh sound."[39] But when the reasons are given why government by law is second best, it becomes clear that Plato's view does not spring from a disregard of the individual:

> The law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest and most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The difference of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. And no art whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time.[40]

For the law can become more oppressive than the worst of tyrants, and it is against the rigidity of the law that Plato wants to guard.

> The law is always striving to make one [rule which will last for all time]:—like an obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary to his appointment, or any question to be asked—not even in the sudden changes of circumstances, when something happens to be better than what he commanded for some one.[41]

The law can never do justice to the individual or to the concrete situation in which he operates. It must reduce both situation and individual to kinds or classes; only when they are reduced to instances of the law does the law become legitimately applicable. "Then if the law is not the perfection of right," asks the Stranger, "why are we compelled to make laws at all?"[42] It is obvious that no man possesses the wisdom which would be necessary to consider in their concrete individuality "the endless irregular movements of human things." The laws, though ideally speaking the second best, are yet the best that is accessible

[39] *Ibid.*, 293 (II, 321).

[40] *Ibid.*, 294 (II, 322).

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] *Ibid.*

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[43] "But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has no natural head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body and in mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and to endeavor to approach as nearly as they can to the true form of government" (*ibid.*, 301 [II, 329]).

[44] "If there are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a standard of measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting there is neither. . . . And these persons . . . jumble together two widely different things, relation to one another, and to a standard, under the idea that they are the same" (*ibid.*, 285-86 [II, 312-13]).

[45] *Ibid.*, 300 (II, 328).

[46] Muller, *Uses of the Past*, p. 127.

[47] "The next best thing in legislating is not to allow either the individual or the multitude to break the law in any respect whatever. . . . If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill" (*Statesman* 300 [II, 328]).

[48] *Ibid.*, 301 (II, 329).

to man.[43] The one supremely wise ruler of whom Plato speaks is evidently a myth, and it is not the function of a myth to act as an existing thing. Realization of a myth's existence in the physical world, in fact, may be impossible or, if possible, undesirable. But it can function, nonetheless, as an ideal or standard which men may try to approximate or, as Plato would say, "imitate."[44] Laws are necessary; but laws are good only to the extent that they succeed in preserving the individual's right and bringing about perfect justice as our mythical ruler would, did he exist. Knowing that the law is only an approximation, we will refuse to raise it to the status of an absolute; we will not sacrifice the individual to the law but rather disregard or abandon the law whenever its application to a given situation would pervert the very purpose for which the law was enacted.

> And any individual or any number of men, having fixed laws, in acting contrary to them with a view to something better, would only be acting, as far as they are able, like the true Statesman.[45]

In the light of the above quotation it becomes very difficult to understand why Herbert Muller should appeal not only to the *Republic* but also to the *Statesman* to confirm the view that "Plato's ideal republic incorporates the ideal of the beehive, in which there is no freedom, no individualism, no desire for self-realization, but only the unthinking devotion to the prescribed task."[46] It is true, statements which have a harsh sound are found in this dialogue. Freedom and the right to disregard the law when the circumstances warrant are not enjoyed by everyone. However, the distinction is based on knowledge and wisdom rather than wealth, birth, or caste.[47] Nor is the mythical ruler to be confused with the autocrat who uses his power for his own selfish ends. The Eleatic Stranger asks:

> When an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation, may not such a one be called a tyrant?[48]

The individual citizen who is free because he has learned to control his impulses, who is wise because he not only sees his private advantage

but has identified his good with the good of the whole community—such a man must not be hampered by the man-made law which forever tends to become rigid and oppressive. His freedom is not license, however, for he is bound by a higher law; he must, as Socrates says in the *Crito*, "be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best."[49] Freedom, therefore, is not a birthright to which everyone is entitled. It is something which must be acquired; and since the multitude, as a matter of fact, shows neither the inclination nor the willingness to undergo the arduous discipline which it demands, the truly free men, the really good citizens, are few in number.[50] So far from hampering the development and self-realization of the individual, as Muller would have us believe, Plato's concern, at least in the *Statesman*, is to prevent the petrification of the written law, which would make progress impossible. He says explicitly: "Inquiry would be unlawful, and human life which is bad enough already, would then become utterly unendurable."[51]

So whatever the relation of the *Statesman* may be to the *Republic*, it seems quite obvious that it not only does not contradict the *Crito* but restates the same ideas in more precise and elaborate form. Both express the same contempt, not for the masses in the modern sense, but for those who lack education and self-discipline; both emphasize the need for laws and the duty of obeying them, coupled with the claim that the wise man need not obey the law blindly and will know when it is his duty to set aside the law and follow his own enlightened conscience as to what is right or wrong. If there is anything new in the *Statesman* as to Plato's political theory, it is the fear of the rigidity of the law, and this again is more a new emphasis than a new idea.

Turning from the *Statesman* to a consideration of the *Laws*, we find

[49] *Crito* 46 (I, 430).

[50] "The principle that no great number of men are able to acquire a knowledge of any art has already been admitted by us" *Statesman* 300 (II, 328).

Cf. also: "The multitude will never become philosophers, says Plato, but he does not rule them out by arbitrary decree or caprice on the ground that certain people must be held in subjection to do the dirty work. Ultimate truth, as Cornford points out, is open to any one on Plato's theory in the same sense in which it is open to any one to grasp the theory of relativity" (Robert Jordan, "The Revolt against Philosophy: The Spell of Popper," *The Return to Reason*, ed. by John Wild [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953], p. 281).

[51] *Statesman* 299 (II, 327).

[52] *Laws* iv. 709 (II, 481).

[53] *Ibid.*, iv. 710 (II, 482).

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] *Ibid.*, iv. 711-12 (II, 483).

[56] *Ibid.*, iv. 712 (II, 483).

that the latter lend themselves to misquotations with the same ease. Shocking pronouncements, such as the following, can be culled from the text without having to resort to as much as the abbreviation of a sentence:

> 'Come Legislator,' we shall say to him, 'what are the conditions which you require in a state before you can organize it?' He will say: 'Give me a state which is governed by a tyrant, and let the tyrant be young and have a good memory; let him be quick at learning, and of a courageous and noble nature.'[52]

But even more vigorously than in the *Statesman,* where a similar suggestion is made, one of the participants interjects: "By what possible arguments, Stranger, can any man persuade himself of such a monstrous doctrine?"[53] Whereupon the Athenian corrects himself by saying that to the qualities of the tyrant

> you must add fortunate. And his good fortune must be that he is the contemporary of a great legislator, and that some happy chance brings them together. And when this has been accomplished, God has done all that He ever will do for a state which He desires to be eminently prosperous[54] . . .
>
> And this may be said of power in general: When the supreme power in man coincides with the greatest wisdom and temperance, then the best laws and the best constitution come into being.[55]

It requires little ingenuity at this point to recognize our mythical ruler of the *Statesman.* As if to make sure that his ideal be not mistaken for a goal to be realized, Plato continues: "And let what I have been saying be regarded as a kind of sacred legend or oracle."[56] He is emphatic in his declaration that it would not only be futile but outright dangerous to entrust a single individual with absolute authority:

> Cronos knew what we ourselves were saying, that no human nature invested with supreme power is able to order human affairs and not overflow with insolence and wrong. Which reflection led him to appoint not men but demigods, who are of a higher and more divine race, to be the kings and rulers of our cities; he did as we do with flocks of sheep and other tame animals . . . And this tradition, which is true, declares that cities of which some mortal man and not

God is the ruler, have no escape from evils and toils.[57]

And finally, as if made wary through past experience of leaving anything unsaid and trusting the intelligence of the reader to carry his thought to completion, Plato explicitly states the function of the myth:

> Still we must do all we can to imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of Cronos, and, as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, we must harken, both in public and private life, and regulate our cities and houses according to law, meaning by the very term 'law' the distribution of mind.[58]

Since all these statements appear in close proximity to one another, it is difficult to see how any misunderstanding as to Plato's meaning could arise, except for the most cursory of readers.

A careful study of the *Laws* also fails to find support for Plato's alleged contempt for the masses. In fact, his attitude toward the multitude, both in the early and the late dialogues, remains fundamentally unchanged. In the *Crito*, the "many" are simply those who do not possess knowledge and whose judgment in ethical matters is, therefore, of no value; from Socrates's interrogations of the false pretenders to wisdom in the *Apology* it appears that they do not belong to a particular class. Now Plato makes it very clear that by the superior man he means not simply the intelligent and well-trained but the individual whose inclinations are in harmony with his understanding. Only the citizen who is at peace with himself can be entrusted with any kind of authority.[59] While reading the description of such a man one cannot help

[57] *Ibid.*, iv. 713 (II, 485).

[58] *Ibid.*, iv. 713-14 (II, 485).

[59] "The citizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind of authority entrusted to him: he must be stigmatized as ignorant, even though he be versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts of accomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity; and the opposite are to be called wise, even though, in the words of the proverb, they know neither how to read nor how to swim; and to them, as to men of sense, authority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how can there be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony? There is none; but the noblest and greatest harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom, and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason; whereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and the very opposite of a savior of the state; he is utterly ignorant of political wisdom" (*ibid.*, iii. 689 [II, 464]).

Cf.: "Between the rulers and the masses, however, there is an unbridgeable abyss. They are separated not by a temporary difference of class or function, but by a permanent difference of race or caste. (The comparisons of Platonic classification with Hindu castes is substantially correct, but it is not necessary to assume that Plato was aware of their existence.)" (Sarton, *History of Science*, p. 410).

[60] Sarton, *History of Science*, p. 419.

[61] *Laws*, ix. 875 (II, 620).

thinking of the Socrates whom Crito finds sound asleep when he visits him in jail in the early morning hours a few days before the time set for the execution, or of the Socrates who unflinchingly drinks the cup of poison and calmly lies down as if for a good night's sleep. So Plato in his old age has not forgotten his beloved master, and he has not betrayed him.[60] While he was young, he may have thought that there must be other men who, if not the equal of Socrates, rise far above the crowd. It may be for this reason, or simply because the memory of the living Socrates was still so fresh in his mind, that in the early dialogues he speaks as if the truly wise man did exist. In the *Laws*, because of old age and disillusionment, or simply because he has been taught by experience, he practically transplants the wise man from the world of existing things to the world of ideals:

> For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could actually apprehend the truth, he would not have need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but rather the law of all. I speak of mind, true and free, and in harmony with nature. *But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at least not much*; and therefore we must choose law and order, which are second best. These look at things as they exist for the most part only, and are unable to survey the whole of them. And therefore I have spoken as I have.[61]

Or perhaps Plato has simply become more practical, more empirical-minded. Far from withdrawing from this evil world and seeking refuge in his dreams, he puts his dreams to work and shows how they can serve as guiding lights. The nature of the laws is determined to some extent by the people for whom the laws are intended. Our supremely wise man, as we have seen, would need no law at all. As we move down the scale of wisdom, the number and the severity of the laws increase until we end up with blind obedience. The Athenian says:

> The legislators never appear to have considered that they have two instruments which they might use in legislation—persuasion and force; for in dealing with the rude and uneducated multitude, they use the one only as far as they can; they do not mingle persuasion

with coercion, but employ force pure and simple.[62]

In similar fashion, while the supreme ruler would need no law to restrain him in handling the affairs of the state, the citizen who is busy making a living by the work of his hands cannot be allowed to hold office at all: "For he who is to secure and preserve the public order of the state has an art which requires much study and many kinds of knowledge, and does not admit of being made a secondary occupation."[63] The rules governing public officials in the execution of their office will depend on their position on a scale limited by the supreme ruler on the one hand and the totally uneducated on the other.

> When a state has good courts, and the judges are well-trained and scrupulously tested, the determination of the penalties or punishments which shall be inflicted on the guilty may fairly and with advantage be left to them.[64]

But if the officials are lower on the scale, the legislator "must take most matters into his own hands and speak distinctly."[65] Thus the ideal enables Plato to set limits of liberty and of right to rule in either direction and, what is more important, to determine the degrees of freedom and authority which are appropriate to the intermediate levels. He thus gains a firm foothold, a frame of reference in terms of which he can survey and evaluate the manifold and shifting forms of existing things. But Plato's concern with the ideal extremes as limiting conditions of the content of human experience can confuse the literal-minded reader into mistaking the ideal for the real. He will insist that Plato advocates dictatorship of one man—forgetting that according to Plato's own account only a god could enjoy such power and not become corrupt—and that Plato has only contempt for the masses—overlooking the

[62] *Ibid.*, iv. 722 (II, 493).

That in practice the judgment of the many is not altogether untrustworthy is indicated by the following: "The many are not so far wrong in their judgment of who are bad and who are good, as they are removed from the nature of virtue in themselves. Even bad men have a definite instinct which guesses rightly, and very many who are utterly depraved form correct notions and judgments of the differences between the good and the bad" (*ibid.*, xii. 950 [II, 684-85]).

[63] *Ibid.*, viii. 846 (II, 595).

[64] *Ibid.*, ix. 876 (II, 621).

[65] *Ibid.*

[66] *Ibid.*, i. 634 (II, 416).

[67] *Ibid.*

[68] "The assembly of those who review the laws . . . shall be a mixed body of young and old men, who shall be required to meet daily between the hour of dawn and the rising sun" (*ibid.*, xii. 951 [II, 686]).

[69] *Ibid.*, xii. 951 (II, 685-86).

fact that Plato refers to the wholly uneducated who in our own society would be deprived of even the minimum of civic rights, the right to vote.

When viewed from such a strong prejudice, many statements of the *Laws* are likely to assume an unwholesome aspect. There is the rule, for instance, that young men must not be allowed to criticize the laws but that if an old man finds fault with them he may "communicate his observation to a ruler or to an equal in years when no young man is present."[66] This appears to be an undesirable curtailment of the right of free speech and inquiry. But is it really so undesirable? After all, the rule is based on the assumption "that we have reasonably good laws."[67] And is it not true that young men often are enamored of the ideal and impatient of the compromise and restriction which actual conditions impose? Perhaps it is not so wrong to make the young first understand and appreciate the laws fully before they are allowed to try their hand at innovations. Of course, the old, on the other hand, are often overly conservative; and this might be the reason why Plato would compose the "nocturnal council"[68] of both young and old men, the old to give stability to the body of laws, the young to promote their normal growth and development. The view that it is not the criticism of existing institutions that Plato tries to curtail but rather premature censure which may come from the young and inexperienced seems supported by the rule laid down for the conduct of the "spectators." These are older men of good reputation between the ages of fifty and sixty who desire to study conditions in other lands. Such men must be encouraged, for they render a great service to the city. They will report new ideas to the "nocturnal council" and thus help to "establish more firmly institutions in their own state which are good already, and amend what is deficient; for without this examination and enquiry a city will never continue perfect any more than if the examination is ill-conducted."[69] In other words, no matter how good a state turns out to be at any given moment, the Rulers must ever try to adjust it to the continually changing conditions of time and place. To cease in this endeavor is not simply to stand still; it is to slide backward and move rapidly down the road to self-destruction. Our Rulers must be the gadflies of their community, always prodding their city into improving

itself, a role which the Socrates of the *Apology* considered so vital that he called it a mission given to him by the gods and so deserving that he told the Athenians in the Assembly that instead of condemning him to exile or death they ought to honor him as a benefactor and maintain him at public expense at the Prytaneion.

One of the most disturbing passages in the *Laws* is undoubtedly the one which deals with the punishment to be inflicted on those who refuse to believe in the existence and goodness of the gods and their concern with the affairs of men:

> Let those who have been made what they are only from want of understanding, and not from malice or evil nature, be placed by the judge in the House of Reformation, and ordered to suffer imprisonment during a period of not less than five years. And in the meantime let them have no intercourse with the other citizens, except with the members of the nocturnal council, and with them let them converse with a view to the improvement of their soul's health. And when the time of their imprisonment has expired, if any of them be of sound mind let him be restored to sane company, but if not, and if he be condemned a second time, let him be punished by death.[70]

Those who make a sharp distinction between the Socratic and the Platonic dialogues and claim that Socrates would have been the first victim of the *Laws*,[71] should note that Socrates, when accused of impiety, does not insist on his right not to believe in the gods at all. "I do

[70]*Ibid.*, x. 908-9 (II, 650).

[71]Muller, *Uses of the Past*, p. 128.

[72]*Apology*, 35 (I, 418).

[73]*Ibid.*, 41 (I, 423).

[74]From the *Gorgias* it also appears that the rational life of the good man and the religious life are identical: "Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judge in that day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when I die, to die as well as I can. And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same" (*Gorgias* 526 [I, 586]).

[75]*Ibid.*, 527 (I, 587).

[76]*Laws* x. 899 (II, 641).

[77]Cf. also: "Plato, true to his conception of Socrates' own faith, asks only a belief in gods (or god) who are providential and incorruptibly just. The mildness of these minimum requirements, which represent almost the least supposed necessary by any European society until after the Reformation, is underscored by Plato's hope of winning over the disbeliever by a five-years' course in natural theology. In the light of history we plainly see the folly of such trust in what, to him, was simply rational persuasion; yet it has a nobly Socratic aspect. These admirable elements in Plato's law lend tragedy to the spectacle of a high and serious intent brought to naught by a misplaced coercion" (Levinson, *In Defense of Plato*, pp. 560-61).

believe in the gods," he says, "and in a sense higher than that in which any of my accusers believe in them."[72] Furthermore, there is the seemingly dogmatic statement at the end of the *Apology*: "Know of a certainty that no evil can befall a good man in this life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods."[73] But when, in the same dialogue, Socrates refers to his divine mission, one gains the impression that what the gods ordain and what reason prescribes is one and the same.[74] In the *Gorgias,* when he speaks about the rewards and punishments meted out by the gods, he is far from dogmatic and quite aware of the mythical character of his assertions. "Perhaps this will appear to you," he says to Gorgias, "to be only an old wife's tale, which you will condemn. And there might be reason in your condemning such tales, *if by searching we could find out anything better or truer.*"[75] This notion that God or the gods serve also, if not mainly, as ultimate principles of explanation becomes more evident in the *Laws,* where, contrary to the *Apology,* the obligation to believe is not simply imposed, but a proof is offered. And the obligation is not so much to believe as not to refuse to accept the verdict of reason. Such a verdict cannot simply be thrust aside, but can be overcome only by a better reason:

> Either he shall teach us that we were wrong in saying that the soul is the original of all things, and arguing accordingly; or, *if he be not able to say anything better, then he must yield to us* and live for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are gods.[76]

So it seems that there is not such a wide gap after all between the *Crito,* where Socrates submits the choice between escape and death to reason rather than impulse, and the *Laws,* where Plato insists that the problem of religion should be decided on intellectual rather than emotional grounds.[77]

Of course, after all has been said in an attempt to mitigate the harshness of some of Plato's statements, it must be admitted that in some particular spheres he favored more interference in personal matters and was willing to grant more power to the rulers than we would allow today. But his political theory is still a far cry from a totalitarian conception of the state.

Let us suppose for a moment that we have been successful in our

attempt to show that in essence at least there has been no great change in Plato's advocacy of the life of reason in the later dialogues as compared with the earlier ones, except for that which naturally accompanies a long life as it passes from a youth full of hope and fervor to the more tempered outlook of an old age which has suffered many disillusionments but has profited by them. It seems, however, that we have won a Pyrrhic victory, for our argument at this point has forced us into an untenable position. As matters stand now, we must apparently maintain that Plato, in his early dialogues, was faithful to the Socratic spirit; that while composing one single dialogue, the *Republic*, he turned authoritarian and fanatical; but that he recaptured the old liberal attitude in the political writings following the *Republic*.

However, if we find it impossible to reconcile the *Republic* with the *Statesman* and the *Laws*, the fault may lie, not with Plato, but with ourselves. Perhaps we are misled by the same kind of literal-mindedness which has caused so much confusion in the minds of some interpreters of the later dialogues. There are good reasons for the belief that the *Republic* was not meant to be taken literally. The first of such reasons can be discovered in the Socratic method. This method, as is generally agreed, consists of two parts: (*a*) the destructive part, which is discussed in the *Apology*, where Socrates compares himself to a gadfly inasmuch as he irritates people into thinking for themselves after he has made them aware of their ignorance; and (*b*) the constructive part, whose function, as he tells us in the *Theaetetus*, is similar to that of a midwife, inasmuch as Socrates claims to be able to assist others in the birth and subsequent examination of new ideas. Socrates's general theory, as Plato reports in many dialogues, seems to have been that knowledge cannot be imparted but must be drawn out of the student; that is, the student must discover it for himself. Why, then, does Plato let Socrates abandon his method in the *Republic*, where Socrates, contrary to the *Statesman* and the *Laws*, still plays the leading role? This is all the more astonishing in view of the fact—and this brings us to the second reason—that in the first book of the *Republic* Socrates

[78]*Republic* v. 473 (pp. 178-79).

[79]*Ibid.*, vii. 540 (p. 262).

Cf. also: "He will take society and human character as his canvas, and begin by scraping it clean. That is no easy matter; but, as you know, unlike other reformers, he will not consent to take in hand either an individual or a state or to draft laws, until he is given a clean surface or has cleansed it himself" (*ibid.*, vi. 500 [p. 209]).

[80]"Did Plato learn nothing in Syracuse?

is made to adhere strictly to the method. Definitions of justice are offered for examination in the customary manner, and, as usual, no definite conclusion is reached. Then all of a sudden the questioning method is cast aside and indoctrination begins.

Can we simply disregard the Socratic method so conspicuously exhibited in the first book? Perhaps when so reading the main body of the *Republic*, we are disregarding a sufficiently vital element to throw everything out of focus. As a matter of fact, the method of the first book can be extended significantly over the entire dialogue. In an advanced course of study it is not unusual for teacher and students to exchange places. Some of the young men who participate in the discussion at the house of Cephalus have been under the tutelage of Socrates presumably for a considerable length of time. "Let us try the mettle of their critical ability," Socrates might be assumed to say, "and see how they stand up when confronted with a startling new idea." After refreshing their memory of the Socratic method by putting them through their accustomed paces in the first book, where they suggest and he examines, Socrates now reverses the roles. This reversal, aside from pedagogical reasons, is also required by the nature of the subject matter; the suggestion offered for critical evaluation is not a definition but a picture of an ideal state which in its production requires not only the skill of a dialectician but that of a poet as well. Just as the definitions in the first book of the *Republic* and in other dialogues are not altogether false, so the description of the state in the *Republic* need not be altogether undesirable. Portions of it may be too narrowly conceived; others require qualifications and correction; and some may have to be completely rejected. After all, the imagination merely presents; it is the task of reason to analyze, correct, and adjust to concrete situations the daring flights of poetic inspiration.

Hints that we are here dealing with a hypothesis which needs to be revised and adjusted to practice are not lacking. There is, first of all, the condition that before the ideal city can be realized, philosophers must become kings and kings philosophers;[78] second, there is the condition that once their rule has been established they "must send out into the country all citizens who are above ten years old."[79] Those two conditions, if not theoretically, are at least factually impossible.[80] "If the

impossible becomes possible," Socrates seems to say, "your ideal city will see the light of day." The reason why nothing can be done with the adult citizens is that they have developed the wrong habits. A great deal of attention is paid in the *Republic* to the creation of conditions which will develop, in the young, habits beneficial to them in carrying out their duties as citizens. This is why the poets must be banished. But are men so trained really good men? Can the well-organized community guarantee the development of virtuous citizens? The answer, significantly enough, is hidden away in the *Myth of Er* at the end of the tenth and last book of the *Republic.* When the souls about to start a new cycle of life choose their destiny (only the sequence of their choice, not the choice itself being determined by lot) the one who draws the first lot rushes forward and, overwhelmed by his greed for power, seizes upon an absolute despotism which brings great evil in its wake. Says Socrates ironically,

> He was one of those who had come down from heaven, having spent his former life in a well-ordered commonwealth and become virtuous from habit without pursuing wisdom. It might indeed be said that not the least part of those who were caught in this way were of the company which had come from heaven, because they were not disciplined by suffering; whereas most of those who had come up of the earth, having suffered themselves and seen others suffer, were not hasty in making their choice.[81]

So even if we were to succeed in building the perfect city and a man were to spend his whole life in it and in addition a thousand years in heaven, he might still fail when confronted with a novel choice, under new and unaccustomed circumstances.

And how could he imagine the possibility of such a conjunction? . . . The simultaneous existence of such different vocations in a single person would be nothing short of a miracle" (Sarton, *History of Science,* pp. 414-15).

[81] *Republic* x. 619 (p. 357).

[82] Sarton, *History of Science,* p. 411.

[83] *Laws* iii. 691 (II, 466).

Cf. also: "No human nature invested with supreme power is able to order human affairs and not overflow with insolence and wrong" (*ibid.,* iv. 713 [II, 485]).

"If a person be possessed of absolute and irresponsible power, he will never remain firm in his principles or persist in regarding the public good as primary in the state, and the private good as secondary. Human nature will always be drawing him into avarice and selfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and better; and so working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and the whole city" (*ibid.,* ix. 875 [II, 620]).

If these were intended to be hints, the young men conversing with Socrates at the house of Cephalus did not take them up; and whatever objections they raised were easily removed by Socrates. However, this failure on the part of the participants to learn their lesson need not disconcert us; it is a common trait of the "Socratic" dialogues to end inconclusively. Euthyphro, for instance, in the dialogue by the same name, is considerably irritated but hardly enlightened at the end of the discussion. Of course, Euthyphro is not very bright, while the young men of the *Republic* are; but then the subject matter of the *Republic* is immensely more complicated. Furthermore, it is the reader who is to be made to think, and neither Socrates nor his listeners must be allowed to supply the answers.

Perhaps the most satisfying aspect of the theory that the *Republic* is not to be taken literally but constitutes simply a hypothesis submitted for examination is the fact that the *Laws* can in part be read as a corrective of the *Republic*. The amount of power, for instance, that is handed over to the rulers in the *Republic* is disquieting to the modern reader. "It is strange," says George Sarton, "that Plato realized the disintegrating nature of human passions, such as love of money or love of family, but did not realize that other passions (greed of power) might be equally dangerous."[82] However, in the *Laws*, as we have seen, Plato is fully conscious of the danger. "There is no soul of man," he says, "young and irresponsible, who will be able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power—no one who will not, under such circumstances, become filled with folly."[83]

Both in the *Statesman* and in the *Laws*, as pointed out before, Plato is sensitive to another and still more subtle threat to the freedom of the individual. This danger has its origin not in the tyrant but in the rigid application of the law to cases which, because of a change of circumstance, do not properly fall under it and yet are not covered by any other law. The good man, recognizing the good which the law represents, in obeying the law freely wills a good either for himself or for his fellowmen. He does willingly what others, less wise than himself, might have to do under compulsion or out of fear of punishment. Now, if the law is applied rigidly to cases which do not reasonably fall under it, it loses that goodness which can be freely chosen and becomes op-

pressive. In that sense, the bad law, or the good law applied to the wrong case, destroys the freedom of the individual. It demands obedience simply as a matter of brute fact. This danger resulting from the improper administration of the law can never be completely eliminated; but it is good to be conscious of it, and "we must not conceal from ourselves that . . . laws are apt to be oppressive."[84] The legislator, therefore, cannot expect absolute obedience to his laws, nor need the subject blindly submit. "Wherefore," says the Athenian in the *Laws*,

> let us make a common prelude on behalf of the lawgiver and of his subjects, the law begging the latter to forgive the legislator, in that he, having to take care of the common weal, cannot order at the same time the various circumstances of individuals, and begging him to pardon them if naturally they are sometimes unable to fulfil the act which he in his ignorance imposes upon them.[85]

The ultimate decision rests always with the enlightened conscience of the individual.

In the *Statesman* and the *Laws*, therefore, the philosopher-kings cease to function as realizable goals but serve as ideals which written laws must approximate as far as the actual circumstances permit. The written laws themselves are only second best; for they tend to become rigid, and if they do, the individual is not bound by them but by reason —the reason of the good man, that is, who is not blinded by prejudice and who clearly sees the good of the individual as closely linked with that of the community.

A similar transformation occurs with other elements of the *Republic*. The scheme to abolish private property and to have wives and children in common is abandoned in the *Laws*. To insist on such a scheme would be to overrate the power of the ruler and the malleability of the sub-

[84] *Ibid.*, xi. 925 (II, 664). Cf. also *Statesman* 294 (II, 322).

[85] *Laws* xi. 925-26 (II, 664).

Cf. also: "And there are cases in which the legislator will be imposing upon him the greatest calamity, and he will be compelled to disobey the law" (*ibid.*, xi. 926 [II, 665]).

[86] *Ibid.*, v. 746 (II, 512).

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] "Wherefore the law must let alone such matters, but we should try to charm the spirits of men into believing the equability of their children's disposition to be of more importance than equality in excessive fortune when they marry; and him who is too desirous of making a rich marriage, we should endeavor to turn aside by reproaches, not, however, by any compulsion of written law" (*ibid.*, vi. 773 [II, 533-34]).

[89] *Ibid.*, v. 730 (II, 498).

jects. It would be as if "the legislator were telling his dreams, or making a city and citizens of wax."[86] But that does not mean that the idea should simply be discarded. It would certainly be a fine thing if our citizens could regard the community as their family and treat their fellow citizens as if they were their sisters and brothers. However, if this ideal condition cannot be brought about, it can still serve as a far-off goal toward which to aspire:

> In matters which are not present but future, he who exhibits a pattern of that at which he aims, should in nothing fall short of the fairest and truest; and that if he finds any part of his work impossible of execution he should avoid and not execute it, but he should contrive to carry out that which is nearest and most akin to it; you must allow the legislator to perfect his design and when it is perfected, you should join with him in considering what part of his legislation is expedient and what will arouse opposition; for surely the artist who is deemed worthy of any regard at all, ought always to make his work self-consistent.[87]

Some of the proposals made in the *Republic* are, however, beyond redemption. The "noble lie" which sees to it that the suitable men and women are paired off at the marriage festivals is not taken up in the *Laws*. It is replaced by an attempt to achieve the same ends by persuasion.[88] But the *Laws* contain a general statement which seems to condemn lying categorically:

> Truth is the beginning of every good thing, both to gods and men; and he who would be blessed and happy, should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool.[89]

The pernicious consequences of undue interference with private matters are also pointed out in the *Laws*, while they go unheeded in the *Republic*. The argument advanced is very much the same as that so frequently heard at the time of the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, when, after costly experience, the American people finally recognized that certain actions do not lend themselves to government control. In the *Laws* the Athenian remarks:

By reason of their smallness and frequent occurrence there would be an unseemliness and want of propriety in making them penal by law; and if made penal, they are the destruction of the written law because mankind get the habit of frequently transgressing the law in small matters.[90]

The same pragmatic test is applied to other proposed institutions, gymnasia and common meals. In the *Republic,* these are advocated without qualification. In the *Laws* there is a great concern with consequences foreseeable in the light of past experience.

There seems to be a difficulty with regard to states making words and facts coincide, so that there can be no dispute about them. As in the human body, the regimen which does good in one way does harm in another: and we can hardly say that any one case of treatment is adapted to a particular constitution. Now the gymnasia and common meals do a great deal of good, and yet they are a source of evil in civil troubles; as is shown in the case of the Milesian and Boeotian and Thurian youth, among whom these institutions seem always to have had a tendency to degrade the ancient and natural custom of love below the level, not only of man, but of the beasts.[91]

[90] *Ibid.*, vii. 788 (II, 544).

[91] *Ibid.*, i. 636 (II, 517-18).

[92] "And these are our original principles; and do you now, fixing your eyes upon the standard of what a man and a citizen ought or ought not to be, praise and blame the laws—blame those which have not this power of making a citizen better, but embrace those which have; and with gladness receive and live in them; bidding a long farewell to other institutions which aim at goods, as they are termed, of a different kind" (*ibid.*, vi. 770-71 [II, 531]).

[93] *Ibid.*, xii. 951 (II, 685).

[94] *Ibid.*, iii. 689 (II, 464).

Cf. also: "Now I mean by education that training which is given by suitable habits to the first instincts of virtue in children;—when pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred, are rightly implanted in souls not yet capable of understanding the nature of them, and who find them, after they have attained reason, to be in harmony with her. This harmony of the soul, taken as a whole, is virtue; but the particular training in respect of pleasure and pain, which leads you always to hate what you ought to hate, and love what you ought to love from the beginning of life to the end, may be separated off; and, in my view, will be rightly called education" (*ibid.*, ii. 653 [II, 431-32]).

[95] *Ibid.*, xii. 951 (II, 685).

[96] Professor Levinson, who adheres to a literal interpretation of the *Republic,* unwittingly seems to lend support to the view that the late dialogues often serve as a corrective of the *Republic,* when he remarks: "It is interesting to note that Plato, before he wrote the *Politicus,* apparently abandoned the hope that the genetic program of the *Republic* was feasible. . . . We know from the *Laws* (951B) that he retained the belief that men of rare and divine natures come occasionally into existence, but he offers no account of the mode of their production" (*In Defense of Plato,* p. 540).

Cf. also: "Were we commissioned . . . to survey the works of Plato with special

Finally, the *Laws* circumscribe the function of the state, which in the Republic seems almost without limits. Its chief responsibility is to provide the conditions which help the individual to unfold his capacities to the fullest and make himself a well-adjusted individual both within, and with reference to, the community in which he lives.[92] As mentioned before, a great deal is made in the *Republic* of the creation of acceptable habits. This is the reason why the influences on the young must be carefully controlled. The significance of this early training cannot be overestimated. But good habits alone do not make a good man,

> for a city which has no experience of good and bad men or intercourse with them, can never be thoroughly and perfectly civilized, nor again, can the citizens of a city properly observe the laws by habit only, and without an intelligent understanding of them.[93]

On the other hand, understanding by itself is not necessarily a good, for if it is opposed by strong impulses it is helpless and merely serves to create a sense of frustration:

> The greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he nevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves and embraces that which he knows to be unrighteous and evil. This disagreement between the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my opinion, the worst ignorance.[94]

In the educative process of the individual the state plays an indispensable role. But it cannot guarantee that this process will be carried to a successful conclusion, for harmony between understanding and impulse is not something which is due wholly to the environmental conditions provided by the community. Not even the *good* state seems to be absolutely necessary for "there are always in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities."[95] Thus the author of the *Laws* seems to be in essential agreement with the Socrates of the *Protagoras* who argued against the great Sophist that virtue cannot be taught in the sense of being imparted or produced by external means and that the good life, although greatly enhanced by the establishment of a good state, is in the last analysis the creation of the individual man.[96]

From the evidence submitted, which, because of limitations of space had to be restricted to a few typical instances, it is obvious that the manner in which Plato presents his ideas can easily mislead the cursory reader and that the damaging views maintained by some of the critics can for the most part be maintained only at the cost of tearing statements in the dialogues from their natural context. It would also appear that the *Republic* can plausibly be regarded as an illustration, albeit a unique one, of the old Socratic method and thus become more closely linked up with the earlier dialogues. As far as the relation of the *Republic* to the *Statesman* and the *Laws* is concerned, that relationship is neither one of opposition nor of simple harmony.[97] It is rather that of a brilliantly conceived hyperbolic first hypothesis to a carefully analyzed, well considered, and thoroughly tested theory.

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attention to his city . . . we should find some elements that we could positively wish to destroy . . . we should revoke (as he himself went far toward doing in the *Laws*) the hard and fast distinction between the rulers and ruled which in the *Republic* he has based on a mistaken estimate of the capacity of the common man" (*ibid.*, p. 575).

Robert Jordan, who also takes the *Republic* at its face value, nevertheless feels the need for correction: "Plato certainly gives it [heredity] altogether unnecessary emphasis, and it is a point on which he can be legitimately attacked. But like the strict division of labor, it is not an essential element in Plato's thought, that is, he could abandon his extreme position without making a significant alteration in his political theory" (Jordan, *Return to Reason*, p. 280). This is precisely the kind of revision to which one would subject a generally useful but still inadequately formulated hypothesis.

[97]"A harmony of the *Laws* and *Republic*, however, though not a difficult task, would demand more space than can be given to it here" (Paul Shorey, *The Unity of Plato's Thought* [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1903], p. 73).

THE CONCEPT OF THE GIVEN IN PEIRCE AND MEAD

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This paper was read before the Peirce Society in the December 1952 meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. It is part of the work accomplished during the author's tenure as American Council of Learned Societies Scholar, 1951-53. The author wishes to thank Dr. Alfred Schütz for his criticisms of this paper.

I

Charles S. Peirce and George H. Mead are names inevitably to be mentioned in any history of American pragmatism; yet the systematic relationship between the thought of these men has not, to my knowledge, been clearly articulated. It seems to me that there are aspects of Mead's philosophic thought that come into understandable relief when they are grasped within the framework of Peirce's categoriology or, at least, within the compass of a theory of categories comparable to that of Peirce. Conversely, a comparative study of Peirce and Mead allows a sharpening in our appreciation of ground questions in Peirce's writings. One way of exploring this contention is to take a specific problem with which both Peirce and Mead have dealt and to see the extent to which a comparative study proves valuable. I propose, then, to take the problem of the given in the thought of Peirce and Mead,

to clarify their concepts of the given, to consider the meeting points in their ideas as well as to focus upon significant disagreements. But before engaging the issues, I should like to indicate very briefly what I intend when, in this paper, I speak of the concept of "the given."

"There is, in all experience," writes C. I. Lewis, "that element which we are aware that we do not create by thinking and cannot, in general, displace or alter."[1] That element which is independent of the individual's conceptual contribution to experience we may call the given. Such a notion of the given reflects a dichotomy evidenced throughout the history of philosophy; namely, the distinction between acting mind and that upon which mind acts. Again, as Lewis puts it: "We may, then, fairly take it for granted, as something generally recognized, that there are in experience these two elements, something given and the interpretation or construction put upon it."[2] The relationship between these two elements is a central problem, one with which both Peirce and Mead are seriously concerned.

II

It is more than doubtful that a systematic formulation of the problem of the given can be found in Peirce's writings, despite the fact that he devotes a considerable amount of space to such notions as presentness, immediate awareness, and so on. If, as one might suspect, there are variant concepts of the given in Peirce, it is difficult to organize his views, either from the point of view of development or systematics. I propose to deal with this organizational difficulty by treating the issues under three divisions: first, a general attempt to state Peirce's concept of the given apart from his phenomenology; second, an approach to the problem through an analysis of the categories, especially Firstness; third, an approach to the concept of the given as an ontological construction.

"Some writers," Peirce says, "insist that all experience consists in sense-perception; and I think it is probably true that every element of experience is in the first instance applied to an external object."[3] We

[1] *Mind and the World Order* (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 48.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Cambridge, 1931-35), Vol. I, par. 335.

[4] *Ibid.*, par. 336.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*

must, however, Peirce warns, distinguish between experience and perception.[4] We experience events but we do not perceive events. Experience involves "what Kant called the 'synthesis of apprehension,' "[5] while perception involves no more than immediate awareness of sense data. Peirce's illustration in this connection is helpful.

> A whistling locomotive passes at high speed close beside me. As it passes the note of the whistle is suddenly lowered from a well-understood cause. I perceive the whistle, if you will. I have, at any rate, a sensation of it. But I cannot be said to have a sensation of the change of note. I have a sensation of the lower note. But the cognition of the change is of a more intellectual kind. That I experience rather than perceive.[6]

Experience is wider than perception because it involves more than the immediate object of perception. In Peirce's illustration, the lowering of the locomotive whistle tone is experienced as a result of a sense of resistance the individual feels when the note lowers. The long blast preceding the lowering sets up a kind of inertia which the experience of lowering reacts against in the form of a resistance. The extra element in this experiential instance, then, is the resistance phenomenon which cannot be said to be a proper part of the sense datum. All of experience, for Peirce, transpires within a horizon (in Husserl's sense) of effort and resistance. What is given must then be given within such a horizon.

Sheer perception is, for Peirce, immediate awareness of sense data, while experience, introducing a conceptual element, relates immediacy to temporal sequence, linking what is now present to consciousness to what is present a moment later. That we cannot then *fix* an instantaneous givenness is a necessary correlate of the fact that conception mediates between immediate awareness and attempted fixation. In short, the flux of sensory life is such that we are conscious *that* something is immediately given but unable to prevent ourselves from relating and so transposing what is originally given into a datum of mediate awareness.

If being present implies being present to someone, then what is initially given to consciousness cannot properly be said to be imme-

diately present, for such immediacy is a monadic structure that cannot tolerate an "observer." The "thatness" of being present can be affirmed, but the "whatness" present eludes analysis. If, for Peirce, we cannot grasp or fix the content of Firstness; if, indeed, to speak of a "content" of Firstness is itself misleading, then what facet of Firstness can we apprehend with something more than metaphor? We may experience Firstness as *quality*. Quality is not presence but "abstract potentiality";[7] it is not a continuous awareness but a resultant impression.[8] As Peirce says, "Red, sour, toothache are each *sui generis* and indescribable";[9] but the *quality* as a resultant impression from the experience of red, sour, toothache is describable.

For Peirce, quality is not presence but potentiality, because we are here concerned not with existential fact but with the phaneron, the phenomenologically given in experience. The quality of a phaneron is a mere may-be[10] which is not necessarily realized in sensuous experience. As Peirce writes, "A quality of feeling can be imagined to be without any occurrence. . . . Its mere may-being gets along without any realization at all."[11] But the may-being of quality presents difficulties in the understanding of Peirce in this regard, for quality has may-being in the sense of "abstract potentiality"; yet apprehension of that may-being would seem to require some modus of presence. In other words, Peirce appears to imply a distinction between the may-being of the phaneron and the may-being of a *possible* phaneron. A complete study of quality would have to include both phenomenology as the science of the phaneron and a more generalized categoriology capable of dealing with potential phanerons.

Thus far we have attempted to give a general statement of Peirce's concept of the given and to approach the problem via his phenomenology. We come now to a final treatment suggested by the distinction between the may-being of the phaneron and the may-being of the potential phaneron: the concept of the given as an ontological construction.

While a category is understood as an "element of phenomena of the

[7] *Ibid.*, par. 422. (Cf. John Dewey, "Peirce's Theory of Quality," *The Journal of Philosophy*, XXXII [Dec. 9, 1935], 701-8.)

[8] *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, par. 424.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Ibid.*, par. 304.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] *Ibid.*, Vol. V, par. 43.

[13] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, par. 374.

first rank of generality,"[12] the categories in Peirce have ontological as well as methodological status. The categories as phenomenological structures may be deduced from the categories taken as the ground of all relata: as monads, dyads, and triads. The difference between the quality of the phaneron in Firstness and the quality of the monad is the difference between an experiential presentation and a logical construction. The pure monad of Firstness must be considered an ontological construction, for it cannot, in principle, be phenomenologically experienced. The pure monad, given in this constructional sense, placed as it must be outside of sensory experience, is knowable because, apparently, it is revelatory of the a-priori nature of mind. "A man must be a very uncompromising partisan of the theory of the *tabula rasa* to deny that the ideas of first, second, and third are due to congenital tendencies of the mind."[13] In a sense, then, the categories themselves are given to us in experience, but an experience which is, in part at least, constituted by "tendencies" of mind.

If we can reduce the variant aspects of Peirce's concept of the given to a more simplified organizational unity, we would say this, that there appear to be three levels of givenness in Peirce's thought: (1) the given as sensory experience; (2) the given as refracted by the categories; and finally (3) the given as a construct beyond sensation and the categories. These levels appear to be not only beyond systematic unification but also internally inconsistent with each other. We shall now see that George H. Mead's effort to develop a theory of sociality is in many respects analagous to Peirce's attempt to account for the character of experience, despite the fact that Peirce and Mead formulated their problems differently, approached them in diverse ways, and sought to resolve them in accordance with variant criteria.

III

Mead's books represent, I shall argue, a three-directioned attempt to resolve the problem of the given in experience. *Mind, Self, and Society* interprets the given in experience from the standpoint of society; *The Philosophy of the Act* approaches the given from the standpoint of human subjectivity; *The Philosophy of the Present* interprets what is

given in human experience from the standpoint of sociality and in terms of a radical conception of temporality. We shall here consider each of these positions in turn, treating the concept of the given within Mead's uneasy trinity: society, act, and temporality.

From the point of view of *Mind, Self, and Society,* what is given is given always within the ongoing movement of experience in which self and society are only methodologically separable aspects of an integral phenomenon. Mead is concerned with what is given not at the level of sense-data or immediate awareness, but rather at the level of the life-world of human beings and their experience. Here Mead is concerned with those aspects of the given that relate to the genesis and nature of the Self, other selves, communication, consciousness, and so on. Let us consider, as illustrative of Mead's style, his analysis of consciousness of the object in experience.

"Consciousness as such refers to both the organism and its environment and cannot be located simply in either," Mead writes.[14] What is given in experience is epistemologically recognized as "object" for consciousness only when consciousness selects out of the welter of possible structures in experience that one to which it grants special status. Bread is a food object only for the organism that selects it as food and for whom it is possible to be food.[15] The object given in experience, then, is a function of two polarities of the ongoing stream of societal reality: the organism and the environment. Consciousness of the object resides in neither the individual organism nor in the environment but is a character of the relation between them.

At the level and from the point of view of *Mind, Self, and Society,* "selection" of the object is linked and limited to what Mead calls the "internal" experience of physical reality; that is, the meanings with which the individual endows its objects. Mead's realism is, in intention, quite clear. "Nature—the external world—," he writes, "is objectively there, in opposition to our experience of it, or in opposition to the individual thinker himself."[16] Yet the full status of the object is determined by the organism who "selects" the object from the flux of what

[14] *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 332.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 333; see *ibid.,* pp. 77, 129.
[16] *Ibid.,* n. 131.
[17] *The Philosophy of the Act* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 65.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. 364.
[19] *Ibid.,* p. 128.
[20] *Ibid.,* p. 107.

is given and thus experiences it as what it is for him.

The object is given to consciousness, according to Mead, in and through the act, the stages of which—impulse, perception, manipulation, and consummation—form the basis for Mead's theory of the relationship of subjectivity to external reality. Mead does not state precisely what he means by the act; he only sees the necessity of distinguishing between the static datum and the passage of events. Thus, "the unit of existence is the act, not the moment. And the act stretches beyond the stimulus to the response."[17] We have knowledge of the given only in the act. "An act," Mead writes, "is an ongoing event that consists of stimulation and response and the results of the response."[18] The stages of the act must be analyzed to grasp Mead's notion of the act. Such analysis shows, I think, that the second stage of the act, perception, occupies a central position in importance. "The percept is a collapsed act"[19] because impulse is experienced only in the second stage of the act, though it is logically delineable prior to perception, while the third and fourth stages of manipulation and consummation are modes of *possible* activity as long as the object is "at distance." The implications of this general situation are far-reaching for Mead's thought. If impulse is "absorbed" experientially into the stage of perception, it becomes difficult to give a clear account of the role of what is initially given in the act. What is given becomes, as it were, unavailable for analysis.

Writes Mead:

> We live, then, in a world that is independent of us, except in so far as we determine its perspective, but within this world lies a field of so-called consciousness in which appear the character and meanings of things that are spatiotemporally distant and have been detached from what we consider the reality of the thing, by the problematic form of conduct.[20]

The dualism of the "independent" world and the "character and meanings" that are occasioned through perspectives are attacked through an analysis of temporality in *The Philosophy of the Present.* The content of experience is internally related to a time structure, for what we term the "real" event is an occurrence in the *present.* Yet the present event cannot be understood as isolated or *sui generis*; it has its relata

to the past and to the future. Mead sees, at this point in his development, that "passage" in experience refers not simply to the continuous advance from stimulus to response, from impulse to consummation, but demands a ground analysis of the relationship of content and meaning in the history of the event. Events have, then, their "sedimentations" of meaning which the temporal dimension of experience carries forward. What *is* given as an event in human experience, what *was* given, and what *will* be given, are constituted in and through the perspective chosen by the organism. Both past and future, then, are involved in the present. What is given as "past" is then both "irrevocable and revocable."[21] *That* the past has been is irrevocable; *what it was* is revocable; in fact, the "content" of the past is restructured continually in the passage of a reality that permits, necessitates, taking new perspectives. The present as the locus of reality is the freshly emerging and novel quality that arises from the organization of the past and the tendencies of the future. What is given as a present, then, is given out of the fabric of a past that is itself still a becoming. In Mead's language, "the past in passage is irrecoverable as well as irrevocable. It is producing all the reality that there is. The meaning of that which is, is illuminated in the face of the emergent in experience . . . by the expansion of the passage which is going on."[22]

As an attempt to transcend the limitations of a description of the given from the polarities of society and act, Mead's description of the Present as temporally conditioned and structured is only a partial success, a fractional resolution of the issues. Mead lacked a specific method for the description of the given, and he lacked a theory of categories for the full articulation of the metaphysical-epistemological implications of his concepts of society, act, and temporality. It may well be that Peirce's phenomenology could have supplied Mead with a methodological organon for the description of the given and that Peirce's categoriology could have given Mead a proper grounding for his basic themes.

IV

It is certainly not possible at this time to enter into an extended set

[21] *The Philosophy of the Present* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 2.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

of comparisons between the general tenets of the thought of Peirce and Mead. In restricting ourselves to comparisons that relate to the problem of the given, we shall still find it difficult to present a systematic analysis without writing at great length. Of course, since Mead does not appear to have written on Peirce, we do not have the good fortune to be able to present his own reactions in even a general way. We are, furthermore, left with the difficult task of deciding on which aspects of the problem to focus our attention. I propose to draw the comparison between Peirce and Mead on the notions of resistance, tychism, and synechism. I choose these topics for several reasons. First, in one form or another they are central in importance in the thought of both authors. Resistance is essential to experience of the object in Mead, to the category of Secondness in Peirce. Emergence is the key to sociality in Mead; tychism is a general character of the real in Peirce. Passage, process, and continuity underlie Mead's theory of societal reality; synechism is granted cosmological status by Peirce. A second reason for choosing these topics for purposes of comparison is that they lead us directly to the heart of the problem of the given, since they throw into contrast the phenomenological method of Peirce and the lack of such a method, coupled with the need for it, in Mead.

So far, in regard to Peirce, our discussion of the concept of the given has been a discussion of Firstness. But there is also, for Peirce, a Firstness of Secondness; and this calls for an understanding of the notion of resistance as an essential characteristic of Secondness which, nevertheless, may be thought of in its *first* or pure form. In its "impure" form, resistance (and its corollary effort) "come tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality."[23] I recognize the brute resistance of the door I have my shoulder against, the facticity of things and events I cannot ignore. Peirce reports the solipsist "lounging down Regent Street . . . when some drunken fellow who is staggering up the street unexpectedly lets fly his fist and knocks him in the eye. What has become of his philosophical reflections now?"[24] Secondness is no respecter of persons!

But to speak of the Firstness of Secondness is to be concerned with the *first* or pure aspect of resistance, and it would seem that for Peirce this pure aspect must be intuited as an immediate quality. If the "tragedy of King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor *sui generis*,"[25] it must

equally be the case that the resistance-sensitivity of my body (apart from any act of pushing or lifting) has "its flavor *sui generis*," a flavor, moreover, unique to me as an individual, unique to me as a male. The quality of resistance as Firstness would appear, then, to involve a double consciousness of body and object. I believe that Mead has made some significant contributions toward the clarification of this problem.

Whitehead's phrase "the pushiness of things" is taken by Mead[26] to express the fundamental resistance quality of all objects that come within perceptual experience in the act. But objects resist us not merely as surface phenomena but as possessing "insides" which, according to Mead, we can experience through an almost empathic sort of "interiorization" when we react to the object by taking its role or perspective. In actual contact experience with the object, when one manipulates, handles the object, "the contact . . . is not simply a pressure, not simply a hardness or roughness. It is primarily a resistance."[27] The interaction of organism and object involves a "co-operation of resistance offered by physical things to the organism and by the organism to physical things."[28] All human experience is understood by Mead to take place within the framework of this "co-operation of resistance."[29] It is we ourselves who "invite" the resistance of the object, who elicit its active "pushiness." In an almost Bergsonian sense we can grasp the interior of the object only by penetrating to its self-active core.[30] The given is inexperiencable apart from resistance.

Mead discusses resistance within the act in the sense of Peirce's Secondness rather than the quality of pure resistance, the Firstness of Secondness. Still, resistance in Mead is more than the element of opposition or facticity: like Peirce, Mead intends resistance to be understood as a character of being.

As the locus of reality, the present, for Mead, is at once novel and indeterminate. The present as an emergent from the past and as intimately related to the future bears the stamp of contingency, for "any anticipated events and any remembered or recorded events are in-

[23] *Collected Papers of C. S. Pierce*, Vol. I, par. 24.
[24] *Ibid.*, Vol. V, par. 539.
[25] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, par. 531.
[26] *Philosophy of the Act*, pp. 186, 213.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 143.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 143.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[32] *Mind, Self, and Society*, pp. 177-78.
[33] *Philosophy of the Act*, p. 412.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 413.
[35] *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI, par. 32.

fected with varying degrees of dubiety."[31] In part, the chance element in experience is introduced by what Mead calls the "I" that transcends the "me." Very briefly, the "me" represents the social aspect of the self—the self as it reflects the mores, attitudes, and attitudinal expectations of society. The "me" is the conservative, conforming character of the self. The "I," on the other hand, is the unique, individual, original, and improvisational aspect of the self. The "I" cannot be prefigured; it can be anticipated generally but never predicted precisely. Thus,

> The "I" gives the sense of freedom, of initiative. The situation is there for us to act in a self-conscious fashion. We are aware of ourselves, and of what the situation is, but exactly how we will act never gets into experience until after the action takes place.[32]

In his theory of the self Mead develops a dualism of mechanism and novelty. The determination of the organism by the environment is causal, but the determination of the environment by the organism is noncausal.[33] Organism is determined by environment in the sense of a system of explanation (such as physical systems in science) determining the meaning of an element of the system. Environment is determined by organism to the extent that the objects comprising environment are brought within the manipulatory stage of the act and are "selected" or constituted in the unity of the act. Mead's insistence on emergence and novelty in experience is a function of his concept of this organism-environment interaction. The present as emergent is, then, the product of a causal schema perpetually upset by an unpredictable organism:

> That which will happen is always different in some respect from what has happened, and this different quality is something that cannot be predicted. In a sense we can predict the future, but what we can predict is always something less than that which happens.[34]

Uncertainty, for Peirce, was more than a character of the response of organism to environment; it was a cosmological category. Reality is contingent at its root; and all, then, that is given in experience is given within the horizon of that contingency. While Peirce tells us in regard to the categories that "Chance is First,"[35] it is difficult to work out the relationship between Tychism and Firstness. In answer to

Dr. Carus's criticisms of his doctrine of chance, Peirce writes that his notion of absolute chance is not "something ultimate and inexplicable."[36] Rather, he regards the logical genesis of absolute chance as revelatory of an original, cosmological state in which chance refers not to existent elements but to the very lack of such elements, to their nonbeing. Peirce writes:

> I go back to a chaos so irregular that in strictness the word existence is not applicable to its merely germinal state of being; and here I reach a region in which the objection to ultimate causes loses its force. But I do not stop there. Even this nothingness, though it antecedes the infinitely distant absolute beginning of time, is traced back to a nothingness more rudimentary still, in which there is no variety, but only an indefinite specificability, which is nothing but a tendency to the diversification of the nothing, while leaving it as nothing as it was before.[37]

While Peirce does not appear to have worked out the systematic relationship between Firstness as a phenomenological category and Tychism as a cosmological category, it would appear that the given as ineffable, as indescribable immediacy, arises out of the chaos or the nothing. Firstness as possibility necessitates the correlative idea of possibility as nothingness. At best these matters, important as they are, remain fragmentary and obscure in Peirce's thought.

It is certainly clear that Peirce looked upon his categories as experientially integrated in their operation. "The categories are unintelligible unless they are synthesized by the principle of continuity."[38] Synechism, the principle of continuity, is "the doctrine that all that exists is continuous";[39] and, as Peirce writes in another place, it is "that tendency of philosophical thought which insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance in philosophy."[40] Philip Wiener points out that Peirce used the term "synechism" in two quite different senses, as a

[36] *Ibid.*, par. 612.

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] Eugene Freeman, *The Categories of Charles Peirce*, (Chicago, 1934), p. 48.

[39] *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, par. 172.

[40] *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, par. 169.

[41] Philip P. Wiener, "Peirce's Evolutionary Interpretations of the History of Science," *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. by Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952), pp. 148-49.

[42] Charles Morris, "Peirce, Mead, and Pragmatism," *Philosophical Review*, XLVII (1938), 114, 123.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

methodological regulative principle and as a transcendental conception.[41] Our present concern is more nearly with the latter to the extent that synechism as the underlying unity of the categories is a metaphysical conception. While it is the case that Pierce never gave a complete or systematic examination of the problem of how the categories operate in integral fashion, he at least recognized the necessity for grounding the categories in a principle which could synthesize them. Mead faces the same problem with respect to the stages of the act, but he had developed no integrating ground for the act; the act is placed within the stream of societal reality.

Charles Morris argues that Mead's avoidance of a categoriology permitted him to escape the metaphysical extravagances of Peirce.[42] Of course, Morris's interpretation of Mead is founded on the considered assumption that in Mead's writings "the instrumentalist position is never compromised, and meaning remains embedded to the end in its empirical and behavioristic context."[43] My own interpretation of Mead is in direct conflict with such a characterization. While it is clearly impossible in the limits of this discussion to present an extended, systematic argument to support my interpretation of Mead, I think a very brief statement of the issues is possible and relevant.

What I have termed "Mead's attempt to transcend behaviorism" is, in essence, the attempt to comprehend the actions and meanings of the actor in the life-world who is the experiential center of the multitude of events that occur in the field of his awareness. To understand the actions of the actor *from the point of view of the actor,* to explicate the epistemological bond between the knower and the known from the standpoint of the involved consciousness—these are problems that go beyond the scope of behavioral psychology or behavioristic philosophy. That Mead was deeply concerned with such problems is, to my reading, an inescapable truth. The great themes of Mead's work—the Self and the Other, the "I" and the "me," manipulation, distance experience, and resistance—are all problems that require an account of experience that deals above all with the situation of the individual and the meanings through which the given is constituted by him and for him as "world."

To be sure, it would be patently false to attempt to deny the be-

havioristic *elements* in Mead's thought: they are, in fact, the point of departure for what I have called the three phases in his philosophy: the approach to what is given in experience from the point of view of society, subjectivity, and temporal reconstruction of the present. To support these contentions would require a separate study.

V

I have tried to show that there are at least three conceptions of the given in Peirce:[44] the given as it is "experienced" rather than "perceived," the given as quality and potentiality, and the given as an ontological construction, as the "may-being" of possible phanerons. In Mead we have a triple attempt to deal with the problem: the given as the societal stream of events and meanings in which our consciousness of the object has a double locus in nature and subjectivity; next, the given as constituted in the act from simple impulse to final consummation; last, the given as an emergent present constituted in a radical flux, as seen from a kind of parallelogram of perspectives.

In restricting our comparison between Peirce and Mead to the problem of the given, we attempted to organize the discussion around the three central problems of resistance, tychism, and synechism. In regard to resistance we have suggested that the *first* or pure aspect of Secondness is an immediate quality to be found both in the object and in myself to the extent that my body has a unique quality in its resistance-sensitivity. In Mead, resistance is of profound importance, since it is at the basis of the individual's experience of the object as well as of role-taking. In regard to the concept of emergence in Mead, we have argued that uncertainty in experience is a function of the "I" that transcends, in principle, all expectation. The "I," according to Mead, continually upsets the causal schemas of nature. Tychism in Peirce appears to be grounded in a primordial chaos and nothingness. The relationship between that chaos and nothingness and the category of Firstness is obscure in the *Collected Papers*, but it might be that for Peirce the category of Firstness requires the related idea of possibility as nothingness. Finally, we discussed synechism as a metaphysical

[44]Cf. Thomas A. Goudge, "The Views of Charles Peirce on the Given in Experience," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXII (1935), 538.

[45]"Peirce, Mead, and Pragmatism," p. 112.

conception in Peirce needed to provide an integrating ground for the operation of the categories. We suggested that Mead's theory of the act stands in need of such an integrating conception and attempted to meet Charles Morris's opposing views in this connection. For us, Mead's significance lies largely in his attempt to go beyond behavioristic analysis in dealing with themes that center about the actor in the life-world in whose consciousness the given is structured.

Both Peirce and Mead have seen what I think are fundamental problems for any systematic philosophy or even for any philosophical spirit. They agree that there is a profound relationship between self and society, organism and environment, the given and the selective functions of mind. Moreover, mind operates in a world that is free, elusive, and emergent. I cannot agree with Morris that Peirce and Mead "present a universe unfractured by the dichotomies of subjective experience and external nature, quality and quantity, mind and matter, mechanism and purpose."[45] These are certainly the dualisms dealt with, but the internal tensions of rationalism and empiricism in Peirce and of behaviorism and transbehaviorism in Mead disqualify, it seems to me, the possibility of terming the Peirce-Mead universe "unfractured." Indeed, fracture is perhaps the most significant quality of the problems and proposals we have entertained. The dichotomies of organism and environment, consciousness and object, subjectivity and nature, are varying attempts to comprehend the given in experience. Peirce and Mead have gone far toward engaging the issues; the issues are perennial.

International Congress for Philosophy of Science, Zürich, August 23-28, 1954

ALDEN L. FISHER, *University of Louvain*

This congress was the second one held by the Union Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, but it was the first one that was international in scope. A very large number of papers were accepted for publication in the *Acts;* the ones chosen for public reading and discussion were sent in from various countries. Those actually taking part in the meetings were from forty countries, including four from behind the Iron Curtain. There were many more scientists than philosophers present.

The sessions were of two kinds: plenary and sectional. At the plenary sessions, held every morning, four papers were read (and this crowding of the program practically eliminated public discussion of the papers). The sectional meetings were devoted to the following topics: philosophy of science, theory of knowledge, history of the philosophy of science, linguistics, psychology, biology, sociology, and man and technique; there were also several symposia. This report will mention some of the major papers read at the plenary sessions and report briefly on several of the afternoon sessions.

F. Gonseth (Zürich) opened the sessions with a major address "Sur le statut de la philosophie des sciences." He rejected two positions concerning the nature of the philosophy of science. The first position rejected was that of a philosophy already founded on other grounds and which would exercise a governing function over science. Any anterior metaphysics and epistemology which have attempted to dictate to science its domains and its objects of study have never succeeded. That a philosophy of being must precede science to give it its foundation is a position to be rejected. Secondly, the philosophy of science is something more than the scientific organization of the language of science. Such a superstructure of language is the necessary theoretical and communicable part of any science and is thus an integral part of the science itself, not the philosophy of science. For his philosophy of science, Gonseth chose what he called the "open solution." This would be to develop the "real function of language"; it would make the philosophy of science essentially a discourse about science, developed after science, not before.

M. P. Bernays (Zürich) gave a rather good paper on the modern scientific value of Kant's theory of knowledge. H. Feigl (Minnesota), gave an important paper on "Some Major Issues and Developments in the Philosophy of Science." He admitted the very dogmatic character of the Vienna Circle

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Joseph Owens, C.SS.R.

THE CAUSAL PROPOSITION— PRINCIPLE OR CONCLUSION?

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I The Problem of the Causal Proposition

In the long metaphysical tradition which stems from the Aristotelian treatises, all the causes may, without the least hesitation, be called "principles." Every cause is undoubtedly a principle. But can the same be alleged of the causal proposition in its universality and necessity? Is the universal judgment "Every effect has a cause"[1] really a principle? If it is, in what sense, or with what restrictions, may it be so designated? Moreover, of what is it a principle? what purpose does it serve?

The "principle of causality" has, of course, been a commonplace in the Scholastic revival of the last hundred years. It was accepted by the pioneers of that revival on grounds of common sense and analytic evidence.[2] It was considered to be a basic and indemonstrable principle of philosophical thought.[3] In that light, quite naturally, it appeared as a principle whose function was of the utmost importance for human reasoning. But it soon brought to the fore grave difficulties regarding its character as self-evident. From this point of view, especially, it has given rise to a sharp and persistent controversy, which subsides at intervals and then flares up again, and in which as yet no general agreement has been reached.

That the controversy is not dealing with a problem which interested Aristotelian or medieval philosophy (apart from the general problems of later medieval nominalism) has been recognized with sufficient clarity.[4] True, the proposition that nothing can move itself was on occasion referred to as a "principle," and its limits in this role were

[1]The first difficulty is the initial formulation of the causal proposition. "Aussi bien est-il une seule formule métaphysique dont la teneur littérale soit irréprochable? Toutes ont besoin d'explications" (R. Kremer, "Remarques métaphysiques sur la causalité," *Annales de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie,* IV [1920], 248). ". . . la formulation du principe de causalité est une tâche à pied d'oeuvre" (Ives Simon, *Traité du libre arbitre* [Liège: Sciences et Lettres, 1951], p. 94). Cf. also Albert Lang, *Das Kausalproblem* (Cologne, 1904), pp. 18-28. No satisfactory formula of the causal proposition, in fact, seems to be possible without involving a particular metaphysical doctrine; for a metaphysical conception of what an effect is may be expected to differ radically in different types of metaphysics. The ordinary phrasing, which is philosophically neutral, is accordingly the best expedient in commencing its study. A defense of this formulation may be found in S. Bersani, "De Origine, Vi et Germana Formula Principii Causalitatis," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza), Ser. 3, I (1924), 151-61. For the arguments against its use, as well as against other current formulae of the proposition, cf. C. Fabro, "La Difesa Critica del Principio di Causa," *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica,* XXVIII (1936), 122-30.

Although the notion "effect" need not be restricted to contingent things (cf. *infra,* n. 22), it undoubtedly has its origin in the observation that such things come into being. So is the causal proposition worded in Plato: "Again, all that becomes must needs become by the agency of some cause; for without a cause nothing can come to be" (*Timaeus* 28A, trans. Francis M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1937], p. 22). ". . . for does not everything which comes into being, of necessity come into being through a cause?" (*Philebus* 26E, trans. Benjamin Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato* [New York: Random House, 1937], II, 359). So likewise, in the immediate background of the controversy regarding the principle of causality, is the genesis of the idea of "effect" described by Locke: "In the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe that several particular [*sic*], both qualities and substances, begin to exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of *cause* and *effect*" (*Essay concerning Human Understanding,* II, xxvi, 1; ed. Alexander C. Fraser [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894], I, 433). The controversy begins in Hume's (cf. text *infra,* n. 13) separating those two components in this *idea* of "effect;" that is, that of "beginning to exist" from that of "operation of some other being;" namely, that of "cause."

This background restricts the controversy to efficient causality, and rightly so. The causality of the intrinsic causes, material and formal, is self-evident once these components of a thing are distinctly grasped, while the final cause and the examplar cause exercise their causality through the efficient cause. The difficulty lies in showing how a thing necessarily contains a relation to an efficient cause which produced it, even though that efficient causality, except in the cases of one's own conscious activity, is not immediately evident.

[2]For example: "Propositio Ia. *Principium causalitatis indubium est.* Prob. primo ex communi naturae sensu. Haec propositio: *Non datur effectus sine causa,* adeo in promptu est et explorato apud omnes, ut nemo (modo rationis suae sit compos) de eius veritate dubitare serio affirmet. . . .

"Prob. secundo ex analysis terminorum. Principium: *quidquid fit, causam habet,* in analyticis est; quandoquidem sic praedi-

discussed.[5] But the preoccupation of medieval metaphysics with things,

catum cum subiecto complexum habet atque iunctum, ut si unum sustuleris, alterum quoque evanescere necesse sit" (M. Liberatore, *Institutiones Philosophicae* [1a ed. novae formae; Prati, 1881], I, 191).

"Principium causalitatis, *non datur effectus sine causa,* evidenter dictatur a sensu naturae communi, est evidenter analyticum, est intime connexum cum principio contradictionis" (T. M. Zigliara, *Metaphysica Generalis seu Ontologia,* IV, 2, in *Summa Philosophica* [17a ed.; Paris, 1926], I, 506).

"Principium causalitatis est analyticum et absolute certum. . . . Hoc totum confirmat sensus communis" (S. Tongiorgi, *Ontologia,* II, 5, 11, No. 318, in *Institutiones Philosophicae* [4a ed.; Brussels, 1869], II, 155-56).

"Principium causalitatis demonstratione non indigere, quia est per se notum. Principium causalitatis . . . judicium analyticum esse videbis; tale enim est, ut ex analysi subjecti et praedicati inveniatur ratio ejus universalitatis et necessitatis; neque enim negari potest quin eo ipso negetur principium contradictionis. . . . Confirmatur denique *communi sensu hominum"* (S. Reinstadler, *Elementa Philosophiae Scholasticae* [7a ed.; Freiburg im Bresgau, 1913] I, 370-71).

On the background of "common sense" as a criterion of truth among the early Neo-Scholastics, cf. E. Gilson, *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance* (Paris: Vrin, 1939), pp. 9-35.

[3]For example: ". . . dasselbe, was die Alten . . . *Non est effectus sine causa* ausdrücken. Jedoch es kann und muss dieser Satz über alles Sein und Erkennen ausgedehnt werden. Nichts kann sein (und folglich nichts behauptet werden) ohne hinreichenden Grund: und in dieser seiner Allgemeinheit gehört er ohne Zweifel zu den höchsten Prinzipien" (J. Kleutgen, *Die Philosophie der Vorzeit* [2 ed.; Innsbruck, 1878], I, 459).

". . . les deux axiomes fondamentaux de la philosophie et de toutes les sciences: l'axiome de contradiction et le principe de causalité" (Domet de Vorges, "Fondement de la notion de causalité," *Congrès Scientifique International des Catholiques tenu à Paris en 1888* [Paris, 1889], I, 299).
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"Ex mea nempe sententia principium causalitatis est veritas prima, quae est omnino evidens, statim ac ejus termini innotescant" (J. Fuzier, "De Origine et Natura Principii Causalitatis," *Divus Thomas* [Piacenza], Ser. 2, I [1900], 568).

"Le principe de causalité ou plus généralement de raison suffisant est à la base de nos raisonnements au sujet de l'existence des choises" (J. Laminne, "Le principe de contradiction et le principe de causalité," *Revue néoscolastique,* XIX [1912], 483).

At present it is still called "the central principle of metaphysics" by F. van Steinbergen ("Some Reflections on the Principle of Causality," *Philosophical Studies,* III [1953], 6).

[4]"Es ist nun allerdings wahr, dass die Scholastiker denselben nicht in solcher oder ähnlicher Form ausdrücklich als Prinzip anzuführen pflegen" (Kleutgen, *Philosophie der Vorzeit,* I, 459).

"Die Geltung des Kausalprinzips hat im Altertum und Mittelalter keine eigene und eingehende Behandlung gefunden, so wertvolle Bemerkungen auch gelegentlich darüber gefallen sein mögen" (A. Pechhacker, "Zur Begründung des Kausalprinzips," *Scholastik,* XXV [1950], 518).

On the reason why the problem did not interest Thomistic philosophy, cf. E. Gilson, "Les principes et les causes," *Revue Thomiste,* LX (1952), 60-61. This article, in questioning the *importance* of the principle of causality for Thomistic philosophy, adds a different element to the controversy. The controversy till then had been concerned only with the *self-evidence* of the proposition.

[5]". . . si inquam est principium primum

or at least with realities, could hardly be expected to allow too vital an interest in establishing as absolutely basic to human reasoning any other principle than *being* and the proposition which immediately arises from being; namely, that a thing cannot be and not be simultaneously in the same respects.

Metaphysicum, scio quod illud non est in Metaphysica Aristotelis scriptum. Si ipsi habeant aliam Metaphysicam, quomodo soli isti talem intellectum habuerunt, quod terminos istius principii capere poterant, omnibus aliis non potentibus capere? quia si caperent terminos, et istud esset ut principium primum, statim huic acquiesceretur, quod tamen multi non tantum non capiunt ut principium, immo dicunt simpliciter falsum pro multis ejus singularibus" (John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones Metaphysicae*, IX, 14, 23; ed. Vives, VII, 600-1.

[6]"Quaecunque sub perceptionem nostram cadunt, vel tanquam res, rerumve affectiones quasdam, consideramus; vel tanquam aeternas veritates, nullam existentiam extra cogitationem nostram habentes" (René Descartes, *Principia*, I, 48; *A-T*, VIII, p. 22, ll. 27-30). Cf. the French text (*ibid.*, IX, 45): "Je distingue tout ce qui tombe sous notre connoissance en deux genres: . . ."

[7]"Quid autem magis absurdum fingi potest, quam quod omnes communes notiones, quae menti nostrae insunt, ab istis motibus oriantur, et sine illis esse non possint? Vellem, *noster* me doceret, quisnam ille sit corporeus motus, qui potest in mente nostra formare aliquam communem notionem, exempli causa, *quod, quae eadem sunt uni tertio, sint eadem inter se*, vel quamvis aliam: omnes enim isti motus sunt particulares, notiones vero illae, universales, et nullam cum motibus affinitatem, nullamve ad ipsos relationem, habentes" (*Notae in Programma Quoddam; A-T*, VIII, p. 359, ll. 16-26).

[8]"Cum enim ait, *mentem non indigere ideis, vel notionibus, vel axiomatis innatis*, et interim ei *facultatem cogitandi* concedit (puta naturalem sive innatam), re affirmat plane idem, quod ego, sed verbo negat. Non enim unquam scripsi vel judicavi, mentem indigere ideis innatis, quae sint aliquid diversum ab ejus facultate cogitandi; sed cum adverterem, quasdam in me esse cogitationes, quae non ab objectis externis, nec a voluntatis meae determinatione procedebant, sed a sola cogitandi facultate, quae in me est, ut ideas sive notiones, quae sunt istarum cogitationum formae, ab alis *adventitiis aut factis* distinguerem, illas *innatas* vocavi" (*ibid.*, p. 357, l. 22 — p. 358, l. 6).

[9]"Cum autem agnoscimus fieri non posse, ut ex nihilo aliquid fiat, tunc propositio haec: *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, non tanquam res aliqua existens, neque etiam ut rei modus consideratur, sed ut veritas quaedam aeterna, quae in mente nostra sedem habet, vocaturque communis notio, sive axioma. Cujus generis sunt; *Impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse: Quod factum est, infectum esse nequit: Is qui cogitat, non potest non existere dum cogitat:* et alia innumera, quae quidem omnia recenseri facile non possunt, sed nec etiam ignorari, cum occurrit occasio ut de iis cogitemus, et nullis praejudiciis excaecamur" (*Principia*. I, 49; *A-T*, VIII, p. 23, l. 25 — p. 24, l. 6).

[10]"Nulla res existit de qua non possit quaeri quaenam sit causa cur existat. Hoc enim de ipso Deo quaeri potest, non quod indigeat ulla causa ut existat, sed quia ipsa ejus naturae immensitas est causa sive ratio, propter quam nulla causa indiget ad existendum" (*2ae Resp.; A-T*, VII, p. 164, l. 28 — p. 165, l. 3). French text: ". . . la cause ou la raison . . . [*ibid.*, IX, 127]). Cf. *4ae Resp., A-T*, VII, p. 235, ll. 19 sqq. Descartes had written: ". . . Deus . . . videtur non nimis improprie dici posse *sui causa*" (*1ae Resp.; A-T*, VII, p. 109, ll. 14-16). In so extending the notion of efficient causality, he attenuated the distinction between it and the formal sequence of the essential order almost to the vanishing point: ". . . existimo necesse esse ostendere inter *causam efficientem* proprie dictam et *nullam causam* esse

Under the influence of Cartesian thought, however, the background of this question quite understandably became subject to a profound modification. The most basic distinction in the objects of human cognition had been placed by Descartes in the division between things on the one hand and eternal truths on the other.[6] In origin, the eternal truths or axioms had not the least relation to sense activity.[7] They were innate in the human mind, insofar as they were formed immediately by mind once it started to function.[8] They required no other epistemological justification than their own self-evident presence.[9] Among the more important of these axioms was the causal proposition. So absolutely universal was the axiom that it applied to all things without exception, even to God.[10] With Leibniz this harsh mode of expression became modified in the "principle of sufficient reason," which restricted to creatures the notion of being "caused." But under that form it was expressly designated by Leibniz as a "principle" and was classed along with the principle of contradiction as one of the two basic principles which lie at the source of all human reasoning.[11] The causal proposition becomes a particular application of the principle of sufficient reason in the world of creatures.[12]

In such a background the function and the apparent importance of

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quid intermedium, nempe *positivam rei essentiam*, ad quam causae efficientis conceptus eodem modo potest extendi, quo solemus in Geometricis conceptum lineae circularis quammaximae ad conceptum lineae rectae, vel conceptum polygoni rectilinei, cujus indefinitus sit numerus laterum, ad conceptum circuli extendere" (*4ae Resp.*; *A-T*, VII, p. 239, ll. 15-23; IX, 185).

[11]"Nos raisonnements sont fondés sur *deux grands principes, celui de la contradiction . . . et celui de la raison suffisante*, en vertu duquel nous considérons qu'aucun fait ne saurait se trouver vrai, ou existant, aucune énonciation véritable, sans qu'il y ait une raison suffisante, pourquoi il en soit ainsi et non pas autrement" (*Monadologie*, Nos. 31-32). Cf. *Theodicée*, le partie, No. 44; and ". . . the Other great Principle of our Reasonings, viz., that of *essences;* that is, the principle of Identity or Contradiction: . . ." (*A Collection of Papers which passed between Mr. Leibniz and Dr. Clarke in the Years 1715 & 1716* [London, 1717], p. 163).

[12]"Mais la *raison suffisante* se doit trouver aussi dans les *vérités contingentes* ou *de fait*, c'est-à-dire, dans la suite des choses répandues par l'univers des créatures . . . Il y a une infinité de figures et de mouvements présents et passés qui entrent dans la cause efficiente de mon écriture présente; et il y a une infinité de petites inclinations et dispositions de mon âme, présentes et passées, qui entrent dans la cause finale" (*Monadologie*, No. 36).

the principle of causality were signalized. But difficulties in accepting the principle as self-evident were not long in arising. Hume, while not denying its universal character, could not establish it by the *ideas* of cause and effect but only through the propensity of custom.[13] This, in Kant's words, was "merely subjective necessity."[14] Kant himself

[13]". . . as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 'twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; and consequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas . . ." (*A Treatise of Human Nature*, I, 3, 3; ed. Selby-Bigge [Oxford, 1896], pp. 79-80). ". . . we assert that, after the constant conjunction of two objects—heat and flame, for instance, weight and solidity—we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other" (*Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding*, V, 1, 36; ed. Selby-Bigge [Oxford, 1902], p. 43).

Hume is approaching the question from the *ideas* of cause and effect, as these are described in Locke; for example, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, II, 26, 1; ed. Fraser (Oxford, 1894), I, 433-34.

[14]". . . mithin bloss subjektiven Notwendigkeit" (*K.R.V.*, Einleitung, II; B5).

[15]"Man nehme den Satz: Alles, was geschieht, hat seine Ursache. In dem Begriff von etwas, das geschieht, denke ich zwar ein Dasein, vor welchem eine Zeit vorhergeht etc. und daraus lassen sich analytische Urteile ziehen. Aber der Begriff einer Ursache liegt ganz ausser jenem Begriffe und zeigt etwas von dem, was geschieht, Verschiedenes an, ist also in dieser letzteren Vorstellung gar nicht mit enthalten. . . . Was ist hier das Unbekannte=X, worauf sich der Verstand stützt, wenn er ausser dem Begriff von A ein demselben fremdes Prädikat aufzufinden glaubt, welches er gleichwohl damit verknüpft zu sein erachtet? Erfahrung kann es nicht sein, weil der angeführte Grundsatz nicht allein mit grösserer Allgemeinheit, sondern auch mit dem Ausdruck der Notwendigkeit, mithin gänzlich a priori und aus blossen Begriffen diese zweite Vorstellungen zu der ersteren hinzufügt. Nun beruht auf solchen synthetischen, d.i. Erweiterungs-Grundsätzen. . ." (*Ibid.*, IV; B13 [cf. A9]).

[16]Cf. texts *supra*, nn. 2 & 3.

[17]"J'avouerai tout de suite que la thèse que j'soutiens n'est pas conforme à ce qui est enseigné dans la plupart des écoles catholiques, et qu'elle est même expressément combattue par plusieurs des plus éminents scolastiques modernes" (A. de Margerie, "Le principe de causalité. Est-il une proposition analytique ou une proposition synthétique a priori?," *Congrès scientifique international des catholiques* [Paris, 1889] I, 276).

[18]"Or le concept de phénomène n'est pas le concept de chose *produite:* il est le concept de chose qui apparait à un certain moment, après un moment ou elle n'apparaissait pas . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 277).

[19]"L'intelligence a donc . . . une vertu *additive*, la vertu de saisir comme nécessaire un rapport qui n'est donné dans l'expérience que comme contingent, de saisir comme universel, c'est-à-dire comme s'étendant à tous les cas possibles, un rapport que l'expérience n'apperçoit que dans un groupe restreint de phénomènes" (*ibid.*, p. 279). For a further clarification of this position, cf. G. Vinati, "Studio Critico intorno al Principio di Causa," *Compte rendu du 4e congrès international des catholiques* [Fribourg, Suisse: 1898], 3e section, pp. 645 ff.).

[20]"Si cette analyse est exacte et cette démonstration concluante, elles conduisent à modifier sur un point important, non comme fausse, mais comme incomplète et

found no justification for it in experience but maintained its objective character by establishing it as an a-priori category of the mind; the causal proposition was indeed a priori (that is, absolutely necessary and universal) but was synthetic instead of being analytic; and so it could fulfill its function of extending human knowledge.[15] With the advent of positivism the absolute need of establishing the causal principle disappeared, but by the same token all metaphysical treatment was banished from the domain of strictly scientific thought.

III The Neo-Scholastic Controversy

With such a background and in such an atmosphere, the apparently vital importance of the causal proposition could not escape the men engaged in the revival of the Scholastic philosophies. The indemonstrable "principle of causality" had to be given a basic position in the structure of human thought. In Cartesian fashion it was declared to be self-evident and was characterized by the Kantian term "analytic."[16]

The complacency in its analytic structure, however, was short lived. At a congress held in Paris in the year 1888, Amadée de Margerie, dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Lille, proposed with considerable trepidation that the current acceptance among Catholic writers of this analytic character was unjustified.[17] The concept of being caused was not contained in the concept of a phenomenon.[18] The principle was synthetic and had to be justified in its universal and necessary character by something in the intellect itself.[19] Such a notion of the intellect's *adding* something to what was perceived by the senses was, De Margerie clearly recognized, a considerable modification of the Aristotelian and Scholastic doctrines regarding the function of the intellect.[20]

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insuffisante, la théorie aristotélico-scolastique de la connaissance intellectuelle" (A. de Margerie, *Congrès scientifique international des catholiques*, p. 278). For St. Thomas Aquinas, as for Aristotle, the knowledge of the universal first principles is taken from singular sensible things: "Quia igitur universalium cognitionem accipimus ex singularibus, concludit manifestum esse quod necesse est prima universalia principia cognoscere per inductionem" (*In II Anal. Post.*, lect. 20 [ed. Leonine, No. 14]).

De Margerie's explanation quite naturally provoked immediate and pained reaction. It resulted in a controversy whose history has been sketched frequently enough at its various stages[21] and so need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that De Margerie's penetrating observations brought forcefully into the Neo-Scholastic ambit the argu-

[21]For example: G. Vinati, *4e congrès international des catholiques*, pp. 645-57; A. v. Schmid, "Das Causalitätsproblem," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, IX (1896), 265-70; M. Laminne, *Revue néoscolastique*, XIX (1912), 467-75; S. Bersani, *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza), Ser. 3, I (1924), 146-49; C. Fabro, *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica*, XXVIII (1936), 106-15; L. de Raeymaeker, *Metaphysica Generalis* (2nd ed.; Louvain: Warny, 1935), pp. 467-74, and *Philosophie de l'etre* (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1946), pp. 271-74. For surveys of the controversy when at its height in Germany, cf. H. Straubinger, "Evidenz und Kausalitätsbegriff," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, XLIII (1930), 1-17, and "Die Evidenz des Kausalitätsgesetzes," *ibid.*, XLIV (1931), 25-40; L.-B. Geiger, "Autour du principe de causalité," *Bulletin thomiste*, III (1930-33), 376-94, and IV (1934-36), 96-100.

[22]For example: "La notion d'être contingent réel se définit: L'être qui existe, mais dont l'essence n'inclut pas l'existence. Rien dans cette définition n'implique une relation de dépendance à l'égard d'une cause et la définition de la cause n'implique pas une relation de dépendance de la part de tout être contingent. Il n'est pas donc contradictoire de dire: un être contingent existe, sans être produit par une cause. Cela est faux, mais non contradictoire" (J. Laminne, *Revue néoscolastique*, XIX [1912], 482-83).

"Was *unfraglich* zum Begriff des fieri, des Werdens und Entstehens, als Wesensmerkmal gehört, ist *das Anfangen dazusein*. Das etwas 'geworden sei' besagt, dass es vor einem gewissen Zeitpunkt noch nicht existierte, aber in diesem Zeitpunkt zu existieren begonnen hat" (J. Geyser, *Das Prinzip vom zureichenden Grunde* [Regensburg, 1929] pp. 53-54).

Recent studies have made a sufficiently strong case toward showing that for St. Thomas Aquinas the notion of "contingent" was restricted to generable and corruptible beings. "Concludendo: nel vocabolario tomista il termine 'contingens' . . . non ha l'ampiezza originaria che aveva in Avicenna, ma serve solo, nella linea dell'esegesi averroista, ad indicare i corpi corruttibili, ed oggi possiamo dire i corpi in genere" (C. Fabro, "Intorno alla Nozione 'Tomista' di Contingenza," *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica*, XXX [1938], 145). Similarly, T. B. Wright, "Necessary and Contingent Being in St. Thomas," *New Scholasticism*, XXV (1951), 439-66.

[23]At one stage of the controversy, Joseph de Vries could write: ". . . das geschieht aber ursprünglich in einem—ja, wagen wir das gefürchtete Wort—in einem synthetischen Urteil a priori. Dass das Kausalitätsprinzip ein solches Urteil ist—im Sinne der anfänglichen Fragestellung Kants, nicht im Sinne seiner subjektivistischen Deutung dieser Urteile—, das wird heute im Grunde von allen zugegeben" ("Zur Frage der Begründung des Kausalitätsprinzips," *Stimmen der Zeit*, CXXIII [1932], 381). He himself explains it as follows: "Und doch, es ist kein rein analytisches Urteil! 'Von einem andern bestimmt sein' fügt begrifflich zu dem 'nicht aus sich selbst bestimmt sein' etwas Neues hinzu. Was berechtigt dieser 'additio'? Wir antworten: Die beim Vergleich der beiden Inhalte klar sich zeigende wesensnotwendige Zusammengehörigkeit: Aus dem 'bestimmt sein, aber nicht aus sich selbst' folgt mit absoluter Notwendigkeit das 'von einen andern bestimmt sein.' Wegen dieser Evidenz fügen wir zum Subjektsbegriff unabhängig von der Erfahrung (d.h. a priori) das Prädikat hinzu. Mit andern Worten: Das Urteil ist ein synthetisches Urteil a priori . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 388).

[24]". . . so ist das Kausalgesetz dennoch eine Forderung der Vernunft. Es folgt

ment of Hume and Kant—the notion of "caused" is not contained in the concept of what begins to exist. This argument has been repeated in still clearer and more incisive terms by later writers.[22] Though it has been rejected by the greater number of Neo-Scholastics, it has never been satisfactorily answered in its own context. No one has been able to show that the *concept* of a contingent thing need contain the concept of being caused. A thing can, in this background at least, be *conceived* as at one moment not existing and at the next as existing, without that concept containing any more than the nature of the thing and the actual or possible limitation of its existence by a point in time.

IV "Nonanalytic" Views

As a result numerous attempts have been made to establish the causal proposition on grounds other than the analysis of its subject. Some of these efforts have followed the synthetic a-priori lead suggested by De Margerie.[23] Others, pushing this line of thought to its extreme, have claimed that the only way to justify the causal proposition is to *postulate* it as a principle necessarily required by human thought.[24] Other attempts, less extreme in expression, have invoked the *intelligibility* of things as its ultimate justification.[25] Still others, proceeding in a different way, have sought to generalize the immediate *internal* experience of causality, either through a study of its causal *relation* in comparison with the regularity of the processes of nature[26] or on grounds of the

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nicht aus dem Begriff des Entstehens nach dem Satz vom Widerspruch, es ergibt sich aber aus der Anwendung des allgemeinen Seinsgesetzes vom zureichenden Grunde auf das Entstehen. Der Satz vom zureichenden Grunde ist seinerseits zwar, wie wir gesehen haben, auch nicht analytischer Art, aber er bringt doch ein Postulat der Vernunft zum Ausdruck" (F. Sawicki, *Die Gottesbeweise* [Paderborn: 1926], p. 56). Cf.: "Dieses Vertrauen ist *ein Postulat, eine Forderung und notwendige Voraussetzung der Wissenschaft, ja des menschlichen Denkens überhaupt*" (*ibid.*, p. 31). Cf. also "Das Irrationale in den Grundlagen der Erkenntnis und die Gottesbeweise," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, XLIV (1931), 410. Similarly J. Hessen, *Das Kausalprinzip* (Augsburg, 1928), pp. 227-28.

[25]"On a pu dire dans ce sens que ce principe se confond avec l'affirmation que toute chose est intelligible; le nier c'est renoncer à se servir de sa raison au sujet de l'existence des choses" (J. Laminne, *Revue néoscolastique*, XIX [1912], 484).

[26]"Eine solche Wahrnehmung machen wir nun in der inneren Erfahrung. Gewiss bezeugen alle diese inneren Erfahrungen das Vorhandensein der Kausalrelation immer nur für bestimmte Fälle. Aber nun greifen unsere früheren Wesensfestellungen

type of *being* immediately known in that internal experience.[27]

No one of these solutions has received any wide acceptance. The variety of effort, however, serves at least to emphasize the fact that many Neo-Scholastics have seriously considered the problem and have failed to see that the causal proposition is immediately evident through

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über die Natur der Relationen als generalisierende Prämissen ein. . . . Entweder beruht alles Dasein von Kontingentem auf Zufall oder gar keines. Dass sicher nicht alles Dasein von Kontingentem auf blindem Zufall beruht, wird evident durch die innere und auch durch die aüssere Erfahrung bezeugt" (J. Geyser, *Das Prinzip vom Zureichenden Grunde*, pp. 118-19). Cf. *ibid.*, p. 134, and *Das Gesetz der Ursache* (München, 1933), pp. 81-107.

[27]". . . dépendre ainsi au titre propre de l'être répond à la formule meme du devenir comme tel que j'appréhende immédiatement en moi; en d'autres termes, 'le devenir comme tel dépend d'une raison ontologique, l'effet dépend d'une cause.' C'est précisément le *principe de causalité*, c'est-à-dire le principe de raison suffisante appliqué au devenir . . ." (P. Descoqs, *Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis* [Paris: Beauchesne, 1932], I, 53. In *Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1925), I, 573, Descoqs classed the principle of causality as synthetic in relation to the principle of sufficient reason in the discursive order but analytic in the order of intuition.

"So bietet uns die innere Erfahrung die Tatsache, das etwas von einer Ursache abhängt. Der reflektierende Verstand erschaut, geleitet und geführt von dieser Tatsache, den Gesichtspunkt, auf dem diese Abhängigkeit beruht: es ist die Kontingenz. Daraufhin muss ich bei allen Dingen, an denen ich das gleiche Moment der Kontingenz finde, auf entsprechende Abhängigkeit von einer Ursache Schliessen" (A. Pechhacker, *Scholastik*, XXV [1950], 532).

[28]For example: "Propositio 2a. *Principium causalitatis ex effato contradictionis proxime sequitur*" (M. Liberatore, *Institutiones Philosophicae* [1881], I, 192). "Quapropter principium causalitatis . . . est verum iudicium *analyticum*, in quo praedicatum ita cum subiecto connectitur, ut, si ipsum inde sustuleris, subiecti simul notionem evanescere necesse sit. Unde principium causalitatis suam vim inconcussam ex ipso contradictionis principio desumit" (C. Sanseverino, *Ontologia*, V, 3, No. 288, in *Elementa Philosophiae Christianae* [2a ed., Naples: 1873], II, 174). Cf. *supra*, n. 2, for other earlier Neo-Scholastics. Similarly later ones; for example: "Ratione controversiae satis supra iudicatae, hic tantum volumus ostendere huius principii reductibilitatem ad principium contradictionis" (F.-X. Maquart, *Elementa Philosophiae* [Paris: Blot, 1938], III, 238).

[29]For example: J. Maritain, *Sept lecons sur l'être* (Paris: Téqui, 1934), pp. 144 and 115-16, and *A Preface to Metaphysics* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1948), pp. 133 and 104-5 (cf. *infra*, n. 95); H. Renard, *The Philosophy of Being* (2nd ed., Milwaukee: Bruce, 1947), pp. 125-27. Those who reduce the principle of causality to the principle of sufficient reason but not to the principle of contradiction (for example, Laminne, Sawicki, Descoqs, and so on, cf. *supra*, nn. 24-27) propose "non-analytic" solutions of the problem. They consider the causal proposition as a particular application of the principle of sufficient reason and so establish the principle of causality in the same way as they justify the principle of sufficient reason. "Le principe de causalité n'est que le conséquence du principe général de raison suffisante concernant les choses réelles" (J. Laminne, *Revue néoscolastique*, XIX [1912], 482).

[30]"On énonce parfois le principe de causalité sous cette forme: Tout effet a une cause. Et l'on entend par *effet* une chose faite, c'est-à-dire, produite ou causée. Dans ce sens le principe de causalité est strictement analytique. On ne peut le nier

an analysis of its subject. This fact would be hard to explain if the notion of a contingent thing immediately involved the notion of being caused.

V Insufficiency of the "Analytic" Defense of the Principle

The usual way of defending the analytic character in the causal proposition has been an appeal to the first principle of demonstration, either directly[28] or through the principle of sufficient reason.[29] Such a procedure cannot but be futile, since it has to presuppose that the causal proposition is in itself already evident. The notion of "effect" would have to be established, universally and necessarily, as the notion of something "caused."[30] Only then would the first principle of demonstration guarantee that the effect cannot be "not-caused," just as in the case of any other positive affirmation. Through human cognition a thing is perceived to have come at a certain point of time into being, being that was not there before. The thing is thereby established as contingent. That is all that is contained in the original concept. What justifies the universal and necessary addition of the notion "caused" to the notion of "contingent"? Once that notion has been added, universally and necessarily, then a contingent thing cannot be uncaused without ceasing to be contingent. But before one can invoke such an application of the first principle of demonstration, one must have already established the contingent thing as *necessarily* a caused thing.

Similarly, the placing of the alternatives "A thing must be either

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sans contradiction. Mais aussi dans ce sense il n'est d'aucun secours pour démontrer l'existence d'une cause, puisque avant de pouvoir appliquer le principe à un objet, il faut *au préalable* démontrer qu'il est un effet, qu'il est causé" (J. Laminne, *Revue néoscolastique,* XIX [1912], 464). "Mais on ne peut dire qu'il est impossible de maintainir le principe de contradiction si on nie le principe de causalité" (*ibid.,* p. 483).

"Une fois reconnu que l'être fini implique ses causes, il devient contradictoire de les lui refuser, mais le principe de contradiction n'implique pas que l'être comme tel doive avoir une cause, ou, en d'autres termes, que la notion d'être incausé soit impossible. . . . la réduction formelle du principe de causalité au principe de contradiction est impossible. La guarantie nécessaire apportée à toute inférence causale par le principe de contradiction suppose que la causalité ellememe soit donnée. On ne déduit pas de la guarantie ce qu'on lui demande de guarantir" (E. Gilson, *Revue thomiste,* LX [1952], 60).

through itself or through another" is not immediately evident. The primitive notion of "being" does not immediately express either "through another" or "not through another."[31] It expresses merely "being"; and the fact that a particular being is seen to exist after not having existed before adds only the note of contingence. Neither of the notions "through itself" or "through another" appears immediately in the notion of contingent being.

[31]". . . sed quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis simpliciter, propter hoc invenitur aliquod ens non causatum" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *ST*, I, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1. Cf. *CG*, II, cap. 52; ed. Leonine, XIII, 387b19-22).

[32]F. van Steenbergen, *Ontologie* (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1946), p. 79, n. 2. Cf.: "Le principe de causalité est évident en vertu du principe du tiers-exclu: pour tout être qui existe, il n'y a pas d'autre alternative possible que d'être par soi ou par autre chose que soi . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 79).

[33]"En realité, 'être par soi' signifie tout simplement 'être non par un autre' . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 80, n.). Against a similar position of the alternatives, Geyser wrote: "Er [that is, the adversary of J. Gredt's position] behauptet vielmehr, *es sei eben nicht alles fieri ein recipere esse, der Empfang des Seins bilde nicht das wesen des fieri,* und darum behauptet er weiter, Gredts Aufzählung der Möglichkeiten sei unvollstandig, wo er schreibe: 'quod enim fit, non est a se, sed ab alio.' Dass die dritte Möglichkeit: ei quod fit, suum esse *non datur,* eine Absurdität sei, müsste von Gredt zureichend begründet werden, wird dies aber nicht" (*Das Prinzip von zureichendem Grunde,* p. 54). Where one notion abstracts from another without prescinding from it, the denial of the second notion does not establish the opposite; that is, the denial of unity to a nature absolutely considered does not establish its plurality: "Unde si queratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici una uel plures neutrum concedendum est, quia utrumque extra intellectum humanitatis . . ." (St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente,* cap. 3; ed. Roland-Gosselin [Kain, Belgique: La Saulchoir, 1926], p. 24, ll. 10-12). Similarly, the nature which is predicated of the singulars abstracts from any *esse* whatsoever (*ibid.*, p. 26, 8-10).

[34]For example, G. Vinati, "Studio Critico intorno al Principio di Causa," *Compte rendu du 4e congrès scientifique international des catholiques tenu à Fribourg, 1897,* 3e section (Fribourg, Suisse; 1898), pp. 658-60. More recently: ". . . l'analyse de l'identité quidditative abstraite ne peut révéler la causalité. Mais la situation est tout autre si l'on considère l'*être 'concret':* son essence est identiquement un 'mode d'être' par lequel il se trouve inséré dans un 'ordre' d'êtres: et s'il est matériel, son essence porte un caractère d'individualité qui le distingue d'autres individus et le rattache à l'ordre de l'espèce. La connaissance de l'être concret particulier atteint donc formellement la relativité de cet être, son appartenance nécessaire à un ordre d'êres, et donc aussi sa référence à la cause dont il dépend; le point de vue de l'identité implique, cette fois, celui de la causalité" (L. de Raeymaeker, *Philosophie de l'être* [Louvain: 1946], pp. 273-74).

[35]". . . I have never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that *anything might arise without a cause:* I only maintained, that our Certainty of the Falsehood of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition or Demonstration: but from another source" (*The Letters of David Hume,* ed. J. Y. T. Greig [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932], I, 187).

[36]De Raeymaeker, following the text of St. Thomas, formulates the causal proposition as "tout être composé est un être cause," after having stated that "ce qui existe par participation . . . est, à raison de cela même, l'effet d'une cause" (*Philosophie de l'être,* p. 266).

There is here no question of a "verbal equivocation"[82] through failing to understand what the notion of "being through itself" means. Even if "being through itself" is understood as "being not by another,"[83] the result is still negative. The contingent being need appear, on the application of the alternatives, merely negatively as neither "being by another" nor "being not by another." A positive causal relation to another is not thereby shown, and neither is it excluded.

Nor is the question solved by admitting that the quidditative concept of an effect does not reveal any relation to a cause but by claiming that the concrete reality shows itself to be identified with such a relativity.[84] How? Not even Hume would assert that an effect could be in the real, concrete order without having a cause.[85] But why? What is there in the thing over and above its quidditative content which reveals that quidditative content as a "mode of being" (identified thereby with a causal relation) and not just as a "being"? To consider an essence in this way as a *mode* of being involves a complicated doctrine of participation and entitative composition.[86]

[*To be continued*]

Monads and Matter: A Note On Leibniz's Metaphysics

NICHOLAS RESCHER

Leibniz's correspondence with Father des Bosses, who taught theology at the Jesuit school at Hildesheim, is of fundamental importance for an understanding of Leibniz's metaphysics.[1] For here, in the course of a discussion of the dogma of transubstantiation, Leibniz develops in detail his concept of a *vinculum substantiale*, a bond that can fuse into organized wholes the monads which are the ontological basis of his metaphysical system. Leibniz's motives for the philosophical contentions made in this correspondence with Des Bosses have been questioned:

> In later letters, the doctrine [of the *vinculum substantiale*] is usually presupposed as the basis of discussion, and is employed to establish real matter and a real continuum. But nowhere does Leibniz himself assert

[1]This correspondence is given in the second volume of Leibniz's *Philosophische Schriften*, ed. by C. I. Gerhardt (7 vols. Berlin, 1875-90).

[2]Bertrand Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (London, 1900), p. 152.

[3]Also given in the second volume of *Philosophische Schriften*.

[4]H. W. B. Joseph, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Leibniz* (Oxford, 1949), p. 43.

[5]This "perception" is indeed related to what is ordinarily so called, but the relation is a distant one. Only if some monad draws on the perceptions of others in "domination" (see below) to an extent exceeding a certain threshhold does it "perceive" in our sense; otherwise it has but unconscious or *little* perceptions. Leibniz draws an analogy between the fusion of an infinity of perceptions, "little" in themselves, into a conscious awareness, and the procedure of integration in the calculus.

[6]*Philosophische Schriften*, II, 96-97, 517.

[7]By Leibniz's conception of space such aggregates form a spatial unit (*ibid.*, 457). At a given moment of time monads are similar in point of view if their states for that moment are similar; that is, if they perceive each other clearly. Space for Leibniz is nothing but the system of points of view. (See No. 61 of the *Monadology* and No. 3 of the *Principles of Nature and of Grace.*)

Thus when Russell writes that "since nothing really acts on anything else, there seems no plausible reason why, in monads which mirror the whole universe, the perception of what is distant should not be a cause just as much as the perception of what is near" (*Critical Exposition*, p. 93), he overlooks the fact that for Leibniz *causation* is nothing but clear perception. ". . . on attribue l'Action à la Monade en tant qu'elle a des perceptions distinctes" (*Monadology*, No. 49. See also No. 52, and cf. *Philosophische Schriften*, II, 57, 59, 71, 112-13 and VII, 312).

[8]Leibniz draws the common-sense distinction between illusory and "real" phenomena in the essay *De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis* (*Philosophische Schriften*, VII, 319-22).

that he believes it. He was extremely anxious to persuade Catholics that they might, without heresy, believe in his doctrine of monads. Thus the *vinculum substantiale* is rather the concession of a diplomatist than the creed of a philosopher.[3]

In view of this rebuke it is of interest to remark that the contentions of Leibniz's to which Russell objects are all to be found, in effect, in Leibniz's correspondence about some points in the philosophy of physics with Burcher de Volder, a Cartesian who taught mathematics, physics, and philosophy at Leyden.[3] Though Leibniz does not here use the term *vinculum substantiale,* he presents all essentials of the doctrine in question. And its roots, very plainly, are not found in any desire to persuade, but in Leibniz's belief that, as one recent commentator put it, "he was establishing a connection between his metaphysical theory of nature and the truths of dynamics."[4] It will be my aim in this note to briefly examine this connection in its relation to Leibniz's concept of monads organized into wholes.

A short review of some features of the monads is required. Leibniz conceives of these as being nonextended, perduring entities, possessing attributes which vary constantly and continuously. He holds the universe to be a *plenum* of such "substances." There is a pre-established harmony as a result of which there corresponds to every momentary state of each monad exactly one momentary state of every other monad—a correspondence which is capable of varying degrees of completeness, since the states may agree with one another to a greater or lesser extent. The fact that a given state of monad *A* corresponds to the contemporaneous state of monad *B* is characterized by Leibniz by saying that *B perceives A* (or, inversely, that *A represents B*); that this is a matter of degree he signalizes by saying that perception (representation) takes place with varying degrees of *clarity* or *confusion.*[5] Since a monad perceives the contemporary state of all others at each moment, Leibniz says that it *mirrors* its entire contemporary world.

We now come to Leibniz's crucial concept of a *monadic aggregate.* This is a group of monads which perceive each other with great clarity, far exceeding that with which they perceive any monad external to the group.[6] Such a collection of monads, by virtue of the mutual perceptions of its members, possesses a measure of unity and coherence.[7] And in case one monad of the collection perceives all others with special clarity—and in this sense "dominates" them in its perception and so as bonding substance links them all to itself (*vinculum substantiale*)—the aggregate is held to be a virtual unit or individual. The aggregational character of a group of monads is independent of any external perceiver, and it is aggregation which accounts for the fact that something is "independently real" in nonillusory human experience.[8] Aggregation provides the only way in which the otherwise in-

dependent or "windowless" monads can combine.

Leibniz holds that since the objects of our experience (and hence the subject matter of our science) owe their existence to monadic aggregation, all of their properties must be *founded in,* or *derived from,* the attributes of the constituent monads.[9] How does he proceed to make good this claim?

First we must examine Leibniz's use of some important terms. A characteristic is *primitive* if it characterizes monads and *derivative* if it characterizes aggregates; that is, if it derives in the aggregation of monads from some primitive monadic characteristic.[10] But what is primitive, it must be realized, is simply the series of the perceptions of monads and nothing else. Thus Leibniz comes to call perception *primitive force,* the clear perceptions of a monad being its *primitive active force* (*vis primitiva agendi*) and its confused perceptions *primitive passive force* (*vis primitiva patiendi*) or, preferably, *prime matter* (*materia prima*).[11]

As can be expected, these primitive features of monads give rise to derivative aggregational characteristics. From the passive aspect of monads, their prime matter, there arises in aggregation what Leibniz calls "secondary matter" (*materia secunda*)—the "matter" of the physics of his time—along with its principal features, including especially the two basic derivative passive forces (*vires derivativae patiendi*): inertia (*resistentia*) and impenetrability (*antitypia*).[12] There are also several derivative active forces (*vires derivativae agendi*). These are the "forces" of the physics of the time and include especially what Leibniz terms "live force" (*vis viva*), by which he understands essentially what is now called kinetic energy.[13] Thus Leibniz holds that the entire subject matter of the physical science of his time (that

[9]*Philosophische Schriften,* II, 270, 450; IV, 471-77. See also p. 139 of the *Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wolf,* ed. by C. I. Gerhardt (Halle, 1860).

[10]*Philosophische Schriften,* II, 251, 306, 517; and *Mathematische Schriften,* ed. by C. I. Gerhardt (7 vols. Berlin and Halle, 1849-56), VI, 101, 236.

[11]*Philosophische Schriften,* II, 206, 244-45, 250-52; *Mathematische Schriften,* VI, 100-101.

[12]*Philosophische Schriften,* II, 171, 184, 306; *Mathematische Schriften,* VI, 100, 236-37.

[13]Its derivative character is assured by the statement, "Vires quae ex massa et velocitate oriuntur, derivativae sunt" (*Philosophische Schriften,* II, 251). Regarding derivative active forces see also *ibid.,* 2, 171, 201 ff., 275-76 and *Mathematische Schriften,* VI, 101-3, 236-37.

[14]It should be noted that the monad is its own clock and that space is derivable in the manner of footnote 7. For Leibniz's derivation of mechanics see the essay *Specimen dynamicum pro admirandis naturae legibus circa corporum vires et mutuas actiones detegendis et ad suas causas revocandis* (*Mathematische Schriften,* VI, 234 ff.; cf. 98 ff.).

[15]*Philosophische Schriften,* II, 314.

[16]*Ibid.,* 78.

[17]*Ibid.,* 250.

[18]*Ibid.,* 58.

[19]Leibniz himself draws the analogy between position and that of the atomists (*ibid.,* 252).

[20]This aspect of Leibniz's mechanism is most explicit in his illuminating letter to De Volder (*ibid.,* 248-53).

is, mechanics) is "derived" from the two primitive forces, since the structure of the monad, its series of perceptions, suffices to account for the fundamental concepts of mechanics.[14]

Leibniz's mechanism enters at this juncture and enables him to proceed beyond this point. For according to it, all natural processes are complexes of mechanical ones, and thus all natural phenomena (human perception alone excepted) can be explained mechanically. "It is the case that all the phenomena of material objects (*corpora naturalia*), excepting perceptions, can be accounted for in terms of magnitude, shape, and motion."[15] "All the phenomena of material objects (*corps*) can be explained mechanically or by the corpuscular philosophy, in accordance with certain mechanical principles . . ."[16] "Moreover in the phenomena, i.e., in the aggregate[s] resulting [from monads], all is explained mechanically . . ."[17] "Nature must always be explained mechanically and mathematically, provided one bears in mind that the principles or laws of mechanics themselves do not derive from mere mathematical extension, but from metaphysical reasons."[18]

Thus we see that the idea of a monadic aggregate, and so of a *vinculum substantiale*, is the basis of Leibniz's account of matter within the framework of the monadic theory. The mechanical properties of material objects are "derived" directly in aggregation; and then their remaining properties are to be accounted for mechanically.

From this viewpoint we also clearly see the intimate connection which obtains between Leibniz's metaphysics, his monadism, and his mechanistic position in natural philosophy. With metaphysics (as with any scientific "reduction," say, to atoms or force or energy) the question of explanatory adequacy arises, since what is held to be "ultimately real" must—somehow—give rise to all there is.[19] By making the derivation of mechanical characteristics suffice for that of aggregational characteristics in general, Leibniz's mechanism provides the machinery with which he endeavors to show the explanatory adequacy of the monadic theory.[20]

International Congress for Philosophy of Science, Zürich, August 23-28, 1954

[*Continued from p. 158*]

in the beginning and indicated the various changes that followed. His own present attitude was very open, even going so far as to consider some metaphysics acceptable. Piaget (Geneva and Paris) gave a paper on "The General Lines of a Genetic Epistemology," which summarized his previous work in a clear and provocative fashion. Destouches (Sorbonne) gave a paper

worth noting. He developed an interesting thesis on the two possible, equally logical, interpretations of physical knowledge, realist or phenomenalist. Pereleman (Brussels) gave a good paper on "The Role of Decision in the Theory of Knowledge." The paper of Filiasi-Carcano (Naples), "Confrontation of the Different Currents of the Philosophy of Science," was noteworthy in that it represented the only serious mention and defense of phenomenology at this congress. G. Klubertanz, S.J. (Saint Louis), gave a paper, "A Program for Progress in the Philosophy of Science" (read *in absentia* by A. Fisher), which was received favorably in spite of a widespread vague suspicion of Catholic thinkers. Two major papers were given by the Russians in the plenary sessions. The first by Fedosseev on the science of society was pure propaganda and the party line; the speaker categorically refused to enter into a discussion of it.

The symposium under the direction of Wolfgang Pauli created the most interest: "Phenomenon and Physical Reality." The discussion was lively, but nothing was concluded. In the psychology symposium under Piaget what was noteworthy was the divergence of views: behaviorism and antibehaviorism, reductionism and antireductionism, and so on. An interesting fact was the interest in cybernetics. Quite a few "cyberneticians" were present, and special meetings were organized.

In general, the positivists were in the saddle. This tendency was marked both by the professional affiliations of the men who attended and by the tenor of the discussions. Yet some of the papers were of high quality and will bear reading when the *Acts* is published.

Chronicle

The Association for Realistic Philosophy held its annual meeting at the University of Connecticut, October 22 and 23. There were three main papers: "The Common Good and the General Welfare," by H. M. Austin; "Comments on Analogy," by V. Decarie; and "On Human Freedom," by L. B. Geiger, O.P.; Paul Dietrichson gave a prepared comment on this last paper.

JOSEPH DE FINANCE, S.J., *Séminaire des Missions, Vals-près-Le Puy*

***Les études philosophiques*, octobre-décembre, 1952. (Paris, Presses universitaires de France).**

This issue is entirely dedicated to Maurice Blondel. Most of the items are communications delivered on December 13, 1952, at Aix, where the disciples and admirers of the philosopher had organized a "journée blondélienne."

Worthy of special mention are A. Forest's "A Praying Philosophy" ("Une philosophie orante"), which is a very fine study of the inmost character of Blondel's philosophical reflection; A. Hayen's "A Master's Testament," concerned with what it is to be true to Blondel; R. Jolivet's "M. Blondel and Existential Thought," which claims that Blondelianism is a genuine existential philosophy that stands in perfect opposition to Sartre's existentialism; A. Cartier's "Existential Thought and Dialectics of Action"; P. Lachieze-Rey's "Blondel and Bergson"; H. Dumery's "Blondel and the Reflexive Method"; and B. Romeyer's "Religious Action and Its Superstitious Deviations," which is a ratification of Blondel's statements about natural religion.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University*

***The Return to Reason: Essays in Realistic Philosophy*. Ed. by John Wild. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953. Pp. x + 373. $7.50.**

This is one of the significant documents of contemporary philosophy. All the major intellectual movements in twentieth-century America have been announced in co-operative volumes. To the earlier programs of new and critical realism, naturalism, and materialism must now be added this joint declaration in favor of a metaphysical realism. It is a sampling of the outlook being fostered by the Association for Realistic Philosophy, whose guiding spirit—John Wild of Harvard—is also the editor of the present group of essays. The platform issued by this association is printed as an appendix to *The Return to Reason*. It contains three basic propositions: (1) there is a real cosmos, composed of both material and immaterial substances or

modes of being; (2) the actual structures or essences of these entities are knowable by the human mind, which is determined primarily by the real world; (3) such knowledge, especially as bearing on human nature, provides us with some reliable and permanent principles of conduct, so that individual and social life may be ordered according to the natural law. Thus a metaphysical, epistemological, and moral realism is advocated, which will remedy the exclusively epistemological orientation of previous realistic philosophies in America. All of the contributors to Wild's symposium agree upon this minimal basis, although each one makes his own independent elaboration and defense.

The essays are grouped into two parts, the first dealing with speculative issues and the second with the practical, normative field. The two divisions are, however, of unequal worth and dissimilar purpose. Most of the essays in the speculative section come directly to grips with basic problems and display a sound understanding of the realistic tradition. In the practical section, however, the connection with the general standpoint is frequently lost sight of or merely alluded to in a loose way. The practical essays do illustrate the concern of realism for the governance of conduct in all phases of modern life, and yet they fail to lay the rigorous foundations for practical philosophy.

Of the seven chapters in the first part, two are primarily polemical in import: Oliver Martin's critique of naturalism and materialism and Jesse De Boer's study of the concepts of continuity and infinity in Bergson and Russell. Martin's contribution is of special interest, since it offers a detailed, critical analysis of two influential symposiums of the past decade, *Naturalism and the Human Spirit,* edited by Y. H. Krikorian, and the manifesto of contemporary materialism, *Philosophy for the Future,* edited by Sellars, McGill, and Farber. Martin ruthlessly exposes the inadequacies in the naturalistic position. Naturalists are unable to decide whether to define their stand in terms of subject matter or of method. They cannot agree among themselves about the exact description of nature and the philosophical import of the scientific method. Either they must beg the question about the sole reality of the spatio-temporal world or else they must suppose that the experimental method gives information about itself and the scope of the real. As for recent materialism, it has deflected attention from its shaky theoretical foundation by insisting warmly and even indignantly that a materialist can be just as upright as anyone else—and perhaps more high-minded. Martin does not dispute this edifying biographical fact; but he does ask whether the moral "idealism" is there because of, or in spite of, the speculative materialism. In a more technical way, he inquires whether the connection between materialism and moral uprightness is based on a necessary

implication of doctrine or on an admirable but wholly contingent relation of conjunction, at the personal level. Materialism cannot take any credit for the fine moral ideals held in a purely conjunctive way by some high-minded persons who are also materialists.

Martin concludes his paper with the following statement made by John Dewey, in the course of one of his last articles: "What is needed is not the carrying over of procedures that have approved themselves in physical science, but *new* methods as adapted to *human* issues and problems, as methods already in scientific use have shown themselves to be in physical subject matter" (Dewey's italics). This suggestion of a plurality of methods, and not merely of procedures and techniques, has produced some consternation in the ranks of the orthodox naturalists and materialists, along with their counterparts in the educational world. On the contrary, the realistic program calls precisely for the adaption of different methods to different subject matters, especially the various aspects of human nature. Unfortunately, however, the essay on a realistic philosophy of education does not explore this issue as thoroughly as it deserves in view of the present crucial situation in American educational theory and policy.

The backbone of *The Return to Reason* is constituted by four essays: "Realism and Phenomenology," by H. M. Chapman; "Phenomenology and Metaphysics," by John Wild; "Realistic Epistemology," by F. H. Parker; and "For a Realistic Logic," by Henry Veatch. Their clear and vigorous approach to topics is enhanced by a skillful use of contemporary techniques. They provide valuable hints for anyone trying to formulate a realistic doctrine, even one of a more definitely Thomistic cast than is advocated in this book.

Wild's paper recalls the main point covered in the metaphysical portion of his textbook, *Introduction to Realistic Philosophy* (1948). What distinguishes his realism from previous American realisms is its employment of a phenomenological method as well as its firm inclusion of epistemology within the prior context of a doctrine on being. Wild also displays the influence of Van Steenberghen's *Ontology* upon his view of existence and his proof of God's existence. He steers clear of the arguments from motion and efficient causation, since he regards them as being encumbered with questionable cosmological assumptions. Only in a variation on the argument from contingency does he find a strictly metaphysical inference. Veatch's contribution is a digest of the theses already expounded in his *Intentional Logic* (1952). Not content with maintaining the intentional character of the forms of thought, he holds that modern symbolic logic is nonintentional and hence is a part of mathematics and not of logic. His notion of the connection between the real relation of cognitive identity and the purely logical

relation of identity remains to be clarified. He furnishes a useful critique of the modern Leibnizian assumption that logical forms must be isomorphic with the structure of the real world.

Chapman's account of phenomenology in the service of realism is a remarkable achievement. For one thing, the essay is itself an instance of phenomenological reflection and is not merely about phenomenology. It is an authentic and intelligible example of a careful description of the immediate data of awareness. The classical thesis about the intentionality of thought is given a descriptive basis, and a defense is made of both sense experience and reflection. Because they are jointly incorporated into realism, the latter can sustain its claim to be a genuine radical empiricism. The harmonious relation between experience and reflection is clearly exhibited in Parker's discussion of epistemology. He starts with the view that epistemology depends on knowledge, rather than the converse, and that our knowldge is always of something other than itself. This leads to an analysis of the relation of consciousness to the world as other and then to a consideration of the veracity of this intentional reference. His study of the intentional reference as such is more detailed and strongly argued than his brief treatment of its trustworthiness to disclose the real. He makes a capital distinction between the object as a concept or mental form and as a real terminus of knowledge. This enables him to distinguish between the sense in which knowledge and the thing known are identical (in respect to the real, terminal object) and the sense in which they are distinct (in respect to the intentional form as mental object). The few pages devoted to the "copy theory" of ideas is a concise refutation of this substitute for the intentionality of concepts.

In the practical section of this book, Eliseo Vivas (who, during his naturalistic days, contributed to the Krikorian volume) provides a sketch of a realistic aesthetics without determining the meaning of "real facts." W. A. Banner discusses natural law, basing his conception mainly on Suarez and Grotius. Charles Malik, the minister of Lebanon and chairman of the U. N. Human Rights Commission, makes a moving plea for a scientific, democratic, and humane solution of the problem of Asia. Robert Jordan subjects Karl Popper's charge about Plato's totalitarianism to a merciless textual criticism. But what should have been the anchor essay on reason and practice fails to grasp the nature of practical reason and the reality of will and natural tendency.

Among the lines of inquiry that call for further investigation along realistic lines, the following are outstanding. (1) The precise relation between realistic and Husserlian phenomenology needs to be worked out. Although these realists deplore Husserl's later idealism, they do not establish how far

they agree with his technical method or how it can be given a realistic outcome. As Edith Stein saw, the central question for a realist is whether the *epoche* is a necessary condition for revealing essential structures and whether this *epoche* must entail the idealistic reduction. (2) The editor mentions the possibility of deriving aid from the analyses made by existentialism. There are at least three specific directions in which a study of existentialism would be helpful. First, most of the existentialists have already faced the problem of detaching the phenomenological method from Husserlian idealism. Second, their studies on the relation between intentional consciousness and the world have stressed certain existential aspects, which realism has not yet mentioned. Finally, the theme of "my body" is an important one for developing both a realistic epistemology and a realistic anthropology. Of all the essays in the present symposium, that by Mr. Malik (who is a competent student of Heidegger's philosophy) comes closest to incorporating some of these existentialist factors. (3) The fate of philosophy of nature in this realism in uncertain. The essay on Bergson and Russell is the only one touching on cosmological issues, but it does so mainly in a negative way. There is need for a precise realistic evaluation of the scientific method and the object of the sciences. The use made by some of these realists of hylomorphism as an explanation of knowledge calls for critical revision. It is rather in the tradition of Kant and the idealism of Husserl that a matter-form analysis of knowledge is orientated. (4) The realists' platform makes a division between general and finite metaphysics. This division should be carefully reconsidered, to test whether it is of classical or rationalist origin. If it is consistently followed, it will transform metaphysics into a purely deductive discipline, which is unmindful of the origin of our metaphysical knowledge in sense experience of finite things and its constant reference to these objects. (5) Finally, it would be helpful to explain the significance of the historical plank which recognizes as a great present need the "prevention of the intrusion of dogmatic theological ideas and the resulting tendency to oppose medieval realism to that of the Greeks." This recommendation may refer to Gilson's studies in the meaning of Christian philosophy and the Thomistic emphasis upon the existential judgment. In Parker's essay, the importance of the existential judgment is acknowledged. The question then arises of whether we are here in the presence of a development beyond the Greeks, although not necessarily an opposition to them. The difficulty concerns how one is to harmonize the demand for a comprehensive synthesis of various realistic positions with the facts of historical development in the realistic outlook. There should be a realistic discussion of the relation between philosophical synthesis and history of philosophy.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University*

Berkeley. **By G. J. Warnock. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1953. Pp. 252. 50¢**

Of all the modern philosophers, Berkeley is the most congenial to the present fashion of linguistic analysis. Hence G. J. Warnock pays more than the usual amount of attention to the *New Theory of Vision* and the introduction to the *Principles of Human Knowledge.* The former work is a classical example of the analytic approach to sense perception and its objects. Berkeley is compelled to acknowledge the definite reference of statements about touch to real physical things. But Warnock points out that we also refer our perceptual statements about the other senses to real physical objects. From the analytic standpoint, therefore, the well-worn distinction between primary and secondary qualities breaks down. But the usage of common language does not support Berkeley's inference that this breakdown leads to a purely immaterialist interpretation of physical objects.

The author reflects contemporary semantic interest when he refers to the introduction to Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge* as "in many ways his most original and lively contribution to philosophy." Instead of emphasizing Berkeley's rejection here of abstract ideas, Warnock concentrates upon the treatment of language and meaning. In order to refute Locke's position on abstract ideas and matter, Berkeley holds that words need not always refer to things. Especially in the case of abstract general terms there is no such reference to individual objects in physical reality, but only to our way of using these terms. Although Berkeley denies that general terms are proper names for any singular things, he does permit them to have some unity of meaning. But Warnock's own restricted interest in language analysis prevents him from seeing the pivotal importance of the distinction between abstract and nonabstract general terms. Hence he does not explore the crucial question of the ultimate basis for the unified general meaning of terms in their legitimate usage. And yet that is one of Berkeley's major aims in this introduction and one of his least satisfactory explanations.

Warnock gives a close exposition of the remaining parts of this system. Unlike some analytic thinkers, he refrains from adopting a patronizing air toward Berkeley. He notes that modern analysts can well learn from Berkeley how to move from piecemeal consideration of particular issues to a total explanation of being or a philosophy. Warnock does not think that Berkeley's own immaterialism is the ultimate philosophical interpretation of experience and language. He seems to accept Hume's suggestion that mind can be dispensed with just as readily as matter. Yet he criticizes the assumption of

logical positivism that explanation consists primarily in the translation of common language into another, technical vocabulary. Instead, he recommends with Ryle that ordinary speech should be studied in its own setting and structure. This common-sense analytic approach has resulted in a sympathetic and vigorous study of Berkeley's thought, which is shown to be quite relevant to the current issues in philosophy, rather than just a quaint bypath of genius.

JOHN P. JELINEK, S.J. *Saint Louis University*

The Philosophy of Social Work. **By Herbert Bisno. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1952. Pp. x + 143. $3.25.**

This work is a first exploratory attempt to formulate the general philosophy which underlies the present theory and practice of social work in the United States. Making use of the writings and varied activities of professional leaders and workers in the field, the author tries to synthesize the fundamental concepts, attitudes, and values of social work, and thus to develop a philosophical basis for this comparatively new profession.

It must be admitted that any impetus given to such an important matter is of great significance, even though one may not agree with the conclusions drawn. Certainly the present work cannot be considered definitive, and the author himself would admit this. It seems that what value it does have—and this is perhaps its only value—lies in the extent to which it will stimulate others to make the necessary corrections and refinements, so that a basic philosophy of social work may gradually be made available.

Four important topics are discussed: (1) the nature of man, (2) the relations between men, (3) the functions and methods of social work, and (4) the need of social change. Of these four, the first must serve as a foundation for the others. No one could possibly formulate a philosophy of social work without first knowing the nature of man. Since social life consists in getting along with other human beings, the whole field of the social worker is reducible to the question, "How is man to be treated and thus helped in solving his many problems?" No one can answer this question intelligently until he is quite certain as to *what man is.* If the answer to this fundamental question is incorrect, all conclusions arrived at, however accurate the investigation and evaluation of experience may be, will be defective, since nothing subsequent to this can heal the defect at its roots.

Mr. Bisno, who is assistant professor of sociology and social work at the University of Oregon, shows that social workers in the United States hold

divergent views on the nature of man, even though they generally agree that each individual is of worth because of the very fact that he is a human being. There are three general views on the nature of man: man is a union of matter and spirit; man is only his body; and man is essentially only a spirit which is afflicted with a body that ought to be ignored or at least disparaged. It becomes evident that, unless some agreement is had as to what man's nature is, there can be no single philosophy of social work.

The position held by most Americans is that man is composed of body and soul, and has an afterlife. Yet, social workers in the United States, according to the writer, frequently disagree with this typically American view of man; and many refuse to accept the concept of an "unchanging entity to which we can attach the inclusive label, 'human nature.'" The author adopts behaviorism as his approach to the study of the nature of the individual and thus stresses the influence on behavior of emotional factors, experience, and culture. The "Thomistic postulates of free will" are rejected, since free will is identified with noncaused activity. Man, furthermore, is not "naturally" rational (p. 16) because his conduct is very frequently irrational. There are even human beings who will not act or be able to act rationally because they may have a "need" to be irrational. Since patterns of behavior are the result of the interaction of the individual's innate impulses with his life experiences, man is by nature amoral and asocial. Consequently, all human needs should be considered by social workers without any reference whatever to morality. From this deterministic concept of the nature of man, the author concludes that the means and techniques employed by social workers must be nonmoralistic. They must, likewise, reject the very idea of absolutes, of unchanging truths and moral standards, as well as the notions that there is any intrinsic value in suffering and any retributive value in punishment.

In arriving at what he calls the philosophy of "scientific" social work, the author makes frequent references to the principles advocated by Roman Catholic social workers. The Catholic philosophy he considers as "outside the main stream of social work thought" (p. 3) because it firmly holds to certain fixed unchanging moral principles as the framework on which human conduct must be patterned. The author intends to show how the "assumptions of Catholic social work" deviate from his own philosophy and are incompatible with the approach of the social-work profession. Thus his use of Catholic sources is limited to those which differ from his own principles, special stress being placed on the Catholic opposition to divorce and contraception. These latter in particular, he claims, make the Catholic social worker impose his will on his clients. Unfortunately, this constant contrasting of his own philosophy with the Catholic viewpoint is a hindrance to

acknowledging the many principles on which social workers of all religious faiths agree.

Briefly, the author's conclusions are that there is a definite philosophy underlying the methods and techniques of social work in the United States, although the principles of the "scientific" social worker are at present indefinite, confused, and frequently inconsistent. There is no uniform concept of human nature. In fact, many social workers have little or no knowledge of the nature and destiny of the man whom they are to help. Besides, they are not too certain, or at least not candid enough to admit, just what it is to which their clients must adapt themselves. Nevertheless, the methods of the social worker must be nonmoralistic and should be means which are suitable to adjust the individual to values now dominant in society, even though these may be debated and rejected by the social workers themselves. It is urgent, he holds, for social workers to engage in an intensive and extensive program of bringing their own social values to the consciousness of the public and thus to change "certain crucial philosophical tenets cherished by important elements of the American culture," since at the present time there is a very real conflict between the philosophy of social work and the American cultural pattern.

Careful consideration is given to the responsibility that the community has for the welfare of its citizens and to the fact that all classes of persons in the community have an equal right to the social services. The only criterion for giving assistance to any member of the community should be the need of the individual. Also emphasized is the social workers' obligation to work for fair labor standards. The place of the Federal Government in providing assistance in social planning is indicated, together with the dangers that would follow from total government control. An examination is also made of the reasons for the failure of social work to "sell its concepts" to influential groups. The author recognizes the need of social co-operation of all race and ethnic groups but thinks that there is a difficulty here for Catholic social work because different cultures have different moral standards.

The important contribution made by this book, in the judgment of the reviewer, is the emphasis placed upon the need of building a philosophical foundation for social work and the admission that such a philosophy must be based on a knowledge of the nature of man. By adopting the deterministic principles of the modern scientific method, however, and by insisting that only this method can give real and objective knowledge, the author fails to discover the true nature of man and, consequently, has a defective foundation for *his* philosophy of social work.

JOHN WILD, *Harvard University*

The Mind of Kierkegaard. **By James Collins. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953. Pp. xiv + 304. $4.50.**

Kierkegaard was ignored by his own contemporaries, and for sixty or seventy years after his death in 1855 his works remained unread. Now, however, they have been translated into all the major languages and are exerting an important influence on secular and religious thought throughout the world. Fragmentary insights have been appropriated by different thinkers, like Sartre and the Neo-Orthodox theologians, who have woven them into strikingly divergent patterns. This has brought forth many hasty and one-sided interpretations of Kierkegaard himself and a widespread confusion concerning the integral structure of his thought and its historical antecedents. Professor Collins's book is a well-informed and disciplined attempt to resolve this confusion. He has given us a penetrating study of Kierkegaard's mind which clearly exposes many current misconceptions.

One of the most important of these is the notion that the Danish thinker is a rabid anti-intellectualist with no respect for theoretical analysis, especially at the level of metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. Mr. Collins grants, of course, that Kierkegaard's barbed and bitter polemics against Hegelian idealism give some excuse for this idea (pp. 252 ff.). But this attack is based upon a clear grasp of the metaphysical distinction between essence and existence, and the profound difference between the ontological status of something merely contemplated before the mind and an essence in the act of existing *in rerum natura.* As Collins shows, "in his writings there is observable a definite strain of sustained, speculative reasoning" (p. 253). *Act* is carefully distinguished from potency (p. 249); the dialectical theory of change is rejected on empirical grounds and replaced by an Aristotelian analysis (pp. 114-6); and the necessity of an "efficient cause of change" is clearly recognized (p. 250).

We cannot hope to understand Kierkegaard's polemic against idealism unless we understand his distinction between *abstract* and *pure* thought. *Abstract thought* can give us genuine knowledge of essence and possibility as long as it recognizes its limits. But *pure thought,* à la Hegel, which "denies its original dependence upon a nonconceptual source, and claims to include existence and actuality within itself," is a delusion (p. 123). This is the meaning of Kierkegaard's attack upon speculative system building. The act of subjective existence cannot be *created* by human thought alone. But it can be truly recognized and accurately described. When we regard the matter objectively, apart from Hegelian prejudices, we can see that

Kierkegaard was not an anti-intellectualist at all but rather a pioneer of theoretical description and analysis, bringing the light of reason into those obscure regions of inner personal experience which had so long been neglected or distorted by subjective interpretation.

Kierkegaard's emphasis upon the role of the will in Christian faith, his reference to the act of choice as a "leap," and his assertion of an extreme discontinuity between religious existence and other levels of life have brought forth two seemingly opposed but allied misconceptions. On the one hand, there is the exclusively religious interpretation which dismisses the moral and psychological ideas of the early pseudonymous works as immature meanderings which were later superseded. On the other, there is the exclusively secular interpretation that dismisses the later religious writings as an imaginative construction which the author could not reconcile with his penetrating philosophical insights and did not himself really believe. Mr. Collins rightly rejects each of these one-sided views and the illicit bifurcation on which they are based. As he says, "it seems more sensible to admit the coherence of these two areas of thought in his own mind, and to weigh the whole outlook in a critical way" (p. 243).

In thus challenging the approaches of both crisis theologians and atheistic existentialists, Mr. Collins offers several pertinent reasons for interpreting Kierkegaard's extreme statements about Christian faith as "absurd" and "paradoxical" in the context of his historical situation and of his integral thought. In the first place, as he himself often reminds us, he is not a technical philosopher with an exact vocabulary but rather "a poet and thinker" who uses ordinary language loosely as the occasion requires. His studies of Hegel and of contemporary Christendom have convinced him of the acute danger of a purely "objective" approach to religion. Christianity is not just a doctrine but a way of existing. In view of this intense conviction which lies at the root of his whole life and thought, it is not surprising that at times his polemic language becomes exaggerated. Finally, Kierkegaard states specifically in his *Philosophical Fragments* that once we have made the religious "leap" we shall discover that reason is in secret accord with faith (p. 227). Is this not a recognition of the Augustinian principle that we must first believe in order to understand? It must be granted, though, that Kierkegaard goes much further than his predecessor in expressing a deep suspicion concerning intellectual motives of faith.

Nevertheless, as Collins points out (p. 85), *moral* motives are recognized. "When the ethical sphere remains open to a decisive religious influence, these two aspects of existence mutually strengthen each other and work toward the unity of the personality." There is a real sense in which the ethical

life, as conceived by Kierkegaard, is naturally ordered to religion. Furthermore, this ethical mode of life necessarily contains an intellectual factor, for it is quite clear, even in *Either/Or*, that it is governed by insight into a universal moral law that is normative for all men. This continuity between the ethical and the religious is increasingly clear in the later writings (as contrasted with *Fear and Trembling* which was published in 1843).

It is obscured in Collins's account by his failure to note the way in which the two terms are bracketed together as "the ethico-religious" and by his assumption that Kant exerted a predominant influence on Kierkegaard's view of ethics (pp. 81-2 and 87-8). This assumption seems to be unwarranted. The Kierkegaardian subject is in no sense noumenal. He acts in the world of nature. Neither he nor his practical reason lays down the law for himself, and there is no conflict between duty and interest. In the light of these facts it is far more reasonable to suppose that Kierkegaard's view of ethics was derived from classical and Christian sources.

Aside from this overemphasis upon Kant, Mr. Collins's account of the background of Kierkegaard's thought is useful and illuminating. Full justice is done to his deep and prolonged study of Plato and to his accurate knowledge and lifelong respect for Aristotle and for Aristotelian realism (cf. pp. 244 and 247). Careful attention is paid to his reading of Luther, and it is pointed out that "through Luther" he was led "to read a good deal in Augustine" (p. 244). The discussion of Trendelenburg (pp. 109-10) is particularly illuminating. It calls attention to an Aristotelian and realistic influence which has hitherto been neglected.

Though Collins admits that Kierkegaard's connection with Aquinas is "indirect" (p. 244), it is from a Thomistic point of view that he analyzes and judges the Danish thinker. The book ends with a comparison of the two philosophies with respect to five specific questions. The conclusion to which we are led is that, when examined in its entirety, the thought of Kierkegaard is far less opposed to Thomistic realism than is commonly supposed. One might even think of this Christian rebel against modern idealism as a somewhat isolated and exotic offspring of the central realistic tradition. There is some truth in this judgment. But in my opinion the orientation from which it emerges is rather unfortunate and has led the author to pass too rapidly over some of the most important and original phases of Kierkegaard's philosophy. This philosophy is far more closely related to Augustine and the Augustinian tradition. If Mr. Collins had used this as his standard of reference, I think that he might have given us a more rounded view, in which three points especially might have been focused with greater clarity.

According to Augustine, the knowledge of my own existence is the most certain of all truths. Even though I may be mistaken on all other matters,

I cannot be mistaken on this, for if I am mistaken, I am (*si enim fallor, sum*). My acts of existing are immediately revealed to me and may be described without distortion as they are. The Augustinian texts are filled with such descriptions of desire, memory, aspiration, and other inner acts. Indeed, his whole philosophy has been rightly characterized as "the translation of an inner experience." For the consistent idealist, such phenomenological description is impossible because the mind transforms its immediate object.

Kierkegaard rejected this idealistic conception and devoted himself to the attempt to describe certain existential data as they are given. This meant more than analyzing their essential structure and fitting them into a general scheme of classification. In addition, their modes of existing in the concrete must be grasped, and the authentic modes sharply distinguished from those that are unauthentic, as true and false *caritas* is distinguished in the *De Civitate Dei* (XIV, 7). This revival of an existential phenomenology with a focusing of existential norms (*how* an act should be done) rather than essential norms (*what* should be done) is a most important and influential phase of Kierkegaard's thought, which Collins passes over without careful analysis or comment. It is an essential phase of the Augustinian tradition.

From the Thomistic point of view, questions about the world of nature are regarded as primarily theoretical and are dealt with in the abstract and detached manner of pure science. There can be little question, however, that "the world" of common experience is determined at least in part by the basic direction and order of practical aspiration. Augustine was clearly aware of this fact and lucidly described ways in which the human will combines and separates items of sense experience, organizing them, together with memories and fantasies, into an ordered world (cf. *De Trinitate,* XI, 10). This same conception plays a vital role in the thought of Kierkegaard and has deeply influenced his followers. Different modes of existence determine different modes of understanding.

Thus in *Either/Or* Kierkegaard gives us exhaustive descriptions of the basic contrast between the world of the aesthetic person and that of the ethical. One divergent factor in particular absorbed his close attention. This was the factor of time, which in the ethical world is dominated by a stable purposive structure, including past and future as well as present, but which in the aesthetic world is dissolved into a discontinuous succession of moments. These studies of the lived time of concrete existence have been further developed by Heidegger and others. They are noteworthy and original variations of a recurrent Augustinian theme (cf. *Confessions,* Book XI) which are not clearly focused in this work.

The most striking omission, however, is the lack of any careful account of Kierkegaard's now famous descriptions of anxiety, the allied feelings of

boredom and melancholy, and his influential theories concerning their moral significance. Here again we are on Augustinian ground, for in the many criticisms of Stoic *apatheia* which fill the classic texts we find a deep respect for the human passions and a keen awareness of their inseparable connection with sound or unsound choices of the will (cf. *De Civitate Dei,* XIV, 8-9). But Kierkegaard's penetrating analysis of the difference between fear and anxiety, its relation to nothingness and to other similar emotions, and its moral position as the gateway to freedom is altogether original. It is somewhat surprising to find these ideas omitted from a book on the mind of Kierkegaard. They were certainly very much on his mind, as one may see by turning to the studies of Nero in *Either/Or* or to *The Concept of Dread.*

Professor Collins has written a sound and illuminating study of the relation between Kierkegaard and Thomistic realism. It corrects many misconceptions about Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel, his metaphysical presuppositions, his realistic epistemological views, his political ideas, and his attitude toward the Christian religion. But his moral and psychological analyses, the most original, and if I may say so, the most *existential* phases of his thought, are not thoroughly discussed or even sharply focused. Kierkegaard's thought as a whole is certainly much closer to the Augustinian than to the Thomistic tradition. Hence a disciplined study of his relation to Augustinian philosophy and theology would be more likely to do justice to the characteristic features of his mind and might prove to be even more illuminating. I hope that such a study may soon be forthcoming.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* The Modern Schoolman *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

Aaron, R. I. *John Locke.* New York: Oxford Book Co., 1954. $2.40.

Alighieri, Dante. *Dante's Paradise.* Ed. by Thomas G. Bergin. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954.

———. *Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri: A New Prose Translation.* Tr. by H. R. Huse. New York: Rinehart & Co.; Nov. 4, 1954. $5.00.

———. *On Monarchy and Three Political Letters.* Tr. by Donald Nicholl. New York: Noonday Press; Nov. 17, 1954. $2.75.

———. *Purgatory.* Tr. by Dorothy L. Sayers. Baltimore: Penguin Books; Nov., 1954.

Allport, Gordon W. *The Nature of Prejudice.* Boston: Beacon Press; Sept., 1954. Pp. 560. $7.00.

Almond, Gabriel A. *The Appeals of Communism.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1954. $6.00.

[Aristotle.] *Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics.* New York: Modern Lib., 1954. $1.45.

Artz, Frederick Binkerd. *The Mind of the Middle Ages A.D. 200-1500.* 2d ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954. Pp. 582. $6.00.

Augustine, St. *Treatises on Marriage.* Tr. by Roy J. Deferrari and others. New York: Fathers of the Church; Dec. 15, 1954.

Ayer, A. J. *Philosophical Essays.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. Pp. xi + 289. $4.50.

These twelve essays have previously appeared in journals or symposia and have been referred to by other authors. Having them available in a single book is an advantage. The author himself arranged the essays thus: three are concerned with questions of logic, five with the theory of knowledge, one with ontology, and three with moral philosophy (p. viii). The author has a reputation for his skill in linguistic analysis; and it is well known that he considers this the principal, if not the only, function of philosophy.

Baruch, Bernard. *A Philosophy for Our Time.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954. $2.00; paper, $1.00.

Bentley, Arthur Fisher. *Inquiry into Inquiries.* Ed. by Sidney Ratner. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. Pp. 381. $6.00.

Berenson, Bernard. *Aesthetics and History.* New York: Doubleday & Co.; Oct. 7, 1954. 85¢

Bergman, Hugo. *The Autobiography of Solomon Maimon.* New York: Farrar, Straus & Young, 1954. $2.50.

Blanshard, Brand. *On Philosophical Style.* Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press; Dec., 1954. $1.00.

Broglie, Louis de. *Physics and Microphysics.* New York: Pantheon Books; Jan. 15, 1955. $4.00.

Bryson, Lyman. *The Drive Toward Reason.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. 156. $2.50.

Burgess, Robert M. *Platonism in Desportes.* Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1954. Pp. 211. Paper, $2.50.

Burtt, Edwin Arthur. *The Metaphysical Foundation of Modern Physical Science.* Rev. ed. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954. Pp. 352. Paper, 95¢

Castell, Alburey. *An Elementary Ethics.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. 267. $4.65.

Ciarlantini, Lino. *The Liberty of the School and Family Education.* Steelton, Pa.: Colosseum, Box 435; 1954. $4.00; paper, $2.75.

Cole, George Douglas Howard. *Socialist Thought, Marxism and Anarchism, 1850-1890.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. Pp. 492. $6.00.

Cotton, James Harry. *Royce on the Human Self.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Nov., 1954. $6.00.

Cusanus, Nicolas. *Of Learned Ignorance.* Tr. by Germain Heron. Introd. by D. J. B. Hawkins. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 202. $4.00.

D'arcy, Martin Cyril, s.j. *St. Thomas Aquinas.* Westminster: Newman Press, 1954. Pp. 232. $3.75.

De Jesus-Marie, Bruno, o.c.d. (ed.). *Love and Violence.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1954. $4.00.

Descartes, René. *Geometry.* Tr. with French text by David Eugene Smith and Marcia L. Latham. New York: Dover Pubns., 1954. Pp. xiii + 244. $2.95; paper, $1.50.

This edition of the *Geometry* is a reprint of the Open Court edition of the translation, with the French text of 1637 printed in facsimile on facing pages. The translation is supplied with explanatory notes by the translators.

There is no need to emphasize the importance of this work for historians of science and mathematics, and students of scientific and mathematical methods. The translation is clear, careful, and accurate, though not strictly literal. The edition is well printed at a very reasonable price.

Dingle, Herbert. *Sources of Eddington's Philosophy.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1954. 75¢

Duverger, Maurice. *Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State.* Tr. by Barbara and Robert North. New York: Wiley & Sons, 1954. Pp. 476. $5.50.

Ebenstein, William. *Modern Political Thought; the Great Issues.* New York: Rinehart & Co., 1954. Pp. 823. $7.00.

Edman, Irwin. *John Dewey.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954. $3.00.

Ellis, Charles Mayo. *Essay on Transcendentalism.* Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints; Sept., 1954. $3.00.

Evans-Pritchard, Edward Evan, and Others. *The Institutions of Primitive Society.* Glencoe: Free Press, 1954. Pp. 115. $2.50.

Fairweather, A. M. (ed.). *Nature and Grace.* Vol. XI. Philadelphia: Westminster Press; Nov. 8, 1954. $5.00.

Fireman, Peter. *Perceptualistic Theory of Knowledge.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. x + 50. $2.75.

In opposition to a-priori and rationalistic accounts of knowledge, the author sets out the basic importance of perception in all knowledge. Unfortunately, he is very poorly equipped to write a theory of knowledge; he identifies idea, or concept, with the memory-image; his knowledge both of scientific method (even though he is a scientist) and of philosophy is inadequate; and he shows no acquaintance with humanistic or with religious knowledge.

Fleckenstein, Norbert J. *A Critique of John Dewey's Theory of the Nature and the Knowledge of Reality in the Light of the Principles of Thomism.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1954. Pp. 199. Paper, $2.25.

Fletcher, Joseph. *Morals and Medicine.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1954. $4.50.

Flood, Dom Peter. *New Problems in Medical Ethics.* 2d series. Tr. by Malachy Gerard Carroll. Westminster: Newman Press, 1954. Pp. 306. $4.50.

Fromm, Erich. *Sane Society.* New York: Rinehart & Co.; Jan., 1955. $4.00.

Ganss, George E., s.j. *St. Ignatius' Idea of a Jesuit University.* Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press; Oct., 1954.

Garnett, A. Campbell. *Religion and the Moral Life.* New York: Ronald Press; Jan., 1955.

Gilson, Etienne (ed.). *The Church Speaks to the Modern World: The Social Teachings of Leo XIII.* New York: Doubleday & Co.; Oct., 1954. 95¢

Glover, John Desmond. *The Attack on Big Business.* Boston: Harvard Univ. Graduate School of Business Administration, 1954. Pp. 391. $4.00.

Grabowski, Stanislaus J. *The All-Present God. A Study in St. Augustine.* St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1954. Pp. xi + 327. $4.50.

This study of the philosophical and theological doctrine of the divine presence begins with a brief account of the sources from which St. Augustine drew that doctrine. The contributions of Scripture and tradition are analyzed in detail. Then the doctrine itself is investigated, in general, with regard to its modes; and dynamic and static presence are distinguished. The last chapters study related problems—dualism, pantheism, the backgrounds of the Augustinian doctrine, the nature of Augustinian philosophy, and the relation of this doctrine to life.

There are indices of names and of subjects.

Gross, Feliks. *Foreign Policy Analysis.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. xxiv + 179. $3.75.

This book attempts to show how scientific methods could be applied to the study of foreign policy. The author first gives a good introduction to the scientific method; he then takes up the concept of causation in social processes and holds for a multiple causal (pluralistic) approach. The third chapter introduces the reader to the problems of terminology and the meanings of terms in the area of politics. In the second part of the book the author expounds his concept of the kind of analysis that would be scientific; according to him, it would embrace a triple analysis: of ideology and objectives, causal factors, and policies. In the third part, he returns to the notion of a scientific approach.

The ideas presented seem to be very good. Unfortunately, the style is jerky and sometimes extremely compressed; at times the author's ideas run far ahead of his words.

HADAMARD, JACQUES. *The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1954. Pp. xiii + 145. $2.50; paper, $1.25.

This treatise, which first appeared in 1945, is of great interest to mathematicians, psychologists, and philosophers, especially those engaged in the philosophy of science. The scientists will be interested in the careful descriptions and references to the psychological processes. Philosophers will find clear descriptions of the relations between thought, language, and imagery of all kinds. Philosophers of science will find very valuable discussions of the origins of new ideas, especially important for the discussion of the formation of new hypotheses.

HALLOWELL, JOHN HAMILTON. *The Moral Foundation of Democracy.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1954. Pp. 143. $3.50.

HARDING, ARTHUR L. *Natural Law and Natural Rights.* Dallas: Southern Methodist Univ. Press; Jan. 31, 1955. $3.00.

HARRIS, ERROL E. *Nature, Mind and Modern Science.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1954. $5.50.

HAWKINS, D. J. *Being and Becoming.* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1954. $3.00.

HAYAKAWA, S. I. *Language, Meaning and Maturity.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. $4.50.

HAYES, C. J. H. *Christianity and Western Civilization.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1954. $2.50.

HAZARD, PAUL. *European Thought in the Eighteenth Century.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1954. $6.00.

HÉRING, JEAN. *A Good and a Bad Government according to the New Testament.* Springfield: Charles C Thomas, 1954. Pp. v. + 68. $2.75.

This volume in the "American Lectures in Philosophy" series considers what traits a government must have in order to be in conformity with the teaching of the New Testament. There is some philosophical analysis of right and power, but very little. The author puts as the two main conditions for a good government, first, that it be not totalitarian and, second, that it work for right, especially justice.

HILARY OF POITIERS. *The Trinity.* Tr. by Stephen J. McKenna. New York: Fathers of the Church; Nov. 15, 1954.

HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON. *Law and Anthropology.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Dec., 1954. $7.50.

HOLBACH, BARON DE. *System of Nature: or Laws of the Moral and Physical World.* New York: Academic Press; Jan. 1955. $4.00.

HSU, FRANCIS L. K. *Aspects of Culture and Personality.* New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1954. $4.00.

HUGHES, ERNEST RICHARD (ed.). *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times.* New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1954. Pp. 401. $1.65.

HUIZINGA, J. *The Waning of the Middle Ages.* New York: Doubleday & Co.; Oct., 1954. 95¢

[HUME, DAVID.] *New Letters of David Hume.* Ed. by Raymond Klibansky and Ernest C. Mossner. New York: Oxford Book Co., 1954. $4.80.

HUXLEY, JULIAN SORELL, and OTHERS (eds.). *Evolution as a Process.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1954. Pp. 367. $4.25.

JAMMER, MAX. *Concepts of Space.* Foreword by Albert Einstein. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 212. $3.75.

JESSUP, FRANK W. (ed.). *Adult Education towards Social and Political Responsibility.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 143. Paper, 75¢

JONES, HOWARD MUMFORD. *Books and the Independent Mind.* Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1954. Pp. 22. Paper, 50¢

KREYCHE, ROBERT J. *Logic for Undergraduates.* New York: Dryden Press, 1954. Pp. x + 308. $2.90.

As the author himself remarks, this textbook is in harmony with "traditional" logic; and, as far as its matter is concerned, it is very similar to other "Scholastic" or "Aristotelian" books. It follows the traditional division of the acts of the mind into concept, judgment, and reasoning, and completes the analysis with chapters on the fallacies and on induction. It is distinguished from other books, first, by a more elaborate introduction than is commonly to be found, one that makes several excellent points; secondly, by its clear and lively style and its concrete and often interesting examples.

There are exercises attached to each chapter; there are a glossary of terms and an index.

LA BARRE, WESTON L. *The Human Animal.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1954. Pp. 386. $6.00.

LANDIS, BENSON Y., (ed.). *Ethics of Business and the Professions.* Philadelphia: American Academy of Political & Social Science; Jan., 1955. $2.00; cloth, $2.50.

LEBLANC, HUGHUES. *Introduction to Deductive Logic.* New York: John Wiley & Sons; Dec., 1954. $4.75.

LOCKE, JOHN. *Essays on the Law of Nature.* Tr. and ed. by W. Von Leyden. New York: Oxford Book Co., 1954. $5.60.

LUNGER, HAROLD L. *Political Ethics of Alexander Campbell.* St. Louis: Bethany Press; Oct. 15, 1954. $3.00.

MANNING, C. A. W. *The University Teaching of Social Sciences, International Relations.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 100. Paper, 75¢

Man's Right to Knowledge. 2d ser., *Present Knowledge and New Directions.* Muschel; Dec. 15, 1954. $1.00.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *An Essay on Christian Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1954. $2.75.

———. *Approaches to God.* Tr. by Peter O'Reilly. New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. xvi + 128. $2.50.

This translation is the first in a new series of books, called "World Perspectives," under the editorship of Ruth Nanda Anshen, who has contributed a brief statement of the plan (pp. vii-xiii).

The book contains five chapters. The first discusses the natural or prephilosophic knowledge of God. The second explains the five ways of Saint Thomas Aquinas. The third chapter presents a sixth way, based on the natural nontemporality of the intellect. The fourth chapter takes up the ways of the practical intellect: poetic experience, the choice of the good in the first act of freedom, and the testimony of the friends of God. The fifth chapter is a very brief explanation of the desire to see God. There is an appendix (pp. 115-28) of uncommented texts, two from the *Upanishads,* seven from the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas. There is no index.

This book should be read and studied by those trained in philosophy, by

educated men who want to have some understanding of the existence of God, and by students, even undergraduates.

———. *Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov. 1954. $6.00.

MARTIN, KINGSLEY. *Rise of French Liberal Thought: A Study of Political Ideas from Bayle to Condorcet.* 2d ed., rev., by J. P. Mayer. New York: New York Univ. Press; Oct. 6, 1954. $3.75.

MCCOY, RALPH E., and BROWN, RALPH A. *The Social Studies Teacher and Industrial Relations.* Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. Pp. 12. Paper, 10¢

MCDONNELL, ERNEST. *The Beguines and Beghards in Medieval Culture.* New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press; Nov., 1954. $10.00.

MCLAUGHLIN, P. J. *Modern Science and God.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. 89. $2.75.

First published in 1952, this little work is a translation of the allocution of Pope Pius to the Pontifical Academy of Science on November 22, 1951, together with explanatory notes. The address aroused great interest at the time, and it is good to have it in a more permanent form. The notes are intended to explain the address rather for the general reader than for the specialist.

The basic position—the compatibility of science, philosophy, and religion—is one of great importance for modern thought; and the problems that seem to be present are discussed eagerly by all kinds of people.

MELZER, JOHN HENRY. *Philosophy in the Classroom: A Report.* Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press; Oct., 1954. Paper, $2.50.

METZGER, CHARLES R. *Emerson and Greenough.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1954. Pp. 153. $3.00.

MEYER, ALFRED G. *Marxism—The Unity of Theory and Practice.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954. $3.50.

MICHELS, JOSEPH J. *Disorders of Character: Persistent Enuresis, Juvenile Delinquency and Psychopathic Personality.* Springfield: Charles C Thomas; Nov., 1954. $4.75.

MILLER, PERRY GILBERT EDDY, and OTHERS. *Religion and Freedom of Thought.* Foreword by Henry P. Van Dusen. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954. Pp. 64. Paper, $1.00.

MINIO-PALUELLO, L. (ed.). *Aristoteles Latinus—Pars Posterior.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Jan. 1955. $14.50.

MONTGOMERY, JOHN D. *The State versus Socrates: A Case Study in Civic Freedom.* Boston: Beacon Press; Oct., 1954. Pp. 247. $3.50.

MORGAN, M. C. *Freedom and Compulsion.* New York: St. Martin's Press; Dec., 1954. $6.00.

MOSSNER, ERNEST. *The Life of David Hume.* Austin: Univ. of Texas Press; Nov., 1954. $7.50.

MOUNIER, EMMANUEL. *Be Not Afraid.* Tr. by Cynthia Rowland. Foreword by Leslie Paul. New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. 230. $3.50.

NOTT, KATHLEEN. *The Emperor's Clothes.* Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1954. $4.00.

NOWELL-SMITH, P. H. *Ethics.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954. Pp. 324. Paper, 85¢

According to the author, the man who engages in advising people what they should do (concretely, but somewhat in general), is a moralist or an ethician; the one who tries to determine what ethical judgments mean is a

moral philosopher. In this book, Mr. Nowell-Smith acts as a moral philosopher, not as a moralist.

The author's first point is that ethical knowledge is practical, not speculative. On this ground he criticizes both naturalists and intuitionists. In the second part of the book he studies choosing and advising, motives, and the "good." In the third part, he studies duty, purpose, conscience, freedom, and responsibility.

The technique employed is that of analysis. The author rejects logical positivism, as do also most of the contemporary British analysts. Many of the points made are good; it is another question whether language analysis is adequate to the task it sets itself.

O'Meara, J. J. *The Young Augustine.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1954. $4.50.

Osborn, Harold. *Aesthetics and Criticism.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov. 16, 1954. $6.00.

Packe, Michael St. John. *The Life of John Stuart Mill.* New York: Macmillan Co.; Oct., 1954. $6.50.

Parsons, Talcott. *Essays in Sociological Theory.* Glencoe: Free Press, 1954. Pp. 459. $6.00.

Perspectives in Philosophy. Essays by Members of the Department of Philosophy. Columbus: Ohio State Univ., 1953. Pp. iv + 148. Paper.

Most of these essays have previously been given as papers at various meetings. The authors and their titles are: Joseph A. Leighton, "Jaspers' Existential Philosophy"; Albert E. Avey, "Whither Philosophy"; D. Luther Evans, "The Ego-Centric Prerogative"; Fritz Kaufmann, "Reality and Truth in History"; Robert S. Hartman, "The Analytic and the Synthetic as Categories of Inquiry"; William H. Reither, "Origins of the Cyrenaic and Cynic Movements"; Virgil C. Hinshaw, Jr., "The Empirically Given and the Philosophic Given"; Hazel E. Barnes, "Existentialism: Positive Contributions"; Marvin Fox, "Moral Facts and Moral Theory"; Robert McNaughton, "Contradiction, the Logical Counterpart to Conflict"; and Charles P. Bigger, "Prolegomena for an Aesthetic."

Petrazhitsky, L. I. *Introduction to the Study of Law and Morality, and Theory of Law and the State.* Tr. by Hugh W. Babb. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954. $7.50.

Piaget, Jean. *The Construction of Reality in the Child.* Tr. by Margaret Cook. New York: Basic Books, 1954. Pp. 399. $6.00.

Pieper, Josef. *The End of Time.* Tr. by Michael Bullock. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. Pp. 157. $2.75.

This little book is appropriately subtitled "A Meditation on the Philosophy of History." It is not a philosophy of history but rather a reflective study of what philosophy of history might be. The author distinguishes between the "theology of history" (which would be a study of what revelation has to say about the meaning of historical events) and the "philosophy of history," which makes use of revealed as well as all other pertinent data but is truly philosophical in its way of proceeding.

There are three chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter tries to make clear what a philosophy of history would be. The second chapter investigates both nihilism and optimistic progress in relation to what we know about the future. The third chapter takes up the notion of Antichrist. The conclusion takes up the psychological impact of a final catastrophe and of hope, to show that the Christian attitude is on the one hand acceptance and on the other activity.

There is an index.

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXVIII. Washington: Office of the Secretary of the Association, 1954. Pp. 282. Paper, $3.00.

The theme of the annual meeting of the association, held in Milwaukee April 20 and 21, 1954, was the existence and nature of God. The papers and discussion contained in this volume almost all center about this theme. The presidential address, by James Collins, is "God as a Function in Modern Systems of Philosophy." The association address, by Richard McKeon, "Contemporary French Philosophy," touches on problems concerning God only indirectly but dwells on a related problem of the starting point of philosophic enquiry. The four major papers—"Invalid Proofs of God's Existence," by Vernon J. Bourke; "Ordinary Knowledge and Philosophical Demonstration of God's Existence," by Peter W. Nash, S.J.; "The Prime Mover in Philosophy of Nature and in Metaphysics," by Vincent E. Smith; and "Duns Scotus and the Existence and Nature of God," by Allen B. Wolter, O.F.M.—deal directly with the major problem, the last two papers from partial points of view. The comments of Charles J. O'Niel on Dr. Bourke's paper and those of Ignatius Brady, O.F.M., on Father Wolter's paper are contributions of some importance. The round-table discussions are "The Philosophical Foundations of Aristotle's Logic and the Origin of the Syllogism," by Marian W. Heitzman and Anthony Nemetz; "The Meaning of Transcendental Unity," by Sister Cyril Edwin Kinney and Maur Burbach; "The Finality of Prime Matter," by James A. McWilliams, S.J.; "The Concept of Chance and Divine Providence," by John Harrington; "The Value of the Moral Argument for God's Existence," by John P. Rock, S.J., and Jeremiah Coleman, S.J.; "The Augustinian Proof for God's Existence and the Thomistic Fourth Way," by Gerard Esser, S.V.D., and Robert F. Harvanek, S.J.; "The Finite God in Modern Thought," by Thomas P. McTighe and Lottie Kendzierski. There are also included two papers of the joint session of the association and the National Catholic Educational Association, "Education's Need for Philosophy," by Michael J. McKeough, and "Some Principles in Christian Learning," by Leo R. Ward, C.S.C. Finally, there are the radio addresses, and the business reports and minutes of the meetings.

Public Education under Criticism. Ed. by C. Winfield Scott and Clyde M. Hill. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xiv + 414. $4.75.

This is an anthology of articles and excerpts from books dealing with criticism of the public schools, especially of elementary and secondary education and of the schools of education. The editor's policy has been to group the articles around major heads and then to present the articles in a pro and con fashion. In the sections that deal with the analysis of the causes of criticism and ways to meet it (Sections III and IV) the articles are mainly from the pro side of the controversy. These last two sections also, as an anthology should, present the curious reaction of some educators who are under fire: that all criticism is somehow unfair and antidemocratic, that criticism must be countered, not admitted.

There is an index.

RAEYMAEKER, LOUIS DE. *Truth and Freedom*. Pittsburgh, Duquesne Univ. Press. In preparation.

Readings in General Psychology. Ed. by Lester D. Crow and Alice Crow. "College Outline Series." New York: Barnes & Noble, 1954. Pp. x + 437. Paper, $1.75.

This book contains a hundred and ninety-five selections, most of them from very recent books and articles. It is very doubtful whether any advantage is gained from "extensive" reading in such short snippets. By and large the selections are representative and adequate. The single selection on

the nature of "meaning," however, is behaviorist and sensist—so much so that most of science could not be said to have any meaning since it does not "signalize an action or an object."

REAVER, J. RUSSELL. *Emerson as Mythmaker.* Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1954. Pp. 115. Paper, $2.00.

REULET, ANÍBAL SÁNCHEZ (ed.). *Contemporary Latin-American Philosophy.* Tr. from the Spanish and Portuguese by Willard R. Trask. Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1954. Pp. 305. $5.00.

ROOS, H. *Kierkegaard and Catholicism.* Westminster: Newman Press, 1954. $2.50.

ROSENBERG, MAX. *Introduction to Philosophy.* New York: Philosophical Lib.; Oct., 1954. $6.00.

ROTH, LEON. *Jewish Thought as a Factor in Civilization.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 64. Paper, 40¢

ROUSSEAU, JEAN-JACQUES. *The Social Contract.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954. Pp. 162. $2.75.

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SARTON, GEORGE. *Ancient Science and Modern Civilization.* Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1954. $2.50.

SCHELER, MAX FERDINAND. *The Nature of Sympathy.* Tr. by Peter Heath. Introd. by W. Stark. 5th ed. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 328. $5.00.

SCHIFFER, WALTER. *The Legal Community of Mankind.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 377. $5.50.

SCHILLER, FREDERICH VON. *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters.* Tr. by Reginald Snell. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 151. $3.00.

SCHLEICHER, CHARLES P. *Introduction to International Relations.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xvi + 941. $6.75.

This is an introductory textbook. Since the field of study has only recently been clearly established, there is inevitably some unsatisfactoriness in any account of it, and such a difficulty should not be charged against a book. However, there are two points of this particular book which need notice. First, the author defines politics as "control over the actions of others" (p. 85); that is, as "the use of power." There is no consideration of the goal or end as specifying factor; the author indeed considers goals as external. This incomplete definition naturally makes it impossible to identify a political society; it enables the author to get every kind of society into his book but does not help him to find his way around. The second difficulty is his failure to take a reasoned stand on the nature of international law. He finds that the "natural law theory" of international law is "absurd" and that the positivist, or conventional, theory is not "very convincing" (pp. 185-94). The result is that his own treatment of international law is neither clear nor convincing.

SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH ALOIS. *Economic Doctrine and Method.* Tr. from the German by R. Aris. New York: Oxford Press, 1954. Pp. 207. $3.50.

SIMON, YVES R., and OTHERS. *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas, Basic Treatises.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Oct., 1954. $10.00.

SMITH, HENRY P. *Psychology in Teaching.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xiii + 466. $4.95.

This is a textbook in educational psychology for prospective teachers. It aims to provide such a knowledge as will be useful for the teacher rather than the kind of psychological knowledge that would be appropriate for

a specialist in psychology. In many ways the book is admirably adapted to this end; it avoids technical terms and refinements of detail that are unnecessary; it is well and interestingly written and has helpful bibliographies.

There are also many inadequacies. The interpretation of emotion and attitude is made partial and superficial by the analysis in terms of "love objects" (p. 63). Throughout, the emphasis is on social approval and social acceptability. Too great a dependence on one type of psychological theory leads the author to suggest that all children should be equally rewarded. Though he insists that the school's primary job is to induce learning (e.g., p. 13), he does not seem to consider the teacher's knowledge as a significant factor.

SMITH, MORTIMER. *The Diminished Mind.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; Oct., 1954. $2.75.

SMITH, VINCENT EDWARD. *St. Thomas on the Object of Geometry.* Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 99. $2.00.

SNYDER, LOUIS L. *The Meaning of Nationalism.* Foreword by Hans Kohn. New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press; Oct., 1954. $4.50.

SOAL, S. G., and BATEMAN, FREDERICK. *Modern Experiments in Telepathy.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Oct. 20, 1954. $5.00.

STIERNOTTE, ALFRED P. *God and Space-Time.* Foreword by Henry Nelson Wieman. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. xxvii + 455. $3.00.

This study of Samuel Alexander's philosophy of religion is viewed as a step in determining the nature of religion and the object of the philosophy of religion. The book is divided into two parts. Part I is an exposition of Alexander's thought, with chapters on his realism, his notion of God, religious consciousness, and value. Part II is an evaluation and criticism. This begins with a summary of Alexander's philosophy as a whole. The second chapter of this part criticizes Alexander's notion of Deity; the third has the notion of value and of personality. The fourth part considers what is left of Alexander's philosophy: his basic realism and his concern with metaphysics, time and process as important and basic, his recognition of religious experience as distinctive, and his conception of divinity as nisus.

Struggle for Tomorrow. Modern Political Ideologies of the Jewish People. Ed. by Feliks Gross and Basil J. Vlavionos. New York: Arts, Inc., 1954. Pp. 303. $6.50.

This book contains thirteen essays on political theories and movements of the Jewish people of the modern period. These essays are grouped into seven parts, dealing with the general topics of Zionism, territorialism, Bundism, religious political movements, assimilationism, Volkism, and some universal movements. All these essays are written by experts in their respective fields.

This is a valuable reference work. It is well indexed and contains useful bibliographies.

SWABEY, MARIE C. *Logic and Nature.* 2d rev. ed. New York: New York Univ. Press; Dec., 1954. $3.75.

TEMPLE, G. *The Classic and Romantic in Natural Philosophy.* New York: Oxford Book Co., 1954. Pp. 22. Paper, 20¢

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. *Truth.* Vol. III, qu. XXI-XXIX. Tr. by Robert W. Schmidt, S.J. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954. Pp. xiii + 530. $7.50.

This is the third and final volume of the translation of the *De Veritate;* the other two volumes have already been published. This final volume contains a brief introduction by the translator, in which he explains the connection of these nine questions on good and the will with the rest of the work by interpreting them as investigations of practical truth. The volume also con-

tains a very valuable index of sources (for all three volumes) and an index of selected subjects (also for all three volumes).

TOMLIN, E. W. F. *Simone Weil.* "Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought." New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Oct. 20, 1954. $2.50.

TRAUGOTT, JOHN. *Tristram Shandy's World: Sterne's Philosophical Rhetoric.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; Nov. 15, 1954. $3.00.

TRETHOWAN, ILLTYD, O.S.B. *An Essay in Christian Philosophy.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1954. $3.00.

Truth and the Philosophy of Teaching. "The McAuley Lectures," 1953. West Hartford, Conn.: Saint Joseph College, 1954. Pp. 28. Paper, $1.00.

The first publication of the "McAuley Lecture Series" contains two addresses: "The Eminence of Teaching," by Etienne Gilson, and "Teaching and the Freedom to Learn," by Anton C. Pegis. Dr. Gilson gives an analysis of what it means to teach, in terms of the kind and nature of causality that goes into that act. Dr. Pegis focuses on the problem of the authority of a teacher and the intellectual freedom of the student, and his solution comes to this, that the teacher's authority is based on his mastery and bears on the communicability of what he is teaching; the student's freedom is based on his intellectual nature and bears on the truth of what is taught.

VAN BREDA, HERMAN LEO, O.F.M. *Philosophical Experience of Nature.* Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press. In preparation.

VAN DEN BERG, J. H. *Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry: An Introduction to Recent Phenomenological Psychopathology.* Springfield: Charles C Thomas; Jan., 1955.

VAN LAER, HENRY, with KOREN, HENRY J. *The Philosophy of Science.* Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press. In preparation.

VAN MELSEN, ANDREW G. *The Philosophy of Nature.* 2d ed. "Duquesne Studies," No. 2. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1954. Pp. xii + 263. $4.50; paper, $3.75.

This is a second edition of a work previously reviewed in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXI (1953), 52. The second edition contains minor corrections and some expansion in a few places. The basic positions are not modified.

VIVAS, ELISEO. *Creation and Discovery: Essays in Criticism and Aesthetics.* New York: Noonday Press, 1954. $5.00.

WHEELWRIGHT, PHILIP. *The Burning Fountain.* Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1954. $6.00.

———. *The Way of Philosophy.* New York: Odyssey Press, 1954. Pp. xv + 617. $4.50.

This is a textbook for an introductory course in philosophy. The book is divided into four parts: the first part discusses the meaning and method of philosophy; the second, the world of nature; the third, the mind, freedom, and other selves; the fourth, values. After each part a number of rather extensive readings from philosophical classics are given (most of the translations are the author's own).

According to the author, philosophies can be classified as materialism, transcendentalism, and humanism (depending on the ultimate standard of reference). The author's own personal preference is for humanism; in other areas he prefers "contextual realism" to both materialism and idealism, freedom to both determinism and complete indeterminism. He does not intend to exclude religion from life or thought, but he tends to see it mainly in terms of its value to man.

Philosophically, it may be questioned whether contextual realism adequately represents metaphysical realism. From another point of view, it

is doubtful whether the presentation of religion as having humanistic values is adequate to the full range of the problem of faith and reason. These deficiencies make it impossible to give the book an unqualified recommendation; yet it may occasionally be of value to a teacher or for supplementary reading.

WHYTE, LANCELOT LAW. *Accent on Form: An Anticipation of the Science of Tomorrow.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. 209. $2.75.

[WILLIAM OF ST. THIERRY.] *Meditations of William of St. Thierry.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. $1.50.

WIMSATT, W. K., JR. *The Verbal Icon. Studies in the Meaning of Poetry.* With two preliminary essays in collaboration with Monroe C. Beardsley. Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1954. Pp. xviii + 299. $4.00.

These sixteen essays, which have previously appeared in various journals and collections, have been revised for this book. The author has grouped them in the following way: the first group deals with some errors which the author believes are to be found in some kinds of criticism; the second and third, with some things which criticism should consider; the fourth, with the relation of literature and literary criticism to the Western tradition.

This is an important volume of studies, and its publication will serve to consolidate and make more permanent an already far-reaching influence.

WOODWORTH, ROBERT SESSIONS, and SCHLOSBERG, HAROLD. *Experimental Psychology.* New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1954. Pp. 959. $8.95.

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DESCARTES, RENÉ. *Geometry.* Tr. with the French text by David Eugene Smith and Marcia L. Latham. New York: Dover Pubns., 1954. Pp. xiii + 244. $2.95; paper, $1.50.

FIREMAN, PETER. *Perceptualistic Theory of Knowledge.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. x + 50. $2.75.

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HADAMARD, JACQUES. *The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1954. Pp. xiii + 145. $2.50; paper, $1.25.

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Highway Safety and Driver Education. Ed. by Leon Brody and Herbert J. Stack. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. Pp. xvi + 464. $4.50.

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Introduction to Theology. Ed. by A. M. Henry, O.P. Tr. by William Storey. Chicago: Fides, 1954. Pp. xiv + 306. $5.95.

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MARITAIN, JACQUES. *Approaches to God.* Tr. by Peter O'Reilly. New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. xvi + 128. $2.50.

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Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXVIII. Washington: Office of the Secretary of the Association, 1954. Pp. 282. Paper, $3.00.

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THOMAS A KEMPIS. *The Imitation of Christ.* Ed. by Wm. D. Ryan. Chicago: Lumen Books, 1954. Pp. 173. Paper, 50¢

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